Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 21, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00386
StatusUnknown

This text of Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz (Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-00386-VBF-MAR Document 3 Filed 01/21/22 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:22-cv-386-VBF (MAR) Date: January 21, 2022 Title: Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz et al. Present: The Honorable: MARGO A. ROCCONI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ERICA BUSTOS N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Defendants: N/A N/A Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

I. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2009, a grand jury indicted Petitioner Dywane Tousant (“Petitioner”) on one (1) count of sexual exploitation of a child (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) and 2). United States v. Dorrough, et al., No. 3:09-CR-1250-W (S.D. Cal. April 1, 2009), ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. On October 30, 2009, a superseding indictment was issued charging one (1) count of sexual exploitation of a child (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) and 2), one (1) count of sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, and coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), (b) and 2), and one (1) count of attempted sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, and coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b), § 1594 and 2). Id., Dkt. 54. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Plaintiff subsequently pled guilty to count 2 of the superseding indictment on November 2, 2009. Id., Dkt. 56, 58. On June 2, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Petitioner to one hundred twenty (120) months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to Petitioner’s fifteen (15) month state court sentence in case number SCS225068. Id., Dkt. 126, 132. On October 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea, which was denied. Id., Dkt. 251, 255.

On November 4, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Id., Dkt. 256; see also Dywane Tousant v. United States, No. 3:21-CV-1905-W. The motion remains pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California with a briefing schedule and reply due by April 11, 2022. Id., Dkt. 265.

On January 18, 2022, Petitioner constructively1 filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“section 2241”). Dkt. 1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Lompoc Federal Correctional Institution. Id. The Petition alleges various consitutuional claims, including the denial of the effective assistance of counsel and a failure to include lesser included offenses in the indictment. Id. at 2-4. Furthermore, Petitioner appears to

1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).

CV-90 (03/15) Civil Minutes – General Page 1 of 4 Case 2:22-cv-00386-VBF-MAR Document 3 Filed 01/21/22 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 2:22-cv-386-VBF (MAR) Date: January 21, 2022 Title: Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz et al. argue that he filed this action in the Central District of California for “immediate relief due to ex post facto violations.” Id. at 5.

II. DISCUSSION

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION

1. Applicable law

A petitioner challenging “the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution” must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 in the custodial court. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, section 2255 “provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of detention.” Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). A petitioner challenging “the legality of his sentence” must file a motion to vacate his sentence under section 2255 and “§ 2255 motions must be heard in the sentencing court.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000).

There is, however, an exception to this general rule that a section 2255 challenge to the legality of detention must be filed in the sentencing court. Under the “escape hatch” of section 2255, a federal prisoner may challenge the legality of detention in the custodial court if, and only if, the remedy under section 2255 in the sentencing court is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner may file under section 2255’s escape hatch in the custodial court “when the prisoner: ‘(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.’ ” Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898).

With respect to the first prong of section 2255’s escape hatch, an actual innocence claim requires a petitioner to “demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614(1998)). With respect to the second prong of section 2255’s escape hatch, whether the petitioner has not had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting his actual innocence claim, the Court must consider: “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CV-90 (03/15) Civil Minutes – General Page 2 of 4 Case 2:22-cv-00386-VBF-MAR Document 3 Filed 01/21/22 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 2:22-cv-386-VBF (MAR) Date: January 21, 2022 Title: Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz et al. 2. Analysis

Here, Petitioner does not challenge “the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution.” See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956. Rather, Petitioner appears to challenge the legality of his 2009-2010 conviction and sentence. See Dkt. 1 at 7–10.

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Related

Bousley v. United States
523 U.S. 614 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Roberts v. Marshall
627 F.3d 768 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Alaimalo v. United States
645 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Edwin Marrero v. Richard Ives
682 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Harrison v. Ollison
519 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Hernandez v. Campbell
204 F.3d 861 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
Dywane Tousant v. B. Birkholz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dywane-tousant-v-b-birkholz-cacd-2022.