Dylan Nathan Hagerman v. the State of Texas

Opinion

NUMBER 13-21-00012-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DYLAN NATHAN HAGERMAN, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Comal County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Dylan Nathan Hagerman was convicted of driving while intoxicated with

an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor, and he was

sentenced to 365 days in jail, to be probated for a period of twenty months. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(d). Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders

brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a

motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed

appellant of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that

1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a

docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

2 response, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous;

and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record

that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within

ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant filed a motion seeking pro se

access to the appellate record which was granted on September 27, 2021. Appellant

requested a thirty-day extension from the time of receipt of the record to file his pro se

response, which was also granted. Appellant received the record on October 4, 2021. An

adequate amount of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s amended motion to withdraw.

3 Within five days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy

of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file

a petition for discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the 28th day of July, 2022.

2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.