Eagle Insurance v. Johnson

982 F. Supp. 1456, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17135, 1997 WL 677597
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedOctober 30, 1997
DocketCIV. A. 97-T-579-N
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 982 F. Supp. 1456 (Eagle Insurance v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eagle Insurance v. Johnson, 982 F. Supp. 1456, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17135, 1997 WL 677597 (M.D. Ala. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, Chief Judge.

On September 16, 1997, the court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Eagle Insurance Co. and against defendant Deloris Carter Johnson. This cause is now before the court this time'on Johnson’s motion to re-tax costs. Eagle Insurance seeks court costs in the amount of $11,597.04. A hearing was held on the motion on October 22, 1997.

I. BACKGROUND

Eagle Insurance issued an insurance policy on a vehicle involved in .a car accident with Johnson on May 5,1995. Johnson brought a state-court- lawsuit, which Eagle Insurance defended against the driver and the owner in state court. Johnson received a 3.5 million dollar judgment in her lawsuit. Johnson claimed that the limits of liability stated in the policy should be extended based on federal and State laws governing ‘motor carriers’ to cover the entire judgment.

*1458 Eagle Insurance responded with this federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of limited liability against Johnson. In a memorandum opinion and judgment entered on September 16, 1997, this court found that Eagle Insurance was entitled to summary judgment limiting its liability to Johnson to $20,000.00. Johnson now objects in part to Eagle Insurance’s request for costs in the amount of $11,597.04.

II. DISCUSSION

The ‘prevailing party1 in an action brought in federal court is presumptively entitled to the cost of that action. Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(d). Admittedly, this ease was disposed of on summary judgment. However, the fact that a court disposes of the case at the summary judgment stage is no impediment to an award of costs, provided that they were otherwise reasonably necessary for use in the case. Hudson v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 758 F.2d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir.1985). The court, therefore, will now consider each, cost item sought by Eagle Insurance.

Fees of the Clerk: Eagle Insurance seeks $200 for fees of the clerk. Johnson objects to $50.00, which one of Eagle Insurance’s attorneys incurred as cost for admission to practice in this court pro hac vice. The attorney paid $20.00 for his actual admission pro hac vice, and he paid $30.00 for obtaining a certificate of good standing, which the clerk of the court required in support of the pro-hac-viee petition. Eagle Insurance refers to Davis v. Puritan-Bennett Corp., 923 F.Supp. 179 (D.Kan.1996) for the proposition that the $50.00 fee for admission pro hac vice is taxable as cost. There, the court wrote that,

“Plaintiff also objects to taxation of the $40.00 clerk’s fees for the defendant’s pro hac vice motions. She argues that the pro hac vice motion local filing fee should not attach to this case because a single filing fee is valid for all cases within the same calendar year in which the attorney enters an appearance pro hac vice. Plaintiff ignores the fact that these motions were specifically and necessarily filed in response to her suit. Plaintiff selected the forum and compelled defendant to defend itself in this district. The court finds that the fee is appropriate under [28 U.S.C.A.] § 1920(1).”

923 F.Supp. at 181. This court cannot agree with this reasoning. The Davis court, essentially and improperly, treats ‘costs’ as synonymous with ‘expense.’

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that “costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-45, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2497-99, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that Rule 54(d)(1) gives district courts the discretion to ‘decline’ to tax allowable costs, but not the discretion to tax costs in the absence of statutory authorization. The ‘costs’ authorized by Rule 54(d)(1) is a term of art not synonymous with expense. 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.103, at 54-174.

In other words, expense includes all the expenditures actually made by a litigant in connection with the lawsuit. 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, at 173. Whereas the costs that the district court may award under Rule 54(d)(1) are listed in 28 U.S.C.A § 1920, and a district court may not award other costs or exceed the amounts provided in § 1920 without explicit authorization in another statutory provision. 10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.103[3][a], at 54-176. The costs, therefore, associated with litigation, almost always will amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in connection with the lawsuit. 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, at 173. However, “[although § 1920 is an exhaustive list of the costs that may be routinely awarded under Rule 54(d)(1), the item sought need not be expressly mentioned in that statute, for Crawford Fitting does not preclude the courts from construing the provisions of § 1920.” 10 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 54.103[3][a], at 54-176-77.

Here, subsection (1) of § 1920, the subsection relied upon by Eagle Insurance, provides for the taxation of the “Fees of the clerk” as costs. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914 lists, in turn, the fees the clerk of the court may charge. Section 1914 provides:

*1459 “(a) The clerk of each- district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $150, except that on application for a writ of habe-as corpus the filing fee shall be $5.
(b) The clerk shall collect from, the parties such additional fees only as are prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
(c) Each district court by rule or standing order may require advance payment of fees.”

Together, § 1920(1) and § 1914 authorize the clerk of the court to collect and tax two types of fees in civil actions other than those for habeas corpus: (1) a $150 filing fee; and (2) any additional fees prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The pro-hac-vice fee Eagle Insurance seeks is, of course, not the same as the $150 filing fee authorized by § 1914. The question, therefore, for the court is whether the pro-hac-vice fee is one authorized by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

‘Pro hae vice’ means “[f]or this turn,” that is, “for this one particular occasion.” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1091 (1979). An admission pro hae vice, therefore, means that a lawyer has been “admitted to practice in a jurisdiction for a particular case only.” Id.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
982 F. Supp. 1456, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17135, 1997 WL 677597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eagle-insurance-v-johnson-almd-1997.