Dwight Hauer v. Department of State Hospitals—Coalinga

Opinion

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11 DWIGHT HAUER, Case No.: 1:25-cv-01090-CDB (PC)

12 ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO Plaintiff, RESPOND 13 (Doc. 1) 14 v. 30-DAY DEADLINE 16 HOSPITALS—COALINGA, 17 Defendant. 18 19 Plaintiff Dwight Hauer is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a 20 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of a 21 complaint on August 28, 2025. (Doc. 1.) 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 25 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 26 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 27 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 1 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 3 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 4 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 5 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 6 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 8 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 9 quotation marks & citation omitted). 10 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 11 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 12 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 13 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 14 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 15 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 16 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 17 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 18 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 19 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings shall be so 20 construed as to do justice.”). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies 21 in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured 22 by amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 23 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987) superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 24 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 25 “[T]he liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not 26 his legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal 27 interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were 1 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 2 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 3 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 4 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 5 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 6 B. Linkage and Causation 7 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 8 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 9 section 1983, a “plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 10 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 11 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is 12 inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 13 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Leer v. 14 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized 15 and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions 16 are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 17 370-71, 375-77 (1976)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 18 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 19 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 20 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 21 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 23 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 24 Plaintiff is a civil detainee housed at Coalinga State Hospital. In his complaint, Plaintiff 25 alleges he was assaulted by another patient and names the Department of State Hospitals – 26 Coalinga, “a state-run medical facility,” as Defendant and seeks to recover damages for unsafe 27 conditions and failure to protect him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 1-4.) 1 practices regarding patient safety and the protection of patients from harm are unconstitutional,” 2 an injunction requiring “Defendant to implement policies and procedures to ensure the safety of 3 patients and protect them from harm,” and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 4.) 4 B. Factual Allegations 5 On April 11, 2025, “Plaintiff was assaulted by another patient, Bishop, while a civil 6 detainee” at Coalinga State Hospital. (Id. at 2.) “Plaintiff has been informed, by staff and other 7 patients, that prior to the assault, Bishop had demonstrated a history of violence and had been 8 moved to different housing units within the hospital due to this behavior.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 9 Defendant “knew or should have known of Bishop’s violent propensities and the substantial risk 10 he posed to other patients, including the elderly Plaintiff.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that 11 he suffered a “bump on his left forehead,” “[p]ain in his right shoulder and lower back,” “[p]urple 12 discoloration of his lip and cheek,” and “confusion and disorientation,” along with “pain, 13 suffering, emotional distress, and the deprivation of his constitutional rights.” (Id. at 3.) 14 C. Plaintiff’s Claim 15 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk 16 of serious harm to Plaintiff by failing to take adequate measures to protect Plaintiff from Bishop, 17 despite the known risk” in violation of “Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Id.) 18 D. Applicable Legal Standards and Discussion 19 1. Fourteenth Amendment 20 The Fourteenth Amendment governs claims for unsafe conditions and failure to protect 21 brought by civilly detained plaintiffs. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 996-97 (9th Cir. 22 2007), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009). A civil 23 detainee’s “right to be protected and confined in a safe institution are [sic] clearly established.” 24 Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-22 (1982) (civil detainees have 25 constitutionally protected rights under due process clause to reasonably safe conditions of 26 confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints)). “[C]ivilly detained persons must 27 be afforded ‘more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 1 the Court must balance the detainee’s liberty interests against relevant state interests in 2 institutional security and the safety of those housed at the facility. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 989–90 3 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22). The negligence of prison officials, however, is not 4 sufficient to trigger the substantive due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 5 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 336 (1986) (negligence by state official does not violate 6 due process under the Fourteenth Amendment). 7 The Ninth Circuit has established “‘(1) [civil detainees] have a constitutional right to be 8 safe in the state institution to which they are committed, and that (2) in the face of known threats 9 to [a civil detainee’s] safety, state officials may not act (or fail to act) with conscious indifference, 10 but must take adequate steps in accordance with professional standards to prevent harm from 11 occurring.’” Hill v. Baughman, No. 2:18-cv-3089 AC P, 2019 WL 3782170, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. 12 Aug. 12, 2019) (quoting Ammons v. Washington Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 13 1030 (9th Cir. 2011)). 14 2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 15 Plaintiff names as a defendant the Department of State Hospitals – Coalinga. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 16 However, the Eleventh Amendment presents a general bar against federal lawsuits brought 17 against the state. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2010). 18 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against a 19 nonconsenting state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 20 2024). “This prohibition applies when the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.”” Id. 21 (quoting Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, the Eleventh 22 Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a 23 defendant, absent consent. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th 24 Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Brown v. Cal. Dep't. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 25 California Department of Corrections and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh 26 Amendment immunity). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment 27 immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court ....” Dittman v. California, 1 241 (1985)). 2 Accordingly, because Coalinga State Hospital is part of the California Department of State 3 Hospitals, which is a state agency, it is immune from civil rights claims raised pursuant to Section 4 1983. See Lazier v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:21-cv-01362-BAM PC, 2021 WL 12157141, at 5 *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2021) (holding Coalinga State Hospital not amenable to Section 1983 6 suit); Huskey v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:13-cv-01708-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 5934142, at *2 7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) (same). 8 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should not name the Department of 9 State Hospitals – Coalinga as a defendant. Rather, he should name as defendants those individuals 10 who were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 11 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983). 12 Other Information for Consideration Regarding Amendment 13 The following information is provided to assist Plaintiff should he elect to file an amended 14 complaint. 15 Avoid Imprecise Identification of Actions by Defendants 16 Any amended complaint filed by Plaintiff must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules 17 of Civil Procedure by clearly and succinctly stating what happened, when it happened, and how 18 each defendant was involved. Simply grouping some or all defendants and ascribing to them 19 generalized assertions of overall conduct is insufficient. See Gibson v. City of Portland, 20 -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 235118, at *16-18 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026). Plaintiff is required to concisely 21 identify the conduct alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as to each defendant 22 for each claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff may not assert multiple claims by simply 23 asserting the supporting facts are the same as a previous claim. Gibson, 2026 WL 235118, *16- 24 18. 26 Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim 27 against the Defendant. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint to cure the identified ] If Plaintiff wishes to file a first amended complaint, any such amended complaint should 2 | be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 3 | deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as 4 | true, the “[flactual allegation must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 5 || level ....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 6 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 7 | claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 8 | “buckshot” complaints). 9 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 10 | Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, an amended complaint 11 | must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 12 | 220. 13 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that: 14 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and, 15 2. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either: 16 (a) File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 17 Court in this order; or 18 (b) in the alternative, file a notice of voluntary dismissal (Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 41(a)(1)(A)(1)); and 20 3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 21 action be dismissed, without prejudice, for his failure to plead any cognizable 22 claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute. 23 | ITIS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ February 17, 2026 | Wr bY 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28