OPINION
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Aurelio Duran Gonzalez, along with six individuals (“Plaintiffs”), voluntarily filed applications for adjustment of status, thus disclosing that they were aliens who had been removed and had reentered the United States without inspection. They did this in reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft,
379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir.2004), wherein the court purportedly held that individuals like Plaintiffs were eligible for relief. The district court certified Plaintiffs’ proposed class and issued a preliminary injunction.
The government appealed, and in
Duran Gonzales v. Department of Homeland Security,
508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.2007)
(“Duran Gonzales II
”), we held that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 967, 981-985, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005)
(“Brand X
”), we were compelled to follow the 2006 opinion by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in
In re Torres-Garcia,
23 I. & N. Dec. 866 (BIA 2006). In
In re Torres-Garcia,
the BIA held that individuals such as Plaintiffs were not eligible for relief. We held that, because this was a reasonable interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with interpreting and enforcing the statute, and because our prior opinion in
Perez-Gonzalez
was based on the statute’s ambiguity,
Brand X
required that we defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, even though it was contrary to our prior interpretation of the statute in
Perez-Gonzalez. Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1242.
Accordingly, we vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the matter. Our opinion stated that “[pjursuant to
In re Torres-Garcia,
plaintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers.”
Id.
On remand, the district court held that
Duran Gonzales II
was binding, declined to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint or the class certification, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ action.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that
Duran Gonzales II
should be given prospective application only. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action because
Du
ran Gonzales II
applied its ruling to the Plaintiffs, and another three-judge panel has held that
Duran Gonzales II
has retroactive application.
See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
600 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.2010).
I
Plaintiffs are individuals who are not citizens of the United States, who were previously deported or removed from the United States, and who reentered the United States without inspection. After returning to the United States, Plaintiffs sought to adjust their immigration status by filing applications for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1256. The statute “allowed the Attorney General to adjust the status of an alien who had entered the United States without inspection to that of a legal permanent resident provided that the alien (1) was admissible to the United States and the beneficiary of an immediately available immigrant visa, and (2) paid an application fee five times the usual fee.”
Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1230.
Plaintiffs’ course to adjustment of status, however, was complicated by two provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). The first appeared to deny Plaintiffs relief. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) provides “for automatic reinstatement of an alien’s prior removal or deportation order when an alien has reentered the United States illegally,” and further provides that the “alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief.”
Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1230.
The second section suggested a possible exception to this bar. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) provides that an alien “who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible,” § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) creates an exception for
an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien’s last departure from the United States if, pri- or to the alien’s reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien’s reapplying for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). The exception had two conditions of particular relevance to Plaintiffs: (1) it was only available if made more than 10 years after the alien’s last departure; and (2) the application has to be made from outside the United States.
Plaintiffs, however, found encouragement in our opinion in
Perez-Gonzalez,
which held “that the INS committed legal error when it concluded that Perez-Gonzalez could not apply for a Form 1-212 waiver from within this country.”
Perez-Gonzalez,
379 F.3d at 789. Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed both 1-212 forms seeking relief under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) and applications for adjustment of status under § 1255(i) with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). USCIS denied three of the Plaintiffs’ applications on the ground that the ten-year period had not elapsed since the dates of the applicants’ last departures from the United States.
Plaintiffs then filed their complaint with the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They argued that USCIS’s position — that an alien’s failure to meet the ten-year requirement barred a successful 1-212 application — -was contrary to
Perez-Gonzalez,
and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order, and class certification. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and certified a class. The Department of Homeland Security filed a timely appeal.
II
On appeal, we were constrained by the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Brand X,
545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, in which the Court “held that the circuit court must apply
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute regardless of the circuit court’s contrary precedent, provided that the court’s earlier precedent was an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity.”
Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1235-36. We determined “that, despite some language to the contrary,
Perez-Gonzalez
was based on a finding of statutory ambiguity that left room for agency discretion.”
Id.
at 1237. We explained:
by declining to adhere to the plain language of the inadmissibility provision and instead falling back on the regulations,
Perez-Gonzalez
did not find the inadmissibility provision, nor the statutory scheme, to be unambiguous. Accordingly, we are not bound by
Perez-Gonzalez
and must defer to
In re Torres-Garcia
if its interpretation of the governing statute is reasonable.
Id.
at 1238-39. We recognized that in deciding
In re Torress-Garcia
the BIA considered various interpretations of the statutes, including our approach in
Perez-Gonzalez,
and found “the more reasonable interpretation of the statutory framework to be that an alien may not obtain a waiver under subsection (a)(9)(C)(ii), retroactively or prospectively, without regard to the ten-year bar.”
Id.
at 1241. We determined that the BIA’s decision was “clearly reasonable” and entitled to
Chevron
deference under
Brand X. Id.
at 1242.
The final paragraph in
Duran Gonzales II
states:
we vacate the district court’s order because we hold today that we are bound by the BIA’s interpretation of the applicable statutes in
In re Torres-Garcia,
even though that interpretation differs from our prior interpretation in
Perez-Gonzalez.
Pursuant to
In re Torres-Garcia,
plaintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers.... The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
508 F.3d at 1242-43 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing which included an argument that the opinion should not be applied retroactively. The panel denied the petition for rehearing, and a majority of the active judges declined the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
In the district court on remand, Plaintiffs argued that
Duran Gonzales II
should be given prospective application only and not applied to them. They also sought to amend their class certification to include only those individuals who filed I-212 applications prior to our opinion in
Duran Gonzales II.
The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments, denied their motion to amend class certification, denied their motion to file an amended complaint, and dismissed the action. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument against
Duran Gonzales
ITs retroactivity because “the Circuit court stated conclusively that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute applied to Plaintiffs,” and held that “the retroactive application of
In re Torres-Garda
is simply not an open question before this Court.”
The court reasoned that allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint or to amend their class certification would be futile because neither amendment could change the presumptive retroactive effect of
Duran Gonzales II.
Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.
Ill
Following our remand in
Duran Gonzales II,
we issued two opinions that bear on our consideration of this appeal:
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d 1076, and
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder,
646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
A.
Morales-Izquierdo v. Holder
Raul Morales, a citizen of Mexico, illegally entered the United States in 1990. After being arrested by the INS, Morales was ordered removed in 1994 and was actually removed to Mexico in 1998. 600 F.3d at 1079. He subsequently reentered the United States, again without inspection, in 2001.
Id.
After being removed but before reentering, Morales married a United States citizen.
Id.
Following his reentry without inspection, Morales sought to adjust his status through his citizen-wife.
Id.
In 2003, Morales was taken into eustody, his application for adjustment of status was denied, and a Notice of Intent to/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order (on the basis of his 1998 removal) was issued.
Id.
at 1079-80.
Morales filed several petitions seeking review of these actions. We granted his initial petition for review of the reinstatement order.
Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft,
388 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.2004). Further litigation ensued, however, and when his case was again before us in 2010, one of the issues was whether
Duran Gonzales II
applied to his situation. We explained:
Morales argues that even though he did not file an application for a Form 1-212 waiver when he applied for adjustment of status in 2001, errors of the INS entitle him to have his subsequently-filed Form 1-212 waiver application treated as if it were timely filed in 2001. Morales has a problem, however: The current law of our circuit provides that a Form 1-212 waiver, even if granted, does not cure the inadmissibility of an alien who reenters the United States without inspection after a prior removal.
Gonzales,
508 F.3d at 1242;
see also
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). Morales concedes that if the holding in
Gonzales
applies to him, he cannot cure the deficiency in his adjustment-of-status application. Morales nonetheless argues that
Gonzales
— decided six years after Morales filed his first adjustment-of-status application and four years after his second — cannot be applied retroactively to make him ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. He argues that under the law that was established in our circuit prior to
Gonzales,
a Form 1-212 waiver could cure his inadmissibility, that he
was eligible for such a waiver, and that our prior law should apply to him.
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d at 1086.
In rejecting Morales’s argument, we started with the standard that “[ojrdinarily, ‘[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.’ ”
Id.
at 1087-88 (quoting
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994)). We further commented that “[t]hus, when a court applies a statute to the parties before it, ‘that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate [the] announcement of the rule.’”
Id.
at 1088 (quoting
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation,
509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)).
We rejected Morales’s argument that
Duran-Gonzales II
was similar to an agency decision and its retroactivity should be evaluated pursuant to a multi-factor standard.
We held:
Yet, whatever disputes on theory of statutory interpretation may be sparked, we conclude that the interpretation of the INA that we adopted in
Gonzales
renders Morales ineligible for a Form 1-212 waiver. True,
Gonzales
declared the INA ambiguous and deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA for the purpose of determining what the statute means. But statutory ambiguity alone has never been sufficient to render judicial interpretation of a statute non-retroactive.
Gonzales
is still a judicial decision interpreting a statute, and courts remain “the final authority on issues of statutory construction.”
Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778,.... Under
Gonzales, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) renders aliens in Morales’s position ineligible for waiver of the ten-year bar.
See Gonzales,
508 F.3d at 1242. That rule is dispositive and wholly scuttles the argument of Morales. Whatever the adjudicative history preceding
Gonzales,
and whatever the tools used in
Gonzales
to interpret the statute, a statute can have only one meaning, and
Gonzales
tells us what that meaning is.
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d at 1089.
Our reasoning led us to reject Morales’s request for “a nunc pro tunc Form 1-212 waiver to cure his inadmissibility and make him eligible for adjustment of status.”
Id.
at 1090. We held that “the law
of our circuit in
Gonzales
explicitly and without apology holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C) ... does not permit such waivers.”
Id.
at 1091. We concluded that the statute and our precedent were controlling and that “a Form 1-212 waiver cannot cure Morales’s inadmissibility until the expiration of the ten-year bar.”
Id.
B.
Nunez-Reyes v. Holder
Flavio Nunez-Reyes entered the United States in 1992 and in 2001 was charged in state court with a felony count and a misdemeanor count involving methamphetamine. He pled guilty to both counts and the state court subsequently dismissed the charges under a state provision wherein courts were directed to set aside convictions and dismiss indictments should a defendant successfully complete a drug treatment program along with other conditions. Under the California provision, “both the arrest and the conviction shall be deemed never to have occurred.”
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 687. In 2002, the federal government found Nunez-Reyes removable, and his applications for adjustment of status and petition for cancellation of removal were denied by the BIA.
Id.
The en banc panel first overruled our prior decision in
Lujan-Armendariz v. INS,
222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir.2000), and held “that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection does not require treating, for immigration purposes, an expunged state conviction of a drug crime the same as a federal drug conviction that has been expunged under the” Federal First Offender Act.
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 690.
The panel, however, determined that this holding “will apply only prospectively.”
Id.
at 694. The panel recognized that the “default principle is that a court’s decisions apply retroactively to all cases still pending before the courts.”
Id.
at 690. However, “courts may depart from that default principle only in certain circumstances, as outlined in”
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 690. Before applying the
Chevron Oil
factors, the panel noted that “a court announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure prospectivity and full retro-activity.”
Id.
(citing
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
501 U.S. 529, 537-38, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (Souter J., plurality opinion)).
The panel identified the
Chevron Oil
factors as: “(1) whether the decision establishes] a new principle of law; (2) whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the rule’s] operation in light of its history, purpose, and effect; and (3) whether our decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively.”
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 692 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The panel found that there was no question that its ruling established a new principle of law.
Id.
It next determined that the retroactive application of its decision created the potential for unfairness, explaining:
Those aliens were assured that, after completion of drug treatment, there would be absolutely no legal consequences. Their waiver of their constitutional rights was in reliance on
Lujanr-Armendariz.
In these circumstances, we easily conclude that the third
Chevron Oil
factor is met: our decision “could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively.”
Chevron Oil,
404 U.S. at 107, 92 S.Ct.
349.... It would be manifestly unfair effectively to hoodwink aliens into waiving their constitutional rights on the promise of no legal consequences and, then, to hold retroactively that their convictions actually carried with them the “particularly severe ‘penalty’ ” of removal,
Padilla,
130 S.Ct. at 1481....
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 693-94. Finally, the panel concluded that the second
Chevron Oil
factor was met: “retroactive application will not further the rule’s operation.”
Id.
at 694. The court reasoned that “Congress did not intend adverse immigration consequences for those who were merely charged with a crime or suspected of a crime.”
Id.
As explained in the next section, the principles set forth in
Morales-Izquierdo
and
Nunez-Reyes
require that we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
IV
Although the district court’s denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion,
Gardner v. Martino,
563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir.2009), as is an order on class certification,
Parra v. Bashas’, Inc.,
536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008), the essence of Plaintiffs’ appeal is that the district court erred in holding that
Duran Gonzales II
applied to them. This underlying conclusion of law is reviewed de novo.
See Citizens for Clean Gov’t v. City of San Diego,
474 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2007).
On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in holding that
Duran Gonzales II
applied retroactively to all class members and in failing to independently determine whether it should be applied to them. We disagree and hold that the district court could not have determined that
Duran Gonzales II
applied prospectively only and hold that we are unable to give
Duran Gonzales II
only prospective application.
A. The District Court Could Not Determine That
Duran Gonzales II
Applies Prospectively Only.
We reiterated in
Nunez-Reyes
that the “default principle is that a court’s decisions apply retroactively to all cases still pending before the courts.” 646 F.3d at 690;
see also Harper,
509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510. Furthermore, we continue to adhere to the Supreme Court’s admonishment that if a decision is not to be given retroactive effect, its prospective-only application should be announced in the opinion itself. In
Harper,
the Supreme Court stated:
When this Court does not “reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it,” however, an opinion announcing a rule of federal law “is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application” and must be “read to hold ... that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court.”
509 U.S. at 97-98, 113 S.Ct. 2510 (quoting
Beam,
501 U.S. at 539, 111 S.Ct. 2439);
see also United States v. 20832 Big Rock Drive,
51 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that “it is now clear that a new rule of law applies retroactively to civil cases on direct review or those not yet final if it is applied to the parties in the case in which it is announced”).
Thus,
Duran Gonzales II
would have retroactive application even if it did not address retroactivity. But it was not silent. The final paragraph held that “plaintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers.”
Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1242. Because this court applied its holding in
Duran Gonzales II
to the parties before it, the ruling is retroactive.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not cited any authority, nor have we found any, that would allow a district court to interpret, in the first instance, whether a Ninth Circuit opinion applied prospectively only or retroactively. Rather, the general rule is that:
On remand, a trial court may not deviate from the mandate of an appellate court. As we have stated earlier, “[w]hen a case has been decided by an appellate court and remanded, the court to which it is remanded must proceed in accordance with the mandate and such law of the case as was established by the appellate court.”
Firth v. United States,
554 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir.1977); .... The Supreme Court long ago emphasized that when acting under an appellate court’s mandate, an inferior court “cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided upon appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.”
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.,
160 U.S. 247, 255, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895).
Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp,
752 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.1984). Here, the district court properly determined that
Duran Gonzales II
applied retroactively to Plaintiffs.
B. This Panel May Not Now Rule That
Duran Gonzales II
Applies Only Prospectively And Not Retroactively.
Even if
Duran Gonzales II
could be read as not clearly holding that it had retroactive application (by applying its ruling to the parties before it), the fact that
Duran Gonzales II
did not otherwise “reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it” would be dispositive.
See Harper,
509 U.S. at 97-98, 113 S.Ct. 2510. It is now too late to apply
Duran Gonzales II
prospectively only. Since its announcement in 2007, the “normal rule of retroactive application” has applied and presumably
Duran Gonzales II
has been routinely applied by district courts and the BIA in other cases. Indeed,
Duran Gonzales II
has been cited approvingly by two other circuit courts.
See Delgado v. Mukasey,
516 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir.2008), and
Gonzalez-Balderas v. Holder,
597 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir.2010).
Furthermore, our opinion in
MoralesIzquierdo,
600 F.3d 1076, held that
Duran Gonzales II
applies retroactively, and we are bound by that decision.
See Santama
ria v. Horsley,
110 F.3d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir.1997) (“It is settled law that one three-judge panel of this court cannot ordinarily reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.”). The
Morales-Izquierdo
court fully considered retroactivity. It commented that “[wjhatever the adjudicative history preceding
Gonzales,
and whatever the tools used in
Gonzales
to interpret the statute, a statute can have only one meaning, and
Gonzales
tells us what that meaning is.”
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d at 1089. The court concluded that
“Gonzales
is ultimately a judicial interpretation of a federal statute,” and despite Morales’s “sense of unfairness engendered by the retrospective application of a new judicial interpretation of an old statute[,] ... when a court interprets a statute, even an ambiguous one, and even when that interpretation conflicts with the court’s own prior interpretation, the new interpretation is treated as the statute’s one-and-only meaning.”
Id.
at 1090 (citing
Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 323, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)). Accordingly, we held that
Duran Gonzales II
applied to Morales and “to all cases currently on direct review.”
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d at 1092.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish
Morales-Izquierdo
on the ground that Morales’s reliance on
Perez-Gonzalez
was not as reasonable as Plaintiffs’ reliance. The argument is not well taken. In
Nunez-Reyes,
we reaffirmed that “a court announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure prospectivity and full retro-activity,” and, citing Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in
James B. Beam Distilling Co.,
501 U.S. at 537-38, 111 S.Ct. 2439, confirmed that weighing “the equities on a case-by-case basis[] is foreclosed.” 646 F.3d at 690-91. Thus,
Morales-Izquierdo’s
holding of retroactivity cannot be distinguished on the ground that Morales’s alleged reliance on
Perez-Gonzalez
was somehow less serious or reasonable than Plaintiffs’ reliance on the opinion.
Duran Gonzales II
specifically applied its ruling to the petitioners before it and in
Morales-Izquierdo,
a separate three-judge panel confirmed that
Duran Gonzales II
applies retroactively; we are bound by these decisions. It follows that the holding in
Duran Gonzales II
that “plaintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers,” 508 F.3d at 1242, applies to Plaintiffs and undermines their legal action.
Finally, because we determine that we cannot retroactively revise
Duran Gonzales II
to have only prospective application, we need not determine whether we would limit
Duran Gonzales II
to prospective application if we could. We note, however, that the situation in
Nunez-Reyes
is distinct from that presented in this appeal. In
Nunez-Reyes,
the petitioner and others similarly situated waived constitutional rights in reliance on our pri- or opinion. We stressed that it “would be manifestly unfair effectively to hoodwink aliens into waiving their constitutional rights on the promise of no legal consequences and, then, to hold retroactively that their convictions actually carried with them the particularly severe penalty of removal.”
Nunez-Reyes,
646 F.3d at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Plaintiffs, in relying on
Perez-Gonzalez,
did not waive any constitutional right, although they did disclose to the government their illegal presence within the country. Whatever weight might be given
to such reliance, it is considerably less than that given to the waiver of a constitutional right.
V
Plaintiffs’ request for relief from the retroactive application of
Duran Gonzales II
to their applications for adjustment of status must be denied because: (1)
Duran Gonzales II
itself applied its rulings to the Plaintiffs, thus giving the opinion retroactive application; and (2) another three-judge panel has reaffirmed that
Duran Gonzales II
has retroactive application.
Morales-Izquierdo,
600 F.3d at 1092. The district court properly determined that
Duran Gonzales II
applies retroactively and that, accordingly, Plaintiffs are “ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers.”
Duran Gonzales II,
508 F.3d at 1242. The district court’s orders denying Plaintiffs’ motions to amend class certification and to file an amended complaint, and dismissing this action, are AFFIRMED.