1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DURRELL ANTHONY PUCKETT, ) Case No. CV 19-7688-JLS (JPR) ) 11 Plaintiff, ) ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED ) COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 12 v. ) ) 13 OFFICER D. BOLANOS et al., ) ) 14 Defendants. ) ) 15 ) 16 17 On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding 18 pro se, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 against numerous employees of the California State Prison, Los 20 Angeles County. He was subsequently granted leave to proceed in 21 forma pauperis. On December 12, 2019, before the Court could 22 screen the Complaint, he filed a First Amended Complaint. On 23 January 19, 2020, the Court dismissed the FAC with leave to 24 amend. On February 11, 2020, he filed a Second Amended 25 Complaint. 26 Plaintiff’s claims arise primarily from several December 28, 27 2017 incidents during which prison guards allegedly assaulted 28 him. He has named as Defendants the following CSP-LAC employees: 1 1 correctional sergeants Salvador Bermudez and Miguel Mendoza; 2 correctional officers David Bolanos, Pedro Castellanos, Aaron 3 Altamirano, Raymond Monteon, David Melos-Trejos, Richard Tull, 4 Robert Anderson, Michael Dilger, and Carlos Flores; and “[p]sych 5 [t]ech[s]” Erika Rios and Clark.1 (SAC at 2-6 (the Court uses 6 the pagination generated by its official Case Management/ 7 Electronic Case Filing system).) He sues them in only their 8 individual capacity, and he seeks damages. (Id. at 2-6, 9.) 9 After screening the SAC under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 10 1915A, the Court finds that some of its allegations fail to state 11 a claim on which relief might be granted. Because those claims 12 might be cured by amendment, the SAC is dismissed with leave to 13 amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 14 2000) (en banc) (holding that pro se litigant must be given leave 15 to amend complaint unless absolutely clear that deficiencies 16 cannot be cured). If Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his 17 claims, he is ORDERED to file a third amended complaint within 28 18 days of the date of this order, remedying the deficiencies 19 discussed below. 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure 22 to state a claim “where there is no cognizable legal theory or an 23 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 24 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 25 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citation omitted); 26 accord O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In 27 28 1 Plaintiff says Clark’s first name is “unknown.” (SAC at 3.) 2 1 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must 2 generally accept as true all the factual allegations in it. 3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown, 4 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). The court need not accept 5 as true, however, “allegations that are merely conclusory, 6 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In 7 re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 8 (citation omitted); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x 9 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly 10 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory 11 allegations” did not support it). 12 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual 13 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 14 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 15 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 17 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it 18 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 19 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 20 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ 21 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 22 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 23 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 24 curiam) (citations omitted); Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 25 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 26 27 28 3 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Some of the SAC’s Allegations Fail to State a Claim on Which 3 Relief Might Be Granted 4 Although the allegations in the SAC provide a somewhat 5 clearer picture of what transpired and who was involved in the 6 alleged attacks giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims than those in 7 the FAC — for instance, he clarifies that he was attacked “(3) 8 times in 10 minutes” (SAC at 11) — there remain glaring problems 9 that he must fix to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims.2 10 For instance, Plaintiff’s allegations that on December 28, 11 2017, Bolanos “intentionally pepper spray[ed]” him; Castellanos, 12 Flores, and Mendoza struck him “multiple times” and called him 13 “racial slurs”; Anderson “beat [him]”; and Melos-Trejos and 14 Altamirano hit him “a lot” with a baton while he was naked (id. 15 at 8) sufficiently establish those Defendants’ role in the 16 attacks. But some of his other allegations are not as clear. 17 The only allegations about Monteon and Dilger are that they tried 18 to “pump everything up.” (Id.) That ambiguous phrase can mean 19 almost anything and is insufficient to support an inference that 20 they participated in the attacks in any way that would make them 21 constitutionally liable. Similarly, he alleges that Bermudez, 22 Rios, Clark, and Tull “failed to intervene or report” the attack 23 2 Plaintiff says he has “filed other lawsuits in state or 24 federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action.” 25 (SAC at 13; see id. at 8, 11 (stating that he filed “Writ of Habeas Corpus due to prison staff’s “non-responsive[ness]” to his 26 administrative grievances).) But the lawsuit he identifies (see id. at 13) was filed in 2010, nearly eight years before the conduct 27 alleged in the SAC, and none of his many lawsuits in either this district or the Eastern District appear related to his claims here. 28 4 1 (id.), but he does not allege facts from which to infer that 2 those Defendants were aware of the attacks and were in a position 3 to stop them. See Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th 4 Cir. 2005) (failure of prison officials to protect inmate from 5 attack “may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation 6 when: (1) the deprivation alleged is ‘objectively, sufficiently 7 serious’ and (2) the prison officials had a ‘sufficiently 8 culpable state of mind,’ acting with deliberate indifference” 9 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).3 10 Plaintiff also fails to adequately allege that he was denied 11 medical or mental-health treatment.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 DURRELL ANTHONY PUCKETT, ) Case No. CV 19-7688-JLS (JPR) ) 11 Plaintiff, ) ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED ) COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 12 v. ) ) 13 OFFICER D. BOLANOS et al., ) ) 14 Defendants. ) ) 15 ) 16 17 On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding 18 pro se, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 against numerous employees of the California State Prison, Los 20 Angeles County. He was subsequently granted leave to proceed in 21 forma pauperis. On December 12, 2019, before the Court could 22 screen the Complaint, he filed a First Amended Complaint. On 23 January 19, 2020, the Court dismissed the FAC with leave to 24 amend. On February 11, 2020, he filed a Second Amended 25 Complaint. 26 Plaintiff’s claims arise primarily from several December 28, 27 2017 incidents during which prison guards allegedly assaulted 28 him. He has named as Defendants the following CSP-LAC employees: 1 1 correctional sergeants Salvador Bermudez and Miguel Mendoza; 2 correctional officers David Bolanos, Pedro Castellanos, Aaron 3 Altamirano, Raymond Monteon, David Melos-Trejos, Richard Tull, 4 Robert Anderson, Michael Dilger, and Carlos Flores; and “[p]sych 5 [t]ech[s]” Erika Rios and Clark.1 (SAC at 2-6 (the Court uses 6 the pagination generated by its official Case Management/ 7 Electronic Case Filing system).) He sues them in only their 8 individual capacity, and he seeks damages. (Id. at 2-6, 9.) 9 After screening the SAC under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 10 1915A, the Court finds that some of its allegations fail to state 11 a claim on which relief might be granted. Because those claims 12 might be cured by amendment, the SAC is dismissed with leave to 13 amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 14 2000) (en banc) (holding that pro se litigant must be given leave 15 to amend complaint unless absolutely clear that deficiencies 16 cannot be cured). If Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his 17 claims, he is ORDERED to file a third amended complaint within 28 18 days of the date of this order, remedying the deficiencies 19 discussed below. 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure 22 to state a claim “where there is no cognizable legal theory or an 23 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 24 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 25 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citation omitted); 26 accord O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In 27 28 1 Plaintiff says Clark’s first name is “unknown.” (SAC at 3.) 2 1 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must 2 generally accept as true all the factual allegations in it. 3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown, 4 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). The court need not accept 5 as true, however, “allegations that are merely conclusory, 6 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In 7 re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 8 (citation omitted); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x 9 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly 10 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory 11 allegations” did not support it). 12 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual 13 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 14 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 15 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 17 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it 18 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 19 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 20 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ 21 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 22 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 23 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 24 curiam) (citations omitted); Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 25 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 26 27 28 3 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Some of the SAC’s Allegations Fail to State a Claim on Which 3 Relief Might Be Granted 4 Although the allegations in the SAC provide a somewhat 5 clearer picture of what transpired and who was involved in the 6 alleged attacks giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims than those in 7 the FAC — for instance, he clarifies that he was attacked “(3) 8 times in 10 minutes” (SAC at 11) — there remain glaring problems 9 that he must fix to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims.2 10 For instance, Plaintiff’s allegations that on December 28, 11 2017, Bolanos “intentionally pepper spray[ed]” him; Castellanos, 12 Flores, and Mendoza struck him “multiple times” and called him 13 “racial slurs”; Anderson “beat [him]”; and Melos-Trejos and 14 Altamirano hit him “a lot” with a baton while he was naked (id. 15 at 8) sufficiently establish those Defendants’ role in the 16 attacks. But some of his other allegations are not as clear. 17 The only allegations about Monteon and Dilger are that they tried 18 to “pump everything up.” (Id.) That ambiguous phrase can mean 19 almost anything and is insufficient to support an inference that 20 they participated in the attacks in any way that would make them 21 constitutionally liable. Similarly, he alleges that Bermudez, 22 Rios, Clark, and Tull “failed to intervene or report” the attack 23 2 Plaintiff says he has “filed other lawsuits in state or 24 federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action.” 25 (SAC at 13; see id. at 8, 11 (stating that he filed “Writ of Habeas Corpus due to prison staff’s “non-responsive[ness]” to his 26 administrative grievances).) But the lawsuit he identifies (see id. at 13) was filed in 2010, nearly eight years before the conduct 27 alleged in the SAC, and none of his many lawsuits in either this district or the Eastern District appear related to his claims here. 28 4 1 (id.), but he does not allege facts from which to infer that 2 those Defendants were aware of the attacks and were in a position 3 to stop them. See Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th 4 Cir. 2005) (failure of prison officials to protect inmate from 5 attack “may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation 6 when: (1) the deprivation alleged is ‘objectively, sufficiently 7 serious’ and (2) the prison officials had a ‘sufficiently 8 culpable state of mind,’ acting with deliberate indifference” 9 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).3 10 Plaintiff also fails to adequately allege that he was denied 11 medical or mental-health treatment. His only allegation on that 12 score is that Rios and Clark “denied medical” because “nobody 13 wanted to get held to do over time.” (SAC at 8.) Those 14 conclusory allegations, which offer no details about what medical 15 treatment he requested and the circumstances under which his 16 requests were denied, are insufficient to establish deliberate 17 indifference to his serious medical needs. See Shelton, 487 F. 18 App’x at 389 (affirming dismissal when plaintiff’s “conclusory 19 3 The SAC still fails to allege sufficient facts to show that 20 the force used by Defendants in the attacks was “malicious[] and 21 sadistic[]” and not “applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L.A., 891 F.3d 776, 788 22 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), as the Court previously warned Plaintiff he must do (see Order Dismissing FAC at 7-8). 23 Specifically, although he claims that to justify the attack several Defendants falsely reported that he had “spit” on them (SAC at 8), 24 he fails to coherently set forth the chain of events that 25 culminated in the attacks, omitting critical information about what prompted the officers’ use of force and whether his admittedly 26 “suicidal” behavior played a role. Although the facts alleged in inmate Billy Cook’s declaration, which is attached to the SAC (see 27 id. at 20-21), likely cure those deficiencies, Plaintiff should himself allege them in any amended pleading, assuming he believes 28 them to be true. 5 1 allegations d[id] not support his claim that defendant’s actions 2 constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need”). 3 Indeed, the exhibits he attaches to the SAC show that he was 4 evaluated by medical staff the same day as the alleged attacks 5 (SAC at 18), and he admits that he was later taken to an “outside 6 hospital for a second opinion” and treatment (id. at 9); see 7 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.) 8 (noting that plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by 9 including . . . details contrary to his claims”), amended by 275 10 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 11 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e are not required to 12 accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by 13 documents referred to in the complaint.”). 14 II. The SAC Once Again Does Not Comply with Federal Rule of 15 Civil Procedure 10(a) 16 As the Court already explained to Plaintiff (see Order 17 Dismissing FAC at 12), Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 Procedure requires that the “title of the complaint must name all 19 the parties.” And the Central District’s standard civil-rights 20 complaint form, which he used to draft the SAC, instructed him to 21 do the same. (See SAC at 1.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff names only 22 “Officer D. Bolanos” in the SAC’s caption. (Id.) In any amended 23 complaint he chooses to file, he must list the names of all 24 Defendants in the proper space in the caption or the amended 25 complaint will be subject to dismissal on that basis alone. See 26 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (as 27 amended). 28 ********************* 6 1 Tf Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his claims, he is 2 || ORDERED to file a third amended complaint within 28 days of the 3 date of this order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above. 4]|| The TAC should bear the docket number assigned to this case, be 5 || labeled “Third Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of 6 || itself, without reference to the SAC or any other pleading. He 7 warned that if he fails to timely file a sufficient TAC, the 8 || Court may dismiss this action entirely on the grounds set forth 9 || above or for failure to diligently prosecute, particularly given 10 | that Plaintiff has already been given numerous opportunities to 11 || cure the deficiencies in his claims. 12 13 || DATED: March 24, 2020 Prenlaten JE P. ROSENBLUTH 14 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28