OPINION
RESTANI, Judge.
This matter is before the court on a motion for judgment upon the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2 by Du-pont Teijin Films USA, LP, Mitsubishi Polyester Film of America, LLC, and To-ray Plastics (America), Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), petitioners in the underlying antidumping duty (“AD”) investigation.
See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip From India,
67 Fed.Reg. 34,899 (Dep’t Commerce May 16, 2002) (final) [hereinafter
“Final Determination”'].
In its
Final Determination,
the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) found that polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip (“PET film”) from India are being sold, or are likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value (“LTFV”).
Id.
at 34,899. Plaintiffs challenge only one aspect of the
Final Determination:
Commerce’s decision to exclude from the antidumping duty order PET film produced in India by defendant-intervenor Polyplex Corporation Limited (“Polyplex”).
JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). The court will uphold Commerce’s determination in an anti-dumping duty investigation unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2001, Plaintiffs, domestic producers of PET film, simultaneously filed an antidumping duty petition against imports of PET film from India and Taiwan and a countervailing duty petition against PET film from India. Commerce published notice of its initiation of both investigations on June 13, 2001.
See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip (PET Film) from India and Taiwan,
66 Fed.Reg. 31,888 (Dep’t Corn-
merce June 13, 2001) (initiation);
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip (PET film) from India,
66 FecLReg. 31,-892 (Dep’t Commerce June 13, 2001) (initiation). Commerce preliminarily determined that PET film from India is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at LTFV.
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from India,
66 Fed.Reg. 65,893, 65,894 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 21, 2001) (prelim.) [hereinafter
“Preliminary Determination”
].
In the
Preliminary Determination,
Commerce calculated the export price,
or, where appropriate, the constructed export price
for Polyplex’s exports in accordance with section 772(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a.
See id.
at 65,895-96. Commerce then increased Polyplex’s export price (sometimes referred to as “U.S. price”) “by the amount of the
export subsidy
found in the companion countervailing duty investigation on PET film from India.”
Id.
at 65,896 (emphasis added). This adjustment caused Polyplex’s estimated dumping margin
to fall below statutory
de min-imis
levels.
Id.
at 65,898 (reporting Poly-plex’s weighted-average dumping margin,
as adjusted, as 1.38 percent);
see
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3) (2000) (requiring Commerce to “disregard any weighted average dumping margin that is ... less than 2 percent ad valorem or the equivalent specific rate for the subject merchandise.”). Commerce therefore preliminarily determined to exclude Polyplex from the antidumping duty order.
See Prelim. Determ.,
66 Fed.Reg. at 65,898. After publishing its
Preliminary Determination,
Commerce issued and received an additional supplemental questionnaire for
respondent Polyplex, conducted a verification of respondents’ questionnaire responses, reviewed case briefs and rebuttal briefs, and held a public hearing.
Final Determ.,
67 Fed.Reg. at 34,899.
In the
Final Determination,
Commerce again found that PET film from India is being sold, or is likely to be sold, in the United States at LTFV, but the Department continued to exclude Polyplex from the affirmative determination.
Id.
Commerce had calculated a weighted-average dumping margin of 10.34 percent for Poly-plex, but it “adjusted the antidumping duty
cash
deposits
for the export subsidies found in the companion countervailing investigation
rather than adjusting net U.S. price.
”
Id.
at 34,900-01 & n. 2 (citing Issues & Decision Mem. at cmt. 2) (emphasis added). The domestic industry, petitioners below and Plaintiffs here, had contested the methodology used in the
Preliminary Determination,
arguing that the statute only authorizes Commerce to increase a producer’s U.S. price by the amount of countervailing duties “actually ‘imposed’ (i.e., assessed) on the subject merchandise” rather than by the amount of estimated eountervailable export subsidies. Issues & Decision Mem. at cmt. 1 (quoting Petitioners’ Case Br. at 3). Commerce agreed that its “longstanding practice in an investigation is to offset the AD cash deposit rate by the export subsidy cash deposit rate” rather than adjusting the dumping margin calculation.
Id.
Nonetheless, Commerce excluded Polyplex from the antidumping duty order, explaining that “[i]f the Department’s calculations in an investigation result in a zero cash deposit rate, then in reality, there exists no dumping upon which an affirmative determination could be based as to that particular respondent.”
Final Determ.,
67 Fed.Reg. at 34,901;
see Antidumping Duty Order,
67 Fed.Reg. at 44,176 (excluding Polyplex). This action followed.
DISCUSSION
The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that Polyplex must be included in the anti-dumping duty order because it has a
dumping margin of 10.34 percent, despite its cash deposit rate of zero. Plaintiffs argue that the statute, legislative history, agency regulations, and the Statement of Administrative Action
(“SAA”)
all support their view that an exclusion from an anti-dumping duty order is only allowed if the producer has a
de minimis
dumping margin.
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OPINION
RESTANI, Judge.
This matter is before the court on a motion for judgment upon the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2 by Du-pont Teijin Films USA, LP, Mitsubishi Polyester Film of America, LLC, and To-ray Plastics (America), Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), petitioners in the underlying antidumping duty (“AD”) investigation.
See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip From India,
67 Fed.Reg. 34,899 (Dep’t Commerce May 16, 2002) (final) [hereinafter
“Final Determination”'].
In its
Final Determination,
the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) found that polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip (“PET film”) from India are being sold, or are likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value (“LTFV”).
Id.
at 34,899. Plaintiffs challenge only one aspect of the
Final Determination:
Commerce’s decision to exclude from the antidumping duty order PET film produced in India by defendant-intervenor Polyplex Corporation Limited (“Polyplex”).
JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). The court will uphold Commerce’s determination in an anti-dumping duty investigation unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2001, Plaintiffs, domestic producers of PET film, simultaneously filed an antidumping duty petition against imports of PET film from India and Taiwan and a countervailing duty petition against PET film from India. Commerce published notice of its initiation of both investigations on June 13, 2001.
See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip (PET Film) from India and Taiwan,
66 Fed.Reg. 31,888 (Dep’t Corn-
merce June 13, 2001) (initiation);
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip (PET film) from India,
66 FecLReg. 31,-892 (Dep’t Commerce June 13, 2001) (initiation). Commerce preliminarily determined that PET film from India is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at LTFV.
Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from India,
66 Fed.Reg. 65,893, 65,894 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 21, 2001) (prelim.) [hereinafter
“Preliminary Determination”
].
In the
Preliminary Determination,
Commerce calculated the export price,
or, where appropriate, the constructed export price
for Polyplex’s exports in accordance with section 772(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a.
See id.
at 65,895-96. Commerce then increased Polyplex’s export price (sometimes referred to as “U.S. price”) “by the amount of the
export subsidy
found in the companion countervailing duty investigation on PET film from India.”
Id.
at 65,896 (emphasis added). This adjustment caused Polyplex’s estimated dumping margin
to fall below statutory
de min-imis
levels.
Id.
at 65,898 (reporting Poly-plex’s weighted-average dumping margin,
as adjusted, as 1.38 percent);
see
19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3) (2000) (requiring Commerce to “disregard any weighted average dumping margin that is ... less than 2 percent ad valorem or the equivalent specific rate for the subject merchandise.”). Commerce therefore preliminarily determined to exclude Polyplex from the antidumping duty order.
See Prelim. Determ.,
66 Fed.Reg. at 65,898. After publishing its
Preliminary Determination,
Commerce issued and received an additional supplemental questionnaire for
respondent Polyplex, conducted a verification of respondents’ questionnaire responses, reviewed case briefs and rebuttal briefs, and held a public hearing.
Final Determ.,
67 Fed.Reg. at 34,899.
In the
Final Determination,
Commerce again found that PET film from India is being sold, or is likely to be sold, in the United States at LTFV, but the Department continued to exclude Polyplex from the affirmative determination.
Id.
Commerce had calculated a weighted-average dumping margin of 10.34 percent for Poly-plex, but it “adjusted the antidumping duty
cash
deposits
for the export subsidies found in the companion countervailing investigation
rather than adjusting net U.S. price.
”
Id.
at 34,900-01 & n. 2 (citing Issues & Decision Mem. at cmt. 2) (emphasis added). The domestic industry, petitioners below and Plaintiffs here, had contested the methodology used in the
Preliminary Determination,
arguing that the statute only authorizes Commerce to increase a producer’s U.S. price by the amount of countervailing duties “actually ‘imposed’ (i.e., assessed) on the subject merchandise” rather than by the amount of estimated eountervailable export subsidies. Issues & Decision Mem. at cmt. 1 (quoting Petitioners’ Case Br. at 3). Commerce agreed that its “longstanding practice in an investigation is to offset the AD cash deposit rate by the export subsidy cash deposit rate” rather than adjusting the dumping margin calculation.
Id.
Nonetheless, Commerce excluded Polyplex from the antidumping duty order, explaining that “[i]f the Department’s calculations in an investigation result in a zero cash deposit rate, then in reality, there exists no dumping upon which an affirmative determination could be based as to that particular respondent.”
Final Determ.,
67 Fed.Reg. at 34,901;
see Antidumping Duty Order,
67 Fed.Reg. at 44,176 (excluding Polyplex). This action followed.
DISCUSSION
The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that Polyplex must be included in the anti-dumping duty order because it has a
dumping margin of 10.34 percent, despite its cash deposit rate of zero. Plaintiffs argue that the statute, legislative history, agency regulations, and the Statement of Administrative Action
(“SAA”)
all support their view that an exclusion from an anti-dumping duty order is only allowed if the producer has a
de minimis
dumping margin. Commerce argues that the statute is silent or ambiguous on this issue, its interpretation of the statute is reasonable, and that Commerce’s decision to exclude Poly-plex from the antidumping duty order is entitled to
Chevron
deference.
See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (holding that if a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, courts must defer to the administrating agency’s permissible construction of it).
The Department’s construction of the antidumping statute is a question of law, so the court must first “determine whether Congress’s purpose and intent on the question at issue is judicially ascertainable.”
Timex V.I. v. United States,
157 F.3d 879, 881 (Fed.Cir.1998). The court looks at the plain language of the statute, legislative history, and the canons of statutory construction in ascertaining the intent of Congress.
See id.
at 881-82;
Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
519 U.S. 465, 470-79, 117 S.Ct. 913, 137 L.Ed.2d 93 (1997). “The expressed will or intent of Congress on a specific issue is dispositive.”
Ilva Lamiere E Tubi S.R.L. v. United States,
196 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1349 (CIT 2002) (citing
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,
478 U.S. 221, 233-37, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). Only if the court concludes that the statute is vague or silent on an issue should the court reach the issue of
Chevron
deference.
See Bd. of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 368, 106 S.Ct. 681, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986);
Timex,
157 F.3d at 881-82. Under
Chevron,
the court will uphold Commerce’s interpretation of the antidumping laws if such an interpretation is reasonable given the express terms of the provisions at issue, the objectives of those provisions, and the objectives of the antidumping scheme as a whole.
See Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States,
266 F.3d 1372, 1379-80 (Fed.Cir.2001) (affording
Chevron
deference to Commerce’s interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms articulated in the course of an antidumping determination);
Windmill Int'l PTE. v. United States,
193 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1305-06 (CIT 2002) (citing
Mitsubishi Heavy Indus, v. United States,
22 CIT 541, 545, 15 F.Supp.2d 807, 813 (1998)).
In the present case, the law is clear that producers with dumping margins over two percent must be included in an affirmative final determination of sales at less than fair value. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d, Commerce engages in a two-step process in making an antidumping determination in an initial investigation. First, Commerce must decide whether the subject merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at LTFV. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l). To make this determination, Commerce compares the normal value of the merchandise in the home market to the export price of the same merchandise. If the normal value exceeds the export price, the merchandise is being sold at LTFV and the producer is “dumping.”
See id.
§ 1677(34) (defining “dumping” as “the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair value”). Commerce is instructed to “disregard any weighted average dumping margin that is de minimis.”
Id.
§ 1673d(a)(4). A
de minimis
margin is one that is “less than 2 percent ad valorem or the equivalent specific rate for the subject merchandise.”
Id.
§ 1673b(b)(3). Thus, producers with
de minimis
dumping margins must be excluded from an anti-dumping duty order.
See id.
§ 1673d(a)(4); 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(e)(1)
(explaining that a producer with a
de min-imis
dumping margin will be excluded from an affirmative final determination); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 at 844 (1994),
reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040 (“Exporters or producers with
de minimis
margins will be excluded from any affirmative determination”).
If Commerce makes an affirmative finding that imports are being sold at LTFV, it must calculate the estimated weighted average dumping margin for each individually-investigated, determine the estimated “all-others rate” for exporters and producers not individually investigated, and order the producers or exporters to post an “appropriate” cash deposit or bond, which is “based on the estimated weighted average dumping margin.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(e)(l)(B); see
Auto Telecom Co. v. United States,
15 CIT 231, 233, 765 F.Supp. 1094,1097 (1991) (emphasizing the two distinct inquires in (1) making a dumping determination and (2) ordering a cash deposit rate).
After Commerce makes its antidumping determination, if the United States International Trade Commission makes an affirmative finding of material injury to the domestic industry by reason of dumped imports, Commerce must issue an antidumping duty order.
See
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(c)(2) & 1673e. The AD order is ministerial in nature, “the first step in the mandatory assessment of antidumping duty.”
Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States,
1 CIT 80, 86, 507 F.Supp. 1007, 1012-13 (1980).
As discussed, Commerce’s dumping margin determination is distinct from its later order of cash deposits for subject entries. In this determination, however,
Commerce
collapsed these two inquiries when it improperly excluded Polyplex based on a zero cash deposit rate when its dumping margin was greater than
de minimis.
There is no statutory authority to exclude an exporter because its cash deposit rate, but not its dumping margin, is zero.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1673d. Therefore, Commerce’s decision to exclude Polyplex from the AD order on that basis is not in accordance with law.
The antidumping statute requires the Department make a final determination of whether the subject merchandise is being sold at LTFV and to “disregard” producers with
de minimis
dumping margins. Commerce cannot disregard a producer based only on a zero cash deposit rate. Upon remand, Commerce must calculate Polyplex’s dumping margin after making the adjustments to export price required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677a and Commerce’s reasonable interpretations thereof.
If Com
merce continues to calculate a dumping margin of 10.34 percent for Polyplex, Poly-plex must be subject to the antidumping duty order, whether or not it is given a cash deposit rate of zero because of
expected
offsetting countervailing duties.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the agency record is granted and the
Final Determination
is remanded for further consideration consistent with the court’s opinion.