Durham v. Social Security, Commissioner of

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-12271
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMANDA D., Case No. 24-12271

Plaintiff, v. Curtis Ivy, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. __________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF Nos. 9, 11)

Plaintiff Amanda D. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 9), the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 11), Plaintiff’s reply (ECF No. 12) and the administrative record (ECF No. 6). For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the administrative decision is AFFIRMED. I. DISCUSSION A. Background and Administrative History Plaintiff alleges her disability began on April 11, 2022, at the age of 33.

(ECF No. 6-1, PageID.35). On April 21, 2022, she applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (Id.). In her disability report, she listed ailments which diminished her ability to work. The ailments included:

limited mobility in her right hand and leg, intermittent low vision in her right eye, and multiple sclerosis. (Id. at PageID.251). Her application was denied on September 23, 2022. (Id. at PageID.35). Following the denial, Plaintiff requested a hearing by an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). On August 23, 2023, ALJ Donald D’Amato held a hearing, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Id. at PageID.52-71). On October 13, 2023, the ALJ issued an opinion, which determined that Plaintiff was

not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at PageID.46). Plaintiff later submitted a request for review of the hearing decision. On July 25, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at PageiD.18- 21). Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.

Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on August 30, 2024. B. Framework for Disability Determinations Disability is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner is to consider, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment

that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations; (4) can return to past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether he or she can perform other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.1 The Plaintiff has the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to

the Commissioner at step five to demonstrate that there is work available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[D]uring the first four steps, the claimant has the

burden of proof; this burden shifts to the Commissioner only at Step Five.”) (citing Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1990)). C. The Administrative Decision Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), at Step 1 of the

sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 11, 2022, the alleged onset date. (Id. at

1 Citations to the regulations or Social Security Rulings are to those effective on the date of the application for disability benefits or the ALJ’s decision, where appropriate, unless otherwise indicated. PageID.37). At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis (“MS”), migraines, degenerative changes of the

cervical spine, adjustment disorder, depressive disorder, neurocognitive disorder, and obesity. (Id. at PageID.38). At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled

the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id. at PageID.38-39). Between Steps 3 and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 and determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with several limitations. (Id. at PageID.39-44). At Step 4, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at PageID.44). At Step 5, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined there were existing jobs in significant numbers

within the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as assembler, packer, and inspector. (Id. at PageiD.45). The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since September 6, 2016, the date the application was filed.

D. Standard of Review

2 The claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is an assessment of the most the claimant can do in a work setting despite his or her physical or mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002). The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009)

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir.

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court,

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Even so, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court

defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). E. Analysis Plaintiff’s appeal focuses on two arguments—(1) the ALJ did not

sufficiently articulate his Step Three finding that Plaintiff’s MS did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment and (2) the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s fatigue when crafting the RFC. The Court finds that neither argument requires remand to the Commissioner.

1. Step Three Articulation At step three, the ALJ compares a claimant’s impairments to an enumerated list of medical conditions that the Social Security Administration has deemed

“severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). Each Listing describes “the objective medical and other findings needed to satisfy the

criteria of that listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3). If a claimant meets or medically equals all of the criteria for a listed impairment, she is disabled; otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)-(e); see

also Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 653 (“A claimant must satisfy all of the criteria to meet the listing.”). Plaintiff bears the burden to show she has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; see Foster v. Halter, 279

F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ’s reference to Plaintiff’s MS at Step Three is brief. He wrote, “The claimant’s physical impairments do not meet or medically equal any listed

impairment including . . . those in listing 11.00 concerning neurological impairments.” (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.38). Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not explaining which listing within 11.00 he is referring to. She insists that she meets Listing 11.09 because her fatigue “greatly affects her ability to function on a day-

to-day basis and that her medical records are filled with statements of fatigue.” (ECF No. 9, PageID.696). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently rejected a heightened articulation

standard, noting . . . that the ALJ is under no obligation to spell out ‘every consideration that went into the step three determination’ or ‘the weight he gave each factor in his step three analysis,’ or to discuss every single impairment.”

Andrews v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 2200393, at *12 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2013) (citing Staggs v. Astrue, 2011 WL 3444014, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2011)). “[I]t is well-settled that the Court may look at the rest of the ALJ’s

decision in order to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s Step Three determination.” Smukala v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 943953, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2016). “[T]he procedure [is not] so legalistic that the requisite explanation and support must be located entirely within the section of the

ALJ’s decision devoted specifically to step three; the court in Bledsoe implicitly endorsed the practice of searching the ALJ’s entire decision for statements supporting his step three analysis.” Staggs, 2011 WL 3444014, at *12 (citing

Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2006)). And “the ALJ need not discuss listings that the applicant clearly does not meet. . . . If, however, the record ‘raise[s] a substantial question as to whether [the claimant] could qualify as disabled’ under a listing, the ALJ should discuss that listing.” Pasiak v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 800 F. App’x 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sheeks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App'x 639, 641 (6th Cir. 2013)). The ALJ’s Step Three conclusion on the MS diagnosis is conclusory, but the

hearing decision as a whole provides a much more extensive review of the medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s Step Three conclusion. (See ECF No. 6-1, PageID.40-44). And that discussion shows that there is no substantial question

about whether Plaintiff meets or medically equals the listing, so no heightened articulation was required at Step Three. The relevant listing here is 11.09 for MS. Plaintiff suggests she meets

Listing 11.09 for MS because her fatigue impacts her day-to-day activities and she mentions that she has MRIs of her spine, but she failed to explain why the results of those MRIs meet or equal the listing. To meet the MS listing, a person must show either: (A) “disorganization of

motor function in two extremities, resulting in an extreme limitation in the ability to stand up from a seated position, balance while standing or walking, or use of the upper extremities” or (B) a marked limitation in physical functioning and in either

“understanding, remembering, or applying information; or interacting with others; or concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing oneself[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 11.09 (cleaned up). An “extreme limitation” means the inability to stand from seated or maintain balance while

standing and walking without assistance, or using the upper extremities for work- related activities. Id. at 11.00(D)(2). Marked limitation means being “seriously limited” in these areas. Id. at 11.00(G)(2)(a). Though Plaintiff insists she meets the listing, she points to no evidence that exactly matches what the listing requires. There is no evidence of an inability to

stand or walk or use her upper extremities. She testified about using a cane or wheelchair, but no medical evidence, such as a doctor’s prescription or observations of impaired gait, verifies that she indeed required the use of an

assistive device to stand or walk. Nor is there evidence of a marked or serious limitation in physical functioning and in any of the three mental health areas listed in (B). The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s “vague” reference to some short- and long-term memory difficulties during a medical encounter, (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.42), but

this reference does not establish a marked limitation in remembering. Finally, her complaints of fatigue do not meet the listing. Perhaps Plaintiff intended to argue that her symptoms medically equal the

listing. Still, she has not met her burden to prove her case. If a claimant’s impairment does not meet a listed impairment, the claimant will still be found disabled at step three if her impairment is the medical equivalent of a listing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Medical equivalence exists if medical findings

related to the impairment are at least of equal medical significance to the findings necessary to meet the listings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b)(1). Plaintiff’s insistence that her fatigue, which she reported to her treating

doctors several times, satisfies the listing is insufficient. So too is her mention of having MRIs of her spine. Contrasting Plaintiff’s assertions with the medical evidence the ALJ cites in his RFC assessment shows why the ALJ decided at Step

Three that Plaintiff does not meet or medically equal the listing for MS. The ALJ discussed the medical records showing improvement in MS symptoms (both physical symptoms and headaches) after taking steroids and engaging in physical

therapy. (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.41-42). He also noted that Plaintiff voluntarily stopped taking steroid medication to pursue pregnancy, which he said was “inconsistent with [her] allegations of debilitating impairments.” (Id. at PageID.42). The ALJ discussed the medical records on Plaintiff’s mental health

and impairments. Though Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated for adjustment disorder, depressive disorder, and neurocognitive disorder, Plaintiff reported that her mood was better and very good in June 2022 and June 2023, respectively. Her

depression was in full remission as of June 2023 (id. at PageID.619) and her cognitive functioning was within normal limits during testing in September 2022 (id. at PageID.479-80). These medical facts do not medically equal the severity of the limitations in Listing 11.09.

In the last appointment before the ALJ’s decision, the record notes that Plaintiff denied “any symptoms to suggest a[n MS] relapse.” (Id. at PageID.678). Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of inaccuracy because he wrote that Plaintiff denied

symptoms of relapse at that appointment, rather than that she denied symptoms suggesting relapse. The ALJ’s choice of phrasing does not meaningfully change Plaintiff’s statement—there were no symptoms of a relapse which is the same as

saying there were no symptoms suggesting Plaintiff was in relapse. In all, the ALJ’s characterization of the evidence as showing controlled, relatively mild symptoms that do not meet or medically equal the standard of

disability is accurate and that evidence does not reflect or suggest that Plaintiff meets or medically equals Listing 11.09. Because the evidence does not raise a substantial question as to whether Plaintiff meets or equals the listing, the ALJ’s statement about the listing at Step Three is sufficient and the decision at Step Three

is supported by substantial evidence. 2. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Fatigue Plaintiff says that the ALJ did not address her fatigue in his analysis. (ECF

No. 9, PageID.697). She relies on the medical records being “replete with statements of her fatigue,” (id.), yet the ALJ did not address fatigue or its effects on her ability to work full time. Specifically, she says medical records from May 9, 2022, June 26, 2023, and August 7, 2023, establish that her fatigue interferes

with her ability to complete activities of daily living. (Id. at PageID.698). Plaintiff’s argument is at odds with what is contained in the ALJ’s RFC analysis. The ALJ expressly mentioned that Plaintiff asserted disability in part

because she experienced exhaustion and fatigue with over-exertion. (ECF No. 6-1, PageID.40). Then, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s physical abilities, abilities which Plaintiff asserted were impacted by fatigue in her

extremities. While Plaintiff complained of fatigue in her legs, the ALJ noted objective findings repeatedly showing no gait abnormality, impaired coordination, weakness, or diminished sensation. (See, e.g., ECF No. 6-1, PageID.421, 584, 589,

596-97, 605, 626, 681). Though the ALJ was not repeating the word “fatigue” as he discussed the evidence, the evidence he reviewed either mentioned fatigue but included normal objective findings or did not mention fatigue and included normal objective

findings. So Plaintiff is incorrect to say that the ALJ did not address how her fatigue and related symptoms impact her ability to do and sustain work-related functions because the ALJ addressed the evidence on her ability to work.

Moreover, what is contained in the three records Plaintiff cites does not detract from the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. On May 9, 2022, a physician concluded, without explanation, that fatigue impaired Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (Id. at PageID.426). Yet almost two weeks later, in a

record the ALJ cited, Plaintiff reported doing better with her MS symptoms, objective examination was normal, and the physician concluded that Plaintiff was “reasonably stable” and “doing better overall following the steroids.” (Id. at

PageID.420-22). The physician did not mention limitations due to fatigue. In the June 26, 2023, record, the physician made no objective statement about leg fatigue. Rather, the physician noted Plaintiff’s complaint of fatigue. (Id. at PageID.582).

Objective examination of her lower extremities revealed normal strength and motor function throughout. (Id. at PageiD.583). Not only did objective examination fail to support the complaint of fatigue on June 26, 2023, the ALJ

found Plaintiff’s subjective statements—which are the only evidence of fatigue impacting her functioning—to be inconsistent with the medical evidence. (Id. at PageID.41). Plaintiff did not challenge that finding. And the ALJ discussed this record, so the Court presumes he saw the notation about Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id.

at PageID.42). Lastly, on August 7, 2023, the physician noted Plaintiff’s “prominent symptoms” including “fatigable leg weakness,” but also found normal strength and motor function in Plaintiff’s lower extremities. (Id. at PageID.681-

82). The ALJ discussed this medical record, too. (Id. at PageID.42). What is clear is that the ALJ considered the evidence concerning fatigue but concluded that the objective findings on Plaintiff’s strength and motor function, i.e., her ability to move and engage in various tasks, were sufficient to support the decision.

Plaintiff’s argument that her fatigue rendered her disabled amounts to a request that the Court reweigh the evidence, which it will not and cannot do. Her burden was to show that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, but she did not meet that burden. That there may be evidence supporting Plaintiff’s position is not a basis to reverse the ALJ’s decision. That decision is supported by substantial evidence, so it is affirmed.

F. Conclusion Plaintiff has the burden of proof on her statements of error. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has not shown

legal error that would upend the ALJ’s decision. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: August 28, 2025 s/Curtis Ivy, Jr. Curtis Ivy, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge