E. W. Bliss Company v. United States

426 F.2d 12, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1138, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9368
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 7, 1970
Docket19576
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 426 F.2d 12 (E. W. Bliss Company v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
E. W. Bliss Company v. United States, 426 F.2d 12, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1138, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9368 (6th Cir. 1970).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

The taxpayer, E. W. Bliss Company, sued to recover excess profits taxes in the sum of $252,666.62 paid for the year 1952. District Judge James C. Connell found for the Government and dismissed the complaint. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm.

Decision of the case requires interpretation of § 446 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. 1 Pertinent sections of this statute, including § 446, are made Appendix A to this opinion.

The question presented on this appeal is whether the taxpayer was entitled to include corporate stock which it owned in other corporations in its “total assets” for the purpose of calculating its “average base period net income.”

In 1950, 1951 and 1952 the taxpayer qualified as a member of the depressed industry subgroup designated as “Manufacture of Metalworking Machinery, Including Machine Tools.” The taxpayer was so classified by the Secretary of the Treasury under § 446(c) for the period 1946 through 1948. It is undisputed that the taxpayer is entitled to compute its *13 average base period net income pursuant to § 446 because it was a member of this depressed industry subgroup.

After receiving a notice of deficiency from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the taxpayer paid the disputed taxes and interest on September 1, 1959, and filed a timely claim for refund which was disallowed. This suit then was filed for recovery of the taxes and interest.

The taxpayer owned corporate stock (other than stock in a foreign personal holding company or stock which is not a capital asset) on the last day of each year of its base period (1946-1949) in the following amounts:

1946 $1,582,315
1947 1,836,699
1948 3,060,859
1949 3,068,859

In computing its average base period net income pursuant to § 446(b) the taxpayer included its corporate stock owned in other corporations in its total assets for the last day of each of the years of its base period. The Commissioner eliminated this stock from the taxpayer’s total assets as inadmissible assets under § 440(a) (1) (Appendix A). The result was to reduce the taxpayer’s excess profits credit 2 for the year 1952 and its carryovers to 1952 of its unused excess profits credits from 1950 and 1951 and to produce a deficiency of excess profits tax and interest for 1952, which is the subject of the present litigation. The taxpayer contends in this Court, as it did in the District Court, that it was entitled to include the corporate stock in question in its total assets for purposes of computing its “average base period net income” pursuant to § 446(b).

This appeal thus presents a question of statutory construction, i. e., the meaning of the words “total assets” as that term appears in § 446(b). To determine the meaning of total assets we examine the language and purpose of the excess profits credit provisions of which § 446 (b) is an integral part.

The excess profits credit was designed to exclude from a taxpayer’s current earnings subject to the excess profits tax that portion thereof which would have been earned if there had not been an increase in profits because of the wartime economy. For corporate excess profits tax purposes, this credit was based upon average net income during the base period years, 1946-49 (which net income is used as a measure of normal profits) and was allowed against the amount of income otherwise subject to the tax. The credit was intended to eliminate from a taxpayer’s current earnings that portion which reflected a taxpayer’s normal “earning capacity in the absence of hostilities in Korea or a large program of military expenditures.” S.Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1951). Accord: H.Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1950); see Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303-304, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859.

Generally the credit was based upon a taxpayer’s average net income realized during the base period years 1946 through 1949 as a measure of normal earnings, or on its invested capital, whichever yielded the lesser tax. In a number of situations, however, the statute recognized that during the base period income might have been abnormally low or the business situation of the taxpayer might have been changing substantially, making the actual base period income an inadequate measure of normal earnings. Congress therefore wrote into the statute certain “general relief” sections, of which § 446 is one. These sections provide that under such circumstances a taxpayer could compute his excess profits credit by using a substitute or constructive base period income. In the present case the taxpayer was allowed to use a substitute base period income because it was a member of an industry subgroup determined by in *14 come statistics to be depressed during the base period. The substitute base period was determined by multiplying the taxpayer’s total assets by an adjusted rate of return for its industry subgroup. Under the provisions of §§ 442, 443, 444 and 445 immediately preceding § 446 in the Act, four other groups of taxpayers also were entitled to the benefits of the general relief provisions and used essentially the same formula applicable in the present case for determining their substitute average base period net incomes. These were taxpayers whose incomes during the base period were inadequate as a measure of their normal income because of: (1) production interruptions or temporary business depression (§ 442); (2) a substantial change in products or services (§ 443); (3) increase in capacity for production or operation (§ 444); or (4) their commencing business as a new corporation during the base period (§ 445).

In each of the four situations covered by §§ 442-445 described in the preceding paragraph, a taxpayer was required to eliminate from its total assets those assets which were defined as inadmissible assets by § 440(a). Under § 440(a) (see Appendix A) one of the definitions of inadmissible assets is stock in corporations, (except stock in a foreign personal holding company, and except stock which is not a capital asset).

The exclusion of inadmissible assets from total assets under §§ 442-445 was accomplished by a specific definition in §§ 442(f) and 445(b) and (c) and by cross reference in § 443(g) (2) and 444 (g) (2) (see Appendix A). No such exclusionary language or cross reference appears in § 446.

The issue in this case is whether the District Court was correct in holding that the term total assets appearing in § 446(b), relating to the excess profits credit of the taxpayer and other members of depressed industry subgroups, should be construed as eliminating inadmissible assets (in this case stock owned in other corporations) despite the absence of any cross reference in § 446 to § 440(a) or § 442(f).

The Government relies upon the fact that dividends on the stock owned by the taxpayer in other corporations were not subjected to the excess profits tax.

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Bluebook (online)
426 F.2d 12, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1138, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/e-w-bliss-company-v-united-states-ca6-1970.