Durga Prasad Komma and Mounika Narisetty v. Joseph B. Edlow in His Official Capacity as Director USCIS, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03702
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DURGA PRASAD KOMMA and No. 2:25-cv-3702 DJC AC PS MOUNIKA NARISETTY, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 JOSEPH B. EDLOW IN HIS OFFICIAL 15 CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR USCIS, et al, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiffs paid the filing fee and are proceeding in this matter pro se; pre-trial proceedings 19 are accordingly referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). Defendants filed a 20 motion to dismiss. ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs opposed the motion (ECF No. 11) and defendants 21 replied (ECF No. 12). Because defendants included new information and a declaration in their 22 reply brief, the court gave plaintiffs an opportunity to file a surreply and took the motion under 23 submission. ECF No. 14. Plaintiffs submitted a surreply. ECF No. 15. Having considered all of 24 the briefing in full, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) 25 be GRANTED. 26 I. Background 27 A. The Complaint 28 Plaintiffs are citizens and nationals of India. ECF No.1 at 3. Plaintiff Durga Prasad 1 Komma filed a Form I-526E, Immigration Petition by Regional Center Investor, on March 31, 2 2025, based on an investment of capital in a rural project, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5). Id. 3 Plaintiff Mounika Narisetty filed a Form I-526E, Immigrant Petition by Regional Center Investor, 4 on January 17, 2025, based on an investment of capital in a rural project. An I-526E is a petition 5 filed with USCIS to demonstrate that the investment of $800,000 (or more) in a specific Regional 6 Center project complies with EB-5 requirements and will create 10 or more jobs, in order to 7 obtain a visa. Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 8 Both plaintiffs also filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or 9 Adjust Status, seeking an adjustment in status. Id. at 3-4. An I-485 is filed with USCIS by an 10 individual already in the U.S. to adjust a non-immigrant status to conditional permanent resident 11 status. Plaintiffs allege that the statutory prerequisites for adjustment (admission/parole, 12 eligibility for an immigrant visa, and visa availability) are fully satisfied. Id. at 4. Despite 13 meeting all statutory and regulatory requirements and submitting all required biometrics, 14 documentation, and fees, plaintiffs’ forms I-485 have remained unadjudicated for what plaintiffs 15 allege is an unreasonable period of time, well beyond the processing targets articulated by statute 16 and agency guidance. Id. at 4. 17 Plaintiffs alleges that defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures Act, which 18 requires agencies to conclude matters presented to them “within a reasonable time,” and assert 19 that action “unreasonably delayed” or “unlawfully withheld” can be compelled by a court under 5 20 U.S.C. §555(b) and §706(1). Id. at 2.1 Plaintiffs argue that USCIS has a clear, non-discretionary 21 duty to adjudicate Form I-485 applications. Id. Plaintiffs contend the delay in adjudicating their 22 I-485 petitions has caused significant harm, including restrictions on employment and travel. Id. 23 at 3. They ask the court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling USCIS to promptly adjudicate 24 their pending Form I-485 petitions, and order other such relief the court deems proper. Id. 25 //// 26

27 1 The cited sections of the APA work together: § 555(b) establishes a general requirement that agencies must act within a reasonable time, and §706(1) gives courts the authority to enforce that 28 duty. 1 A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 2 Defendants argue the court must “dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because courts lack jurisdiction to compel the adjudication of I-485 adjustment 4 applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” ECF No. 6 at 2. Federal courts are courts of 5 limited jurisdiction and, until proven otherwise, cases lie outside the jurisdiction of the court. 6 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377–78 (1994). A motion to 7 dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is a jurisdictional attack and may be either facial or 8 factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the complaint is 9 challenged as failing to establish federal jurisdiction, even assuming all the allegations are true 10 and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Safe Air for Everyone v. 11 Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger 12 provides evidence that an alleged fact is false resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 13 In these circumstances, the allegations are not presumed to be true and “the district court is not 14 restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and 15 testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. 16 United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 In this case, defendants have mounted a “facial” attack. ECF No. 6 at 3. The district 18 court resolves a facial attack as it would resolve a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): 19 Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 20 favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the 21 court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 22 The burden is on the party asserting federal jurisdiction (in this case, plaintiffs) to establish that 23 the court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action. See Assoc. of Am. Medical Colleges v. 24 United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 B. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider the Complaint 26 Plaintiffs assert federal jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act and the 27 Mandamus Act. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. The statute codifying the common law “writ of mandamus,” 28 28 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action 1 in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency 2 thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 3 (1984). “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal official to 4 perform a duty only if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s duty is 5 nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other 6 adequate remedy is available.” Grondal v. United States, 37 F.4th 610, 620 (9th Cir. 2022) 7 (quoting Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added). “Because 8 ‘mandamus relief and relief under the APA are “in essence” the same,’ when a complaint seeks 9 relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA and there is an adequate remedy under the APA, [a 10 court] may elect to analyze the APA claim only.” Vaz v. Neal, 33 F.4th 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 11 2022) (quoting R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997)). Here, 12 plaintiffs seek the same relief under both of their claims. Accordingly, because there is an 13 adequate remedy under the APA, the court analyzes plaintiffs’ claims under the APA only. 14 Under § 706(1) of the APA, courts are authorized to “compel agency action ... 15 unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Not all agency actions are subject to judicial review 16 under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions 17 thereof, except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is 18 committed to agency discretion by law.”). To invoke the APA to allege that an agency has 19 unlawfully withheld action requires that “a plaintiff assert[] that an agency failed to take a 20 discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 21 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis in original). A “court can compel agency action . . . only if there is ‘a 22 specific, unequivocal command’ placed on the agency to take a ‘discrete agency action,’ and the 23 agency has failed to take that action.” Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 811 F.3d 24 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting id. at 63–64). Accordingly, “for a claim of unreasonable 25 delay to survive, the agency must have a statutory duty in the first place.” San Francisco 26 BayKeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 2002). 27 Defendants argue that “judicial review concerning the pace of adjudication of Plaintiffs’ 28 Form I-485 is not permitted under the APA because review is precluded both by the Immigration 1 and Nationality Act and since adjudication is committed to USCIS’s discretion.” ECF No. 12 at 2 2. This court has rejected both of these arguments before and does so again here. Indeed, “many 3 courts in the Ninth Circuit have determined . . . that federal courts have jurisdiction to review the 4 government’s failure to adjudicate a status adjustment application.” Khan v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 5 3d 918, 924–25 (C.D. Cal. 2014). As to defendants’ argument that the absence of a strict 6 timetable for adjudication of an I-485 application renders their obligations discretionary and 7 therefore not enforceable under the APA, “the majority of district courts within this circuit that 8 the government has a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate such a petition within a reasonable 9 period of time, and that to hold otherwise would be to sanction the perpetual delay of 10 governmental obligations that are clearly mandated by law.” Id. at 925 (internal citations 11 omitted). 12 Defendants’ argument that the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes review is 13 likewise unpersuasive. The Act at § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have 14 jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 15 Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the 16 discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 17 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Defendants argue that the use of discretionary terms in this section triggers a 18 jurisdictional bar because there is no mandatory act to enforce under the APA. ECF No. 6 at 5-6. 19 Again, plaintiffs are not asking the court to review a final decision of the Agency, and while the 20 Agency’s “duty to grant an adjusted status is discretionary, its duty to process I-485 applications 21 under § 1255 is non-discretionary.” Xin Liu v. Chertoff, No. S 06-2808 RRB-EFB, 2007 WL 22 2433337, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2007) (finding jurisdiction to adjudicate a delay in processing 23 I-485 applications) (emphasis added). The undersigned concludes, in line with other courts in 24 this district, that “while Defendants have the discretion to grant or deny Plaintiff’s I-485 25 Application, they have a mandatory duty to act upon it ‘within a reasonable time’” and the court 26 has jurisdiction to consider whether or not the government met its mandatory duty. Gao v. 27 Mullin, No. 25-CV-01479-SVK, 2026 WL 948665, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2026). 28 //// 1 C. Dismissal is Appropriate Because Delay is Not Unreasonable 2 Having found that the court has jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims, the undersigned 3 nonetheless concludes that dismissal is appropriate because it is clear on the face of the complaint 4 that there has not, to date, been a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.2 A complaint 5 may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted. Such a motion may be based on either the lack of a cognizable 7 legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri 8 v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). A complaint must present factual 9 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 (2007). Specifically, the factual allegations must suffice to 11 state a claim that is “plausible on its face,” that is, “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent 12 with)” a right to relief. Id. at 557, 570. 13 With respect to cases alleging unreasonable delay in processing immigration applications, 14 courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a six-factor test for determining when an agency delay is 15 unreasonable. These are known as “the ‘TRAC factors,’ which are named after the case in which 16 they originated, Telecommunications Research & Action v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 80 17 (D.C.Cir.1984).” Khan v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 3d 918, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The six factors 18 that the court must balance are: 19 (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; 20 (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of 21 the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of 22 reason; 23 24 2 Defendants assert this basis for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), though it would 25 have more appropriately been raised as a challenge to the complaint on 12(b)(6) grounds. See, 26 Gao v. Mullin, et al., No. 25-CV-01479-SVK, 2026 WL 948665, at *5, n.7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2026). Because the issue was fully briefed by both parties (see plaintiffs’ opposition to the 27 motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11 at 9-10), in the interest of justice and judicial economy the court interprets defendants’ motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency of the complaint as a motion 28 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 1 (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at 2 stake; 3 (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 4 (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of 5 the interests prejudiced by delay; and 6 (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. 7 8 Id. at 928. 9 1. Fist Factor: Rule of Reason 10 The first TRAC factor requires that the time an agency takes to make a decision be guided 11 by a “rule of reason.” Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants state 12 that employment-based immigration applications such as the applications at issue here are 13 decided in the order they are received. ECF No. 12 at 6. “A first-in, first-out (FIFO) procedure 14 for processing applications can constitute a rule of reason.” Varniab v. Edlow, No. 25-CV- 15 10602-SVK, 2026 WL 485490, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026). Plaintiff Komma put his 16 application in the queue on March 31, 2025, and plaintiff Narisetty put hers in the queue on 17 January 17, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. Defendants submitted a declaration from Colin Boatright, 18 Section Chief of USCIS, stating that as of March 20, 2206, the processing center had 19 approximately 24,265 (20,584 based on approved 14 I-526E) employment-based I-485 20 applications pending before it, and approximately 3,737 (1,091 based on 15 approved I-526E), 21 were filed before plaintiffs’ I-485 applications. ECF No. 12-1 at 4. According to Boatright, the 22 average processing speed for applications at the time the declaration was filed was 32 months. Id. 23 The court finds that this factor favors defendants; the FIFO processing method is a reasonable 24 one, and plaintiffs’ applications are still within the average processing time. 25 2. Second Factor: Statutory Timetable 26 “The lack of a specific timetable does not mean that USCIS can take an infinite amount of 27 time to process Plaintiff’s adjustment of status application.” Kashkool v. Chertoff, 553 F. Supp. 28 2d 1131, 1144 (D. Ariz. 2008). “Congress sets a normative expectation and standard in ‘The 1 Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000 Immigration Services and 2 Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000’ of a reasonable processing time for an immigrant 3 benefit application as no more than 180 days after initial application.” Liu, 2007 WL 2435157, * 4 9 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1571 which provides “It is the sense of Congress that the processing of an 5 immigrant benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing 6 of the application....”). See also, Konchitsky v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2070325, * 4 (N.D.Cal.2007) 7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1571); Abbasfar v. Chertoff, No. C07–1155–PVT, 2007 WL 2409538, * 3 8 (N.C.Cal.2007) (“8 U.S.C. § 1571 provides a meaningful standard for the pace of adjudication of 9 adjustment of status applications.”). Congress also requires the Attorney General to “take such 10 measures as may be necessary to ... reduce the backlog in the processing of immigration benefit 11 applications, with the objective of the total elimination of the backlog not later than one year after 12 the enactment of this Act.” 8 U.S.C. § 1573.11. Plaintiffs’ applications have now been pending 13 for over a year each, longer than the 180–day standard set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). ECF No. 1 14 at 3-4. This factor favors plaintiffs. 15 3. Third and Fifth TRAC Factors 16 “The third and fifth TRAC factors overlap and are often addressed together.” Varnib, 17 2026 WL 485490, at *13. In general, delay in processing immigration status change applications 18 affect health and welfare interests. Id. The ability to obtain permanent resident status, by way of 19 Form I-485 applications “affects a wide range of important rights, including but not limited to 20 travel and the ability [to] petition to immigrate close family members” and also impacts such 21 applicants’ “ability to seek United States citizenship and all the rights and privileges attendant 22 thereto.” Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Such prejudice is 23 “substantial.” Id. at 1071. However, some courts in this district have found this factor favors 24 defendants unless plaintiffs can show greater harm than the “general harm experienced by all [ ] 25 applicants.” Kullab v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 24-cv-04140-WHO, 2025 WL 26 901943, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2025). 27 Here, plaintiffs assert they “face restricted travel, limited employment mobility, in ability 28 to plan for their futures, and the emotional toll of indefinite limbo – all while their $800,000 1 investments remain at risk.” ECF No. 11 at 10. Defendants contend that USCIS has approved 2 plaintiffs’ I-131 applications (Application for Travel Documents, Parole Documents, and 3 Arrival/Departure Records), which mitigates health and welfare related harm. ECF No. 12 at 8. 4 Plaintiffs argue that, particularly in the current political climate, they are deterred from making 5 multiple international trips to see family members with medical conditions who remain abroad 6 because even with I-131 approvals, they have no guaranteed right of reentry. ECF No. 15 at 6. 7 While any delay is understandably frustrating, the undersigned finds that plaintiffs have not 8 identified harm beyond the general harm experienced by all applicants facing processing delays. 9 Plaintiffs are able to remain in the country and are able to work, and while they may be 10 understandably hesitant to travel internationally, they are able to do so. This factor weights in 11 favor of defendants. 12 4. Fourth Factor: Effect of Expediting Delayed Action 13 Under the fourth TRAC factor, “the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed 14 action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. This factor 15 considers “whether compelling the agency to act would detract from its higher or competing 16 priorities.” Vaz, 33 F.4th at 1138. Under this factor, courts have “refused to grant relief, even 17 though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting the 18 petitioner at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no 19 net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 20 2003) (cleaned up). Here, defendants have submitted a declaration attesting that applications are 21 processed on a FIFO basis. Though plaintiffs argue that this is not the case, there is no indication 22 that expediting plaintiffs’ applications would do anything other than move them to the front of the 23 line, while moving others one step back. This is particularly true considering the relatively short 24 delay plaintiffs have experienced. This factor favors defendants. 25 5. Sixth Factor: Bad Faith 26 The final TRAC factor focuses “not on the delay itself, but whether the reason behind the 27 delay is improper (e.g., intentional, motivated by animus.)” Infracost Inc. v. Blinken, 732 F. 28 Supp. 3d 1240, 1257 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (citation omitted). Failure to demonstrate bad faith does 1 not weigh against plaintiffs but instead weights neutrally. Id. Plaintiffs allege bad faith because 2 USCIS has voluntarily reduced its workforce, diverted resources from adjudication to 3 enforcement, and adopted policies that cause processing delays. ECF No. 11 at 10. Plaintiffs do 4 not, however, identify any particular bad faith with respect to their own applications. 5 Accordingly, the undersigned finds this factor weighs neutrally 6 In conclusion, the TRAC factors favor dismissal because as a matter of law, plaintiffs 7 have not suffered a delay that constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. This 8 finding does not mean that plaintiffs will never be able to make such a showing. In dismissing 9 cases for insufficient delay under the TRAC factors, courts in this circuit have explained that 10 while a delay might be reasonable at a given point in time, there may come a point where 11 continued delay beccomes unreasonable. Islam v. Heinauer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1070–71 (N.D. 12 Cal. 2014). For that reason, the court recommends dismissing this case without prejudice. 13 III. Leave to Amend Is Not Appropriate 14 Leave to amend is not appropriate in this case. Ordinarily, pro se litigants are granted 15 liberal leave to amend. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 16 prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 17 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, given the defects described above, the undersigned finds that 18 leave to amend would be futile and should therefore not be granted. 19 IV. Pro Se Plaintiffs’ Summary 20 The Magistrate Judge is recommending that your case be dismissed because the delay in 21 processing your status adjustment applications has not been legally unreasonable. It is 22 recommended that denial be without prejudice. If you disagree with these recommendations, you 23 may file objections within 21 days. The District Judge will make the final decision. 24 V. Conclusion 25 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6 26 be GRANTED and that this case be dismissed without prejudice. 27 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 1 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 2 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 3 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 4 || Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 5 || appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 6 || v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 7 || DATED: April 23, 2026 ~

ALLISON CLAIRE 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]