Dustin H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 30, 2025
Docket7:24-cv-00703
StatusUnknown

This text of Dustin H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (Dustin H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dustin H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Va. 2025).

Opinion

CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DISTRICT COL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT ROANOKE, V. FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA oct □□□ 30 502 ctober 30, ROANOKE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN, C BY: s/ S. Neily, Deputy DUSTIN H..,! ) ) Plaintiff ) ) v. ) Civil Action No, 7:24-CV-703 ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) By: Hon. Michael F. Urbanski Commissioner of Social Security,? ) Senior United States District Judge ) Defendant ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Dustin H. (“Dustin”) filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 and 1381a. In support of his application, Dustin argues that the determination of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that he is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. Pl’s Br., ECF No. 11. The Commissioner filed a response to which Dustin has replied. Comm’r’s Br., ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 16. As discussed more fully below, the court finds that substantial evidence does not support the AL]’s determination that Dustin is not disabled. Accordingly, the Commissionetr’s determination that Dustin is not disabled is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to

Due to privacy concerns, the court adopts the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States that courts use only the first name and last initial of the claimant in social security opinions. 2 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), he is substituted as defendant.

the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further development in accordance with this opinion. I. Judicial Review of Social Security Determinations It is not the province of a federal court to make administrative disability decisions. Rather, judicial review of disability cases is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving disability. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990), and Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). The court will uphold a Social Security disability determination if “‘(1) the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and (2) substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings.” Oakes v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 207, 212 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Arakas v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020). A court may neither undertake de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision, reweigh conflicting evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. Evidence is substantial when, considering the record as a whole, it might be deemed adequate to suppott a conclusion by a reasonable mind, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), or when it would be sufficient to refuse a directed verdict in a jury trial. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is not a “large or considerable amount of evidence,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), but is more than a mete scintilla and somewhat less than a preponderance. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. “It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.

197, 229 (1938)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Nevertheless, the court does not “‘reflexively rabber-stamp an AL]’s findings.” Oakes, 70 F.4th at 212 (quoting Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95). Remand is appropriate when the AL]’s analysis is so deficient that it “frustrate[s] meaningful review.” See Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636-37 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “remand is necessaty” because the coutt is “left to guess [at] how the AL] arrived at his conclusions”). See also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that the ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion” and holding that remand was appropriate when the ALJ failed to make “specific findings” about whether the claimant’s limitations would cause him to experience his claimed symptoms duting work and if so, how often) (citation omitted). Ij. Claim History Dustin was born in 1984 and completed the tenth grade. R. 205, 210. He-has past relevant work as a crew member at a fast-food restaurant. R. 210-11, 215. Dustin filed his current application for benefits on March 15, 2022, alleging an onset date of April 2, 2021. He alleges disability based on a herniated disc in his back and asthma. R. 178, 209. His reported symptoms include limitations in his ability to lift heavy objects, bend excessively, stand or walk for long periods of time, or sit in the same position for long periods of time, R. 223. He has back pain that radiates down his left leg when he stands for ten minutes, and it feels like his leg will give out. R. 238.

When the AL] issued his determination following the administrative hearing, he applied the five-step evaluation process described in the regulations. R. 19-31.3 The ALJ first found that regarding Dustin’s DIB claim, he met the insured status requirements through June 30, 2025. He had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of April 2, 2021. R. 21. The ALJ found that Dustin had severe impairments of lumbar degenerative disc disease/spondylosis, obesity, asthma/chronic bronchitis, hypertension, diverticulosis, sleep apnea, and diabetes mellitus. R. 22. The ALJ found Dustin’s seizure impairment, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder to be non-severe undet the regulations. R. 22-23. The ALJ found that Dustin’s severe impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or equal a listed impairment. R. 23-24. The ALJ found that Dustin had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to do sedentary work with the additional limitation of needing a sit/stand option every sixty minutes, allowing for a two-to-three-minute change of position at his workstation. The AL] further found that Dustin could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally climb ramps ot stairs; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; should avoid concentrated

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Pierce v. Underwood
487 U.S. 552 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Scott Ex Rel. Scott v. Barnhart
332 F. Supp. 2d 869 (D. Maryland, 2004)
Bonnilyn Mascio v. Carolyn Colvin
780 F.3d 632 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
George Monroe v. Carolyn Colvin
826 F.3d 176 (Fourth Circuit, 2016)
Nikki Thomas v. Nancy Berryhill
916 F.3d 307 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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Dustin H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dustin-h-v-frank-bisignano-commissioner-of-social-security-vawd-2025.