IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DUSTIN CHAMBERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:24CV562 ) LIEUTENANT MR. COUZZI, ) CORPORAL MR. T. KLUK, ) SERGEANT MR. RODGERS, and ) NURSE MS. JO, ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dustin Chambers’ cellmate at present evidence of his claims. Rockingham County Jail had a Accordingly, the defendants are medical emergency on May 1, 2024, entitled to judgment as a matter of and Chambers called for help. When law. The Court should grant their officers responded to the cell, motions for summary judgment. Lieutenant Mr. Couzzi, Corporal Mr. T. Kluk, and Sergeant Mr. Rodgers Peach also moved to seal portions of allegedly used excessive force against her brief and affidavit in support of Chambers, and “Nurse Ms. Jo” was her motion for summary judgment, as allegedly deliberately indifferent to well as all of Exhibit 1 to her affidavit, the injuries he sustained. Chambers which contain excerpts of Chambers’ brings this action against the medical records. Docket Entry 38. defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Because the public’s First § 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment right of access outweighs Amendment rights. Chambers’ privacy interest, the motion to seal is denied. This matter is now before the Court on Joanna Peach’s motion for summary I. FAILURE TO RESPOND judgment, Docket Entry 35, and her Upon the defendants’ filing of their co-defendants’ (“the Officers’”) respective motions for summary motion for summary judgment, judgment, on October 9, 2025, the Docket Entry 39. Chambers did not Clerk of Court mailed Chambers the respond to either motion, failing to standard Roseboro letter informing although Chambers’ failure to him of the motions and his right to respond may leave the defendants’ respond. The letter warned Chambers facts uncontroverted, they “must still that if he failed to respond to the show that the uncontroverted facts motions, the Court may “conclude entitle [them] to ‘a judgment as a that the defendant(s)’ contentions are matter of law.’” Id. See also Campbell undisputed and/or that you no longer v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 wish to pursue the matter” and grant F.3d 52, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting judgment in favor of the defendants. that, even in the absence of a Docket Entry 41. See also M.D.N.C. response, “the court should look at the Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no response brief movant’s own papers . . . [and] is filed within the time required by determine if the record of filed this rule, the motion will be depositions, answers to considered and decided as an interrogatories, admissions, and uncontested motion, and ordinarily affidavits[] demonstrates that a will be granted without further genuine issue exists as to any material notice.”). Despite the Court’s fact”). warning, Chambers has not responded to either motion,1 nor did The uncontroverted facts do show just he verify the factual allegations in his that, as set forth in further detail Complaint, see Docket Entry 2, such below. that they could be considered as more II. FACTS than mere allegations, see Gowen v. Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th On May 1, 2024, Chambers was an Cir. 2025). inmate at the Rockingham County Detention Center (“Jail”) when, at Nevertheless, the Court cannot approximately 7:20 a.m., his cellmate summarily grant the defendants’ suffered a medical emergency. motions because Chambers’ failure to Windell Brown Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3, Docket respond “does not fulfill the burdens Entry 32-1. Someone in Chambers’ imposed on moving parties by Rule 56 cell pressed the intercom, and Officers [of the Federal Rules of Civil Couzzi, Rodgers, and Kluk, among Procedure].” Custer v. Pan Am. Life others, others responded. Id. ¶ 4. Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993). When officers arrived, “Chambers exited his cell in an aggressive manner “Rule 56 requires that the moving and confronted the responding party establish, in addition to the officers.” Id. ¶ 5. They told him to absence of a dispute over any material move aside so his cellmate could fact, that it is ‘entitled to a judgment receive medical attention. Id. But as a matter of law.’” Id. Thus, Chambers began arguing “so he was
1 There is also no entry on the docket of undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed the Roseboro letter being returned as that Chambers received it. placed on the floor and restrained and injury and no limited rotation of handcuffed.” Id. Officers then moved movement. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 16). him from the area to booking where he stayed for the remainder of the As a result of the Sick Call visit, Peach medical emergency response. Id. ¶ 6. placed Chambers on the list for the Chambers had no obvious injuries doctor to see next time he was at the and did not complain of any neck or Jail. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). The back pain at the time. Id. ¶ 8. None of one doctor contracted to provide the detention officers took him to the services at the Jail generally went medical unit to be evaluated after the there once a week to review charts and incident. Joanna Peach Aff. ¶ 10 evaluate patients, although he was (Sept. 10, 2025), Docket Entry 37-1. available 24 hours a day for consultation and to make verbal At the time of the incident, Joanna orders for patients. Id. ¶ 5. Peach (Nurse Jo) was a licensed practical nurse employed with Nursing staff, including Peach, could Southern Health Partners, Inc. which not independently make medical contracted with the Jail to provide decisions for inmates, nor could they nursing care to inmates. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. unilaterally order prescriptions for There was one nurse on-site at the Jail any inmate. Id. ¶ 7. 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Id. ¶ 4. An off-site on-call registered On May 9, Chambers submitted a Sick nurse was available 24 hours a day, Call request following up on the May 1 seven days a week. Id. incident. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Ex. 1 at 21). In it, he complained that he could not On May 2, Peach saw Chambers in turn his neck and could not bend over. response to an April 30 Sick Call Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21). He asked why request. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Ex. 1 at 12, 14, it was taking so long for a doctor to see 19). During the examination, “someone in pain” for “something Chambers did not mention the May 1 that[’]s an emergency.” Id. (citing Ex. altercation, and Peach did not 1 at 21). Peach responded to the Sick otherwise know of Chambers’ Sick Call request and let Chambers know Call request related to the May 1 that he was on the list for the doctor to altercation. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Ex. 1 at 16). see and he was already receiving pain medication. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 21). On May 3, Peach saw Chambers for the May 1 Sick Call request. Id. ¶ 16 Due to a personal emergency, the (citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). She recorded doctor could not go to the Jail until his vital signs, his complaint that he May 11. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Ex. 1 at 12). could not move his neck in either That day, he examined Chambers who direction, and his pain rating of a 7 complained of stiffness, pain, and a out of 10. Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 15-16). decreased rotation of movement in She also noted no bruising or visible his neck. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Ex. 1 at 12). The doctor prescribed Chambers with III. STANDARD OF REVIEW another pain medication, muscle reliever, and a hot pack. Id. (citing Ex. A court “shall grant summary 1 at 3, 12). judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any Approximately one month later, on material fact and the movant is June 13, Chambers submitted his next entitled to judgment as a matter of Sick Call request, this time reporting law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine slight pains shooting down from his dispute of material fact exists “if the neck to his spine. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Ex. 1 evidence is such that a reasonable jury at 22). Peach placed him on the sick could return a verdict for the call list for the doctor to see. Id. nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 In the meantime, Peach saw (1986). In analyzing a summary Chambers on June 18. Id. ¶ 27. He judgment motion, courts complained that his pain had “must construe all facts and continued since May 1 and was reasonable inferences in the light currently at a 6 out of 10. Id. (citing most favorable to the nonmoving Ex. 1 at 17-18). The doctor prescribed party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 him additional pain medicine. Id. F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). (citing Ex. 1 at 4, 7, 18). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine When the doctor saw Chambers on dispute of material fact by June 30, he noted that Chambers’ “identifying those portions of ‘the cervical pain had improved but he still pleadings, depositions, answers to had neck pain radiating to his back. interrogatories, and admissions on Id. ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 1 at 12). The doctor file, together with the affidavits, if any’ discontinued the medication and which it believes demonstrates the ordered a corticosteroid sequence and absence of a genuine issue of material an x-ray of Chambers’ cervical spine. fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 Id. (citing Ex. 1 at 4, 9, 28). U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule
56). On July 2, Chambers received the x- ray which revealed that his cervical “Where, as here, the nonmoving party spine was normal. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Ex. bears the ultimate burden of proof at 1 at 10-11). The doctor did not order trial, the moving party may discharge any further treatment. Id. ¶ 30 (citing its initial burden at summary Ex. 1 at 4, 9). judgment by ‘showing – that is,
pointing out to the . . . court – that Chambers was transferred out of the there is an absence of evidence to Jail on or about October 23, 2024. Id. support the nonmoving party’s case.’” ¶ 36. Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at other federal legal right. West v. 325). “If the moving party carries this Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go A. The Court should grant the beyond the pleadings and by [his] Officers’ motion for own affidavits, or by the depositions, summary judgment. answers to interrogatories, and Chambers alleges that Couzzi, Kluk, admissions on file, designate specific and Rodgers used excessive force facts showing that there is a genuine when he was exiting his cell to allow issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex access to his cellmate who needed Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). medical assistance. Specifically, he A party cannot rely on statements in a contends that Couzzi and Kluk brief to support a motion for slammed him to the ground for no summary judgment, because they are reason and Rodgers placed his knee not evidence. City of Greensboro v. and weight on Chambers’ neck. As a Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. result, he sustained neck and back 15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 injuries. n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017) An inmate’s right to be free from the (collecting cases); see also Hill v. use of excessive force derives from the Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); see 2022). also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. IV. ANALYSIS 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (“The Eighth Amendment . . . serves as the primary Title 42, United States Code, Section source of substantive protection to 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy convicted prisoners in cases . . . where available to those deprived of rights the deliberate use of force [by prison secured to them by the Constitution officials] is challenged as excessive and, in a more sharply limited way, and unjustified.”). the statutory laws of the United States” by persons acting under color A claim for the use of excessive force of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. “involves both an objective and a Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th subjective component.” Dean v. Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. pursuant to Section 1983 must show 2021). “The objective component that a person acting under color of measures the nature of the force state law violated a Constitutional or employed, asking whether that force ‘was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019)). “This is not a high bar; de minimis or trivial force is not enough, but anything more will suffice.” Id. maintain institutional security.’” Id. (citing Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22).
“The more demanding . . . subjective But an officer crosses the line and acts component . . . asks a single question: maliciously and sadistically, for whether the officers acted with a example, “when [he] inflict[s] pain . . . ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” to punish an inmate for intransigence id. (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 or to retaliate for insubordination,” F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)), that is, Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113-14, n.4 (citing “wantonness in the infliction of pain,” cases finding a reasonable jury could id. The plaintiff must establish that infer the officer used excessive force the officer applied force “maliciously in response to the inmate’s use of and sadistically for the very purpose profanity and threats of violence and of causing harm” rather than “in a other similar statements directed at good-faith effort to maintain or officers), or “to punish or retaliate restore discipline.” Dean, 984 F.3d at against an inmate for his prior 302. conduct,” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302, and
possibly when the officer “use[s] force For example, an officer acts in good on an inmate who is restrained and faith when confronting “immediate compliant and posing no physical risks to physical safety” and threat,” id. (noting this conduct “compelling compliance with prison “raises the specter of such an rules and procedures” to “preserve impermissible motive”). internal order.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at
113 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)). inmate is one factor that may suggest
‘whether the use of force could The United States Supreme Court plausibly have been thought recognized long ago that “corrections necessary’ in a particular situation.” officials must make their decisions ‘in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 haste, under pressure, and frequently (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at without the luxury of a second 7). chance.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To determine the nature of the force, They “must balance the need ‘to courts assess “[1] the need for maintain or restore discipline’ application of force, [2] the through force against the risk of relationship between that need and injury to inmates.” Id. Accordingly, the amount of force used, [3] the “‘[p]rison administrators . . . should threat ‘reasonably perceived by the be accorded wide-ranging deference responsible officials,’ and [4] ‘any in the adoption and execution of efforts made to temper the severity of policies and practices that in their a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at doctor did not order any further 321). treatment. “If a reasonable jury could find, based The law permits officers to use means on the inferences drawn under the to maintain order and discipline. The Whitley factors or other evidence, force used here – placing Chambers that correctional officers used force on the floor to handcuff him – was in maliciously to punish or retaliate response to Chambers’ aggressive, against an inmate, then summary confrontational, and argumentative judgment [in favor of the officers] is behavior when officers and medical not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at personnel needed to access his cell. 303-02. Balancing the Whitley factors, the nature of this force was not excessive. Here, the only evidence before the And the evidence does not show that Court shows that Chambers was any of the officers acted maliciously or aggressive and confrontational sadistically. towards the officers who responded to assist his cellmate. When officers told Chambers, who has the burden at trial him to move aside, he began to argue, of proving these officers used at which time “he was placed on the excessive force, did not respond or floor and restrained and handcuffed.” otherwise provide evidence to the There is no evidence that anyone contrary. In sum, he has failed to placed a knee or any weight on proffer evidence of the essential Chambers’ neck. elements of his excessive force claim.
Once handcuffed, Chambers then Because there is no evidence that any waited in booking until the emergency of the officers violated Chambers’ ended. At the time, he did not constitutional right to be free from the complain of any neck or back pain and use of excessive force, they are had no obvious injuries. entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th Two days later, Peach assessed 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court Chambers for reported pain in his may award qualified immunity to an neck and back and administered official if either (1) there is no medications as the doctor ordered. violation of a constitutional right, or Ultimately, an x-ray of his cervical (2) the constitutional right was not spine showed normal results, and the clearly established.”).
Therefore, the Court should grant the Officers’ motion for summary judgment.2
2 In their brief, the Officers conclude that to Officers Brown, Stultz, Couzzi, Kluk, “summary judgment should be granted and Rodgers.” Defs. Couzzi, Kluk and B. The Court should grant knowledge of the risk of harm to the Peach’s motion for inmate” and also “‘recognize[s] that summary judgment. his actions were insufficient’ to mitigate the risk of harm to the Chambers alleges that Peach was inmate arising from his medical deliberately indifferent to his serious needs.” Id. (quoting Parrish ex rel. medical needs. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has long held that an inmate is due Prison officials may act with “reasonable medical treatment.” See deliberate indifference by Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 “intentionally denying or delaying (4th Cir. 1977). “Claims that prison access to medical care . . . .” Estelle, officials failed to provide adequate 429 U.S. at 105. But “[m]ere delay is medical care to an inmate, like not enough.” Moskos v. Hardee, 24 excessive force claims, sound in the F.4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). “A Eighth Amendment.” Iko v. Shreve, commonplace medical delay such as 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). A that experienced in everyday life will plaintiff must show that the officer only rarely suffice to constitute an “acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ Eighth Amendment violation, absent (subjective) to the inmate’s ‘serious unusual circumstances where the medical needs’ (objective).” Id. delay itself places the prisoner at (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such 97, 104 (1976)). as where the prisoner’s condition
deteriorates markedly or the ailment A serious medical need is “‘one that is of an urgent nature.” Id. has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so An inmate’s disagreement with obvious that even a lay person would medical staff about his treatment is easily recognize the necessity for a insufficient absent exceptional doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting circumstances. See Hixson v. Moran, Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 1 F.4th 297, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2021) 846 (7th Cir. 1999)). (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d
841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing An officer acts with deliberate Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 indifference when he has “actual
Rodgers’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for indifference and conditions of Summ. J. at 8, Docket Entry 40 confinement. See Officers’ Mem. at 11-15. (“Officers’ Mem.”). But the Court In its August 9, 2024 Order, the Court dismissed all claims against Brown and only permitted the excessive force claim Stultz in its August 9, 2024 Order, to proceed against the Officers, while the Docket Entry 5. Similarly, the Officers deliberate indifference to serious medical argue that they are entitled to summary needs claim could proceed against Nurse judgment on claims of deliberate Jo. (3rd Cir. 1970) (noting that Chambers access to treatment. The exceptional circumstances are those delay was due to unforeseen personal in which medical care is “so grossly circumstances of the doctor who was incompetent, inadequate or excessive on-site on May 11 and evaluated as to shock the general conscience or Chambers. When Chambers later to be intolerable to fundamental returned to see Peach with continued fairness”))); see also Bowring, 551 complaints of pain, she once again F.2d at 47-48 (“The right to treatment placed him on the list to see the doctor is, of course, limited to that which who ordered a cervical x-ray, the may be provided upon a reasonable results of which were normal. Thus, cost and time basis and the essential there is no evidence that any delay, test is one of medical necessity and assuming Peach were somehow not simply that which may be responsible for it, placed Chambers at considered merely desirable.”); substantial risk of harm or caused his Moorehead v. Stover, No. 5:13-CT- condition to deteriorate noticeably. 3144-F, 2016 WL 8667807, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2016), aff’d, 671 F. As above, Chambers did not respond App’x 221 (granting summary or otherwise provide evidence to the judgment where the “claims contrary. He has failed to proffer essentially amount to a disagreement evidence of the essential elements of in the course of treatment prescribed his deliberate indifference claim by Defendant”). against Peach.
Here, the undisputed evidence shows Because there is no evidence that that Peach provided Chambers with Peach violated Chambers’ adequate medical treatment for his constitutional right to receive alleged injuries. When she assessed adequate medical treatment, she is him on May 2 for an unrelated earlier entitled to qualified immunity. See, Sick Call request, he did not mention e.g., Nazario, 103 F.4th at 230 (“[A] the May 1 incident, and she did not court may award qualified immunity otherwise know about it. After to an official if either (1) there is no learning of his related Sick Call violation of a constitutional right, or request, she saw him on May 3, noted (2) the constitutional right was not his complaints of neck and back pain, clearly established.”). and placed him on the list to see the doctor. Although Chambers Therefore, the Court should grant complained of the delay in seeing the Peach’s motion for summary doctor, there is no evidence that judgment.3 Peach intentionally delayed
3 Although Peach includes in her brief an dismissed the official capacity claim argument that the Court should also against her in its August 9, 2024 Order, grant summary judgment in her favor on Docket Entry 5. the official capacity claim, the Court V. SEALING STANDARD involving claims of inadequate medical treatment) (citing Press- Peach also moves to seal portions of Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. her summary judgment brief and 501, 510 (1984); Rushford v. New supporting affidavit, and the entirety Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 of the accompanying exhibit, which (4th Cir. 1988)). contain excerpts from Chambers’ medical records. In support of her As did the defendants in Musgrove, motion, she merely relies on the Peach refers to state and federal Court’s express authority to seal statutes and regulations governing materials pursuant to Local Rule 5.4 confidentiality, but “[t]he Court does and requests that they be sealed “so not understand [Peach] to say that that the parties may present them to these statutes and regulations the Court without violating applicable prohibit courts from making such North Carolina or federal statutes records available on the court docket. concerning the confidentiality of Rather, reading between the lines, it medical records, such as the Health appears [she is] saying that [she is] Insurance Portability and required to keep such records Accountability Act Privacy Rule, 45 confidential pursuant to state and CFR Part 160 and 164.” Mot. to Seal federal laws and regulations. But that ¶¶ 4, 5. does not establish that any law prohibits or restricts disclosure of This argument does not address the such records by courts when the legal standards that govern the records are filed and used in pending public’s right of access to documents, cases.” Id. at *2. especially those upon which the Court relies when ruling on a motion for Nevertheless, “the Court will still summary judgment. weigh the public’s right of access against the defendants’ interest in The public has a First Amendment of sealing.” Id. Like the Musgrove access to these judicial records. See, defendants, Peach has “not addressed e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d the public’s interest in access at all, 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014). Therefore, much less explained why it is Peach “must show a compelling outweighed by a governmental governmental interest or other higher interest in secrecy.” Id. value to justify sealing, and the limitation on public access must be “While the Court recognizes that narrowly tailored to serve that medical records are ordinarily kept interest.” Musgrove v. Moore, No. confidential, that is not always the 1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at case when those records are *1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (denying important to a lawsuit the patient the defendants’ motion to seal himself has brought.” Id. medical records in a § 1983 case Although Peach filed her motion to VI. CONCLUSION seal on October 8, 2025, Chambers has not joined the motion. See IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that generally Docket. Furthermore, in Joanna Peach’s motion to seal is his complaint, Chambers described DENIED; his alleged injuries, statements about his medical condition that he made to IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peach, and care he received from the Joanna Peach refile Docket Entries doctor. See Statement of Claim, 37, 37-1, and 37-2 as_ publicly Compl. The Court discerns no accessible documents that also interest here that outweighs the comply with Federal Rule of Civil public’s right of access to these Procedure 5.2; materials. IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED Accordingly, Peach’s motion to seal is that the Court GRANT Defendants denied. Couzzi, Kluk, and Rodgers’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss the claim against them with prejudice; and IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant Joanna Peach’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss the claim against her with prejudice.
Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge July 23, 2026