Earl v. Briggs

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 12, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-01679
StatusUnknown

This text of Earl v. Briggs (Earl v. Briggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Earl v. Briggs, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ DARYISE L. EARL,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-1679-pp

A. BRIGGS,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Daryise L. Earl, who is incarcerated at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution (KMCI) and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant retaliated against him by deliberately withholding his medication. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On December 19, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $4.60. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on January 4,

2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must

dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as the sole defendant Kettle Moraine Correctional Officer A. Briggs. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶3. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant applied “a bias[ed] application to KMCI’s policies and procedures to either

prevent, or frustrate, [the plaintiff’s] ability to utilize the institution’s law library, the collect calling system, and prisoners’ visitations.” Id. at ¶5. The plaintiff says he “made complaints, verbally and written,” about the defendant’s behavior. Id. at ¶6. The plaintiff alleges that at 10:50 a.m. on May 21, 2023, he and the defendant were passing each other as the plaintiff walked toward his assigned room. Id. at ¶7. He says the defendant did not walk around him but instead “tried to squeeze through the small space between him and a table.” Id. at ¶8. He

says the defendant “made physical contact with” his right side while he was focused on a television off to his left side. Id. at ¶¶9–10. The plaintiff says he believed the defendant was trying “to provoke him to make an ignorant outburst,” so he “asked [the defendant] what was her problem.” Id. at ¶11. The defendant told the plaintiff to “stay out of her way or there would be a problem.” Id. at ¶12. KMCI Captain Howe (not a defendant) entered the housing unit a short time later. Id. at ¶13. The plaintiff tried to explain the incident to Howe, who told the plaintiff “that he would review the institution’s camera system and

discuss this matter with [the defendant].” Id. at ¶14. The plaintiff alleges that at around 4:50 p.m. the same day, the defendant gave him a carbon copy receipt of a medical supply refill request that the plaintiff had submitted to obtain a refill of his sinus medication, Loratadine. Id. at ¶15. The plaintiff says he had submitted the form to medical staff the previous day, and staff had returned the form to him to advise him that his medication had been issued. Id. at ¶¶16–17. The plaintiff says that medical staff

sends requested medication to the incarcerated person’s housing unit “in a locked-bag.” Id. at ¶18. A unit officer digitally scans the incarcerated person’s identification card and the bar code on the medication to record the date and time the officer distributed the medication. Id. at ¶¶19–21.

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Earl v. Briggs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/earl-v-briggs-wied-2024.