Dyersville Ready Mix Inc. v. Iowa County Board of Supervisors

CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 20, 2022
Docket2021AP001608
StatusUnpublished

This text of Dyersville Ready Mix Inc. v. Iowa County Board of Supervisors (Dyersville Ready Mix Inc. v. Iowa County Board of Supervisors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dyersville Ready Mix Inc. v. Iowa County Board of Supervisors, (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION NOTICE DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. October 20, 2022 A party may file with the Supreme Court a Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1608 Cir. Ct. No. 2020CV36

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

DYERSVILLE READY MIX INC. D/B/A BARD MATERIALS,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

IOWA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND IOWA COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMITTEE,

DEFENDANTS-CO-APPELLANTS,

TOWN OF BRIGHAM,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Iowa County: MARGARET MARY KOEHLER, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Before Kloppenburg, Graham, and Nashold, JJ. No. 2021AP1608

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. The Town of Brigham, the Iowa County Board of Supervisors, and the Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee (collectively, the Town and County) appeal a circuit court judgment declaring that BARD Materials is entitled to a requested rezoning of its property as a matter of law. The Town and County argue, among other things, that the circuit court lacked authority to grant a declaratory judgment because the proper means of judicial review of a local government’s rezoning decision is by certiorari.1

¶2 We conclude that the narrow issue of the proper means of seeking judicial review of a rezoning decision is dispositive in this appeal. In Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶25, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131, our supreme court determined that certiorari review is the appropriate means to challenge the validity of a local legislative decision, such as the rezoning decision here, and BARD has failed to distinguish this case from Voters with Facts. However, we further conclude that BARD’s complaint can be construed as requesting certiorari review of the decision to deny its rezoning application. Because the record before us does not contain a municipal record sufficient to enable certiorari review, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for certiorari review of BARD’s claims.

1 In the alternative, the Town and County also argue that the circuit court’s declaratory judgment is erroneous because: the court violated the separation of powers doctrine by adopting legislation when it ordered the rezoning of BARD’s property; the zoning ordinance at issue does not mandate the rezoning ordered by the court; and BARD’s rezoning application was properly denied because it did not satisfy all of the criteria of the zoning ordinance. We do not address these alternative arguments.

2 No. 2021AP1608

BACKGROUND

¶3 In October 2019, BARD submitted an application to the Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee, seeking to rezone its property from A-1 zoning to AB-1 zoning under the Iowa County Zoning Ordinance. Bard sought the rezoning from A-1 to AB-1 to allow BARD to apply for a conditional use permit to convert its property from preserved agricultural land to a quarry.

¶4 The Town Board voted to oppose BARD’s rezoning application because it was inconsistent with its comprehensive plan. The Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee then voted to recommend denial of the application for the same reason. The Iowa County Board ultimately voted to deny BARD’s application.

¶5 BARD then commenced this action challenging the denial of its application. BARD argued that the County Board erred by denying its application because BARD satisfied all of the criteria for rezoning its property. BARD labelled its action, and specifically sought, a declaratory judgment that it is entitled to its requested rezoning of its property.

¶6 The Town moved for judgment on the pleadings and the County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. They argued, among other things, that BARD’s exclusive remedy to challenge the denial of its rezoning application was by certiorari. The circuit court denied both motions.

¶7 The parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BARD and issued a declaratory judgment that Bard is entitled to rezoning of its property as a matter of law. The Town and the County appeal.

3 No. 2021AP1608

DISCUSSION

¶8 “The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law that this court reviews de novo.” Wegner v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI App 18, ¶11, 298 Wis. 2d 420, 728 N.W.2d 30. Under summary judgment methodology, the first step is to determine if the complaint states a claim for relief. Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.

¶9 The Town and County contend that BARD’s complaint fails to state a claim because, under Voters with Facts, certiorari is the exclusive remedy for review of a rezoning decision. They argue that Voters with Facts, 382 Wis. 2d 1, ¶39, prohibits declaratory judgment as a method for reviewing municipal legislative decisions, and that rezoning is a legislative act. See Quinn v. Town of Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 584, 364 N.W.2d 149 (1985) (the act of rezoning is as legislative in nature as drafting and adopting a zoning ordinance in the first instance). Thus, they contend, the circuit court erred by allowing the case to proceed as a declaratory judgment action. See Voters with Facts, 382 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶39, 48 (claims for declaratory judgment to challenge legislative determinations dismissed for failure to state a claim, because a legislative determination “is not susceptible to an action for declaratory judgment”). They assert that BARD’s complaint challenged the rezoning decision pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 59.69(14),2 and that, because the statute does not provide for a method of judicial review, review is limited to certiorari. See Voters with Facts, 382 Wis. 2d 1, ¶71

2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

4 No. 2021AP1608

(“Where, as here, there is no express statutory method of review, common law certiorari applies.”).

¶10 BARD makes several arguments as to why we should conclude that Voters with Facts did not limit its remedy to certiorari and that declaratory judgment was appropriate. We are not persuaded by any of BARD’s arguments.

¶11 First, BARD argues that a declaratory judgment action has historically been, and remains, a proper vehicle to seek review of the denial of a rezoning application. It argues that, “[t]ime and again, courts have entertained challenges to rezon[ing] decisions pleaded as claims for declaratory judgment.” In support, it provides a list of cases that it asserts adjudicated, on the merits, a declaratory judgment claim challenging a rezoning decision. However, BARD does not explain why any of those cases control over the specific holding in Voters with Facts that certiorari review, rather than declaratory judgment, is the proper means to seek review of a municipal legislative determination. That is, BARD does not contend that any of the cases it cites addressed the legal question which was squarely addressed and answered in Voters with Facts.3

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Bluebook (online)
Dyersville Ready Mix Inc. v. Iowa County Board of Supervisors, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dyersville-ready-mix-inc-v-iowa-county-board-of-supervisors-wisctapp-2022.