In the
Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
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No. 02-25-00256-CR
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DWAYNE GOULD, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1798232
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a heated argument between Appellant Dwayne Gould and his best friend, X.H. (Zach),1 Gould threatened to go to Zach’s apartment and “pop [him] off.” One week later, Gould—accompanied by two juveniles—drove to Zach’s apartment and murdered him.2 After the killing, Gould made several incriminating remarks to friends and contradictory statements to law enforcement regarding his involvement in the murder. He was arrested, indicted, and tried for murder. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. At Gould’s trial, the State called several witnesses, including the two juvenile accomplices. The accomplices testified against Gould, and the jury found him guilty of murder and assessed his punishment at seventeen years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
In his sole issue, Gould argues that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the accomplice-witnesses’ testimonies. Because the accomplice-witnesses’ testimonies are corroborated by other evidence tending to connect Gould with the murder, we will affirm.
We use pseudonyms for the minor victim, the minor accomplices, and their 1
parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3); 2d Tex. App. (Fort Worth) Loc. R. 7; Stephenson v. State, 673 S.W.3d 370, 375 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pet. ref’d).
Gould was eighteen years old at the time of the murder.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 29, 2023, fifteen-year-old Zach was shot and killed outside his apartment. Six months later, a Tarrant County grand jury indicted Gould and two juvenile accomplices for Zach’s murder. The case proceeded to trial. Gould pleaded not guilty, and the State presented testimony from several witnesses, including Zach’s mother, the case’s lead detective, the two accomplices, and the mother of one accomplice.
Zach’s mother, M.S. (Mary), testified that Zach and Gould grew up together and used to be best friends, like brothers. The two had a falling out, however, on May 23, 2023, when Gould failed to help Zach in a fight against a group of boys outside Zach’s apartment.3 Zach called Gould after that fight, telling him, “You could have come and had my back.” According to Mary, Gould responded “something like, ‘Boy, FU. I’ll come to your house and pop you off or blow your top off.” Mary also testified that Gould later threatened Zach in multiple text messages, telling Zach, “I’m going to see you,” calling Zach a “pussy ass,” and writing that he (Gould) would “[s]tand on business.”4 When asked if she knew Gould’s two accomplices, Mary
3 The group of boys went to Zach’s apartment looking for Gould. Gould was not there, so the group instigated a fight with Zach.
4 According to Mary, “Stand on business” means Gould was “going to up what [he] said, that [he is] going to see [Zach].” Mary explained that she construed this message as a threat.
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denied knowing T.M. (Tim) or K.T. (Ken)5, explaining that Zach never talked about them6 and that she only knew Gould.
The case’s lead detective, Jeffrey Jensen, testified that he was assigned to investigate Zach’s murder and that Mary identified Gould as a possible suspect. Detective Jensen spoke with several witnesses, collected video-surveillance footage from outside Zach’s apartment complex, and interviewed Gould several times.
During Gould’s first interview, he and Detective Jensen discussed a gray SUV that was observed on video-surveillance footage entering Zach’s apartment complex just before the murder and then exiting immediately after.7 Gould admitted that he had been in the SUV earlier that day, but he denied going to Zach’s apartment. According to Gould, he just picked up his brother elsewhere that day—nothing else. During Gould’s second interview, however, he changed his story. This time, Gould admitted to being in the SUV and being at Zach’s apartment complex when the
5 Ken’s “street name” was “Killer” or “Killa.”
6 Tim and Ken were juveniles at the time of the murder. See In re M.K., 514 S.W.3d 369, 380 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (defining a juvenile for purposes of the juvenile and criminal justice systems as a person ten years of age or older and under seventeen years of age).
7 The footage captured the SUV’s license plate, and Detective Jensen discovered that Gould’s friend owned the SUV.
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murder occurred. But he clarified that he simply met his drug dealer at the apartment complex—not Zach.8 Gould also told Detective Jensen different stories about who had accompanied him to Zach’s apartment complex. During his first interview, Gould claimed that only he and Tim had been in the SUV. But during his second interview, Gould admitted that Ken9 had been in the SUV too. Despite this admission, Gould attempted to distance himself from Ken and claimed that he had no way to contact him. Later, however, Detective Jensen learned that this claim was untrue: Gould and Ken had previously been in a music group together, and they “had very regular communications.”10 Detective Jensen discovered that—a few hours after Zach’s murder—Ken had posted a picture on social media of him and Gould’s brother holding a firearm. Shortly thereafter, Ken reported the firearm stolen. Detective Jensen later recovered the firearm and matched it to the casings found at the murder scene.
Tim’s mother, M.B. (Melanie), testified and recounted a notable interaction that she had with Gould in the summer of 2023—a few months after Zach’s murder.
When pressed by Detective Jensen, Gould could not recall his drug dealer’s 8
name or apartment number.
9 Detective Jensen later discovered that Ken had messaged Zach on social media a few minutes before the murder.
10 Detective Jensen obtained search warrants for Gould’s and Ken’s socialmedia records and phone records, which reflected that they were in regular contact.
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That summer, Detective Jensen contacted Melanie to discuss Zach’s murder, which prompted her to discuss it with Tim. Gould, who was present during Melanie and Tim’s discussion, eventually walked over and joined the conversation. Gould then whispered to Tim, “Does [she] know?” to which Tim shook his head. Melanie asked the boys what they meant, and Gould responded cryptically: “Just the way I told him he was going to die, that’s how he died.” Gould then chuckled “like it was a funny situation.” Missing the humor in that statement, Melanie asked, “Is somebody dead?” In response, Gould told her, “Just know that he don’t have to worry about it no more.”
In exchange for their truthful testimony at Gould’s trial, Tim and Ken pleaded guilty to Zach’s murder and received sentences of seventeen years’ and thirty-five years’ confinement respectively.11 Tim testified that although present at Zach’s apartment complex during the murder, he was “really oblivious to the situation,” claiming that Gould told him that they were at the apartment complex just to purchase marijuana. But five minutes after Gould and Ken exited the SUV, Tim heard gunshots. He then saw the pair run back to the SUV, and the group left the apartment complex. Approximately an hour later, Gould began receiving phone calls
11 The trial court identified Tim and Ken as accomplices as a matter of law and included an accomplice-witness instruction in the jury charge. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14 (requiring corroboration); State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
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informing him of Zach’s death. According to Tim, Gould had little-to-no reaction to the news.
Ken testified that during the May 23, 2023 argument between Gould and Zach, Gould threatened to “shoot [Zach] in his face.” Immediately after that argument, Gould said that he wanted to kill Zach, and Ken agreed.12 Then on May 29, 2023, Gould and Ken planned Zach’s murder—which they allegedly told Tim about in the SUV—and drove to Zach’s apartment complex. Upon their arrival, Gould and Ken exited the vehicle, walked up to Zach’s apartment, knocked on the door, and shot him multiple times.13 Ken recalled that Gould “started shooting” first, killing Zach.
The jury found Gould guilty of murder and assessed his punishment at seventeen years’ confinement. The trial court sentenced him accordingly, and this appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Gould argues that “there [is] no evidence corroborating any involvement by [him] in the murder of [Zach].” We disagree.
According to Ken’s testimony, when Gould said that he wanted to kill Zach, 12
Ken simply replied, “All right.”
13 Zach sustained “three firearm injuries,” one of which was to the “right side of his face and head.”
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW “Texas law provides that ‘[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.’”14 Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14). This rule, commonly referred to as the “accomplice-witness rule,” reflects the legislature’s recognition “that accomplice testimony implicating another person should be viewed with a measure of caution, because accomplices often have incentives to lie, such as to avoid punishment or [to] shift blame to another person.” Id. (quoting Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
When, as here, an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony, “the reviewing court eliminates all of the accomplice testimony from consideration and then examines the remaining portions of the record to see if there is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime.” Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). The sufficiency of nonaccomplice evidence is judged according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim.
14 “An accomplice is someone who participates with the defendant before, during, or after the commission of a crime and acts with the required culpable mental state.” Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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App. 2011). We do not independently construe the nonaccomplice evidence but instead defer to the factfinder’s resolution of it. Id.
“[T]he tends-to-connect standard does not present a high threshold.” Cantelon v. State, 85 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (quoting In re C.M.G., 905 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ)). To meet the rule’s requirements, the corroborating evidence need not prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by itself. Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Nor is it necessary for the corroborating evidence to directly link the accused to the commission of the offense. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 593; Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Rather, the evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or both—must show that rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect the accused to the offense. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Although the “mere presence alone of a defendant at the scene of a crime is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony,” Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (quoting Golden v. State, 851 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)), evidence showing that the “accused was at or near the scene of the crime at or about the time of its commission, . . . coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may . . . furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction,” id. (quoting Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). Circumstances that are apparently insignificant in and of themselves may nevertheless constitute sufficient evidence of
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corroboration. Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Simmons v. State, 205 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
B. ANALYSIS
Gould asserts that “[t]he only testimony in the case that implicated [him] in the killing of [Zach] was that of [Ken] and [Tim].”15 But the record belies this assertion, containing nonaccomplice evidence that corroborates their testimonies and tends to connect Gould to Zach’s murder. For example, the record reflects that Gould
• admitted that he was in the SUV that entered Zach’s apartment complex just before the murder and exited immediately after;
• changed his account of events several times during his interviews with Detective Jensen, stating that he was only picking up his brother at another location, then admitting to being at the location of the murder, and then claiming to being there to purchase drugs;
• contradicted himself during his interviews with Detective Jensen, initially claiming that only he and Tim were in the SUV that day and then stating that Ken was in the vehicle too;
• lied to Detective Jensen about knowing Ken and attempted to distance himself from Ken;
• argued with Zach one week before the murder;
15 Gould’s “Statement of Facts” portrays accomplice-witness testimony as the only evidence against him. But, as we note below, many relevant facts in the record are absent from his brief. See Roberts v. State, No. 02-25-00250-CR, 2026 WL 2130569, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (admonishing appellate counsel for omitting relevant facts from the statement of facts and reminding counsel of the duty of candor owed to the court).
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• threatened Zach, stating, “I’ll come to your house and pop you off or blow your top off” and “I’m going to see you”;
• claimed that Zach had died “[j]ust the way I told him he was going to die, that’s how he died” and that “he don’t have to worry about it no more”; and
• served as the only connection between Tim, Ken, and Zach.16 Gould’s blatant lies to Detective Jensen demonstrated his “consciousness of guilt” to the jury and corroborated Tim’s and Ken’s testimonies. See Jones v. State, No. 02-23-00313-CR, 2025 WL 876785, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 20, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Woods v. State, No. 07-22- 00208-CR, 2023 WL 4924076, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Lying to the police reveals a consciousness of guilt and, as such, is circumstantial evidence of guilt.”); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 163–64 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant lied because he had something to hide and that changing his story evidenced his consciousness of guilt); Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.) (holding that “consciousness of guilt” may be one of the strongest indicators of guilt).
Aside from Gould’s deceitful behavior, Mary and Melanie also strongly corroborated Tim’s and Ken’s testimonies. For instance, Mary testified that Gould
16 None of Gould’s aforementioned conduct was included in his statement of facts. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g); Roberts, 2026 WL 2130569, at *1 n.3.
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said he would “blow [Zach’s] top off,” that he would “see” Zach, and that he would “[s]tand on business.” These threats—some blatant, some veiled—support an inference that Gould was involved in Zach’s murder. See Yost v. State, 222 S.W.3d 865, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (holding that appellant’s previous threats to kill murder victim support an inference that appellant killed victim). Melanie then testified that, almost unprompted, Gould told her, “Just the way I told him he was going to die, that’s how he died,” and, “Just know that he don’t have to worry about it no more.” These oddly specific remarks—made less than two months after Zach’s murder—also support an inference that Gould was involved in Zach’s murder. See Torres v. State, 92 S.W.3d 911, 916–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant’s remarks when asked about victim— that appellant had “got him”—supported inference that appellant killed victim).17 As a final point, we recall that Gould admitted he was at the apartment complex at the time of Zach’s murder. When coupled with the other “suspicious circumstances” discussed above, this fact also corroborates Tim’s and Ken’s testimonies. See Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
17 Torres involved a factual-sufficiency challenge. See 92 S.W.3d at 917.
Nonetheless, “[t]he accomplice-witness rule is a statutorily imposed sufficiency review and is not derived from federal or state constitutional principles that define the legal and factual sufficiency standards.” Clark v. State, 324 S.W.3d 620, 629 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462–63). And as noted, the accomplice-witness rule’s “tends-to-connect standard does not present a high threshold.” Cantelon, 85 S.W.3d at 461.
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pet. ref’d) (“[P]roof that the accused was at or near the scene of the crime at or about the time of its commission, when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction.” (citing Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 443)).
Viewing this evidence in its totality and deferring to the jury’s resolution of it, see Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that it tended to connect Gould to the charged offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14; Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 443; Qualls, 547 S.W.3d at 672. Accordingly, we hold that Tim’s and Ken’s testimonies were sufficiently corroborated and that sufficient evidence supports Gould’s conviction under the accomplice-witness rule. See Qualls, 547 S.W.3d at 672; Jones v. State, No. 14-03-00650-CR, 2005 WL 549541, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 10, 2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We overrule Gould’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Gould’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
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/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 27, 20267