Dunn's Adm'r v. Kyle's Ex'r

77 Ky. 134, 14 Bush 134, 1878 Ky. LEXIS 47
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedApril 12, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 77 Ky. 134 (Dunn's Adm'r v. Kyle's Ex'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunn's Adm'r v. Kyle's Ex'r, 77 Ky. 134, 14 Bush 134, 1878 Ky. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 1878).

Opinions

JUDGE PRYOR

delivered the opinion oe the court.

"We have devoted much time to the consideration of the questions arising upon the demurrer of the appellees to the several petitions filed by the appellants, and while many of the objections urged are well taken, and fatal to some of the grounds of complaint, still the answer filed may be regarded as raising such an issue as authorized the court below to pass upon the facts. This the court must have done, as the demurrer to the petition as amended was overruled and an affirmance now, by reason of the defective pleading, would amount to a disposal of the case without passing upon the •merits, and deprive the appellants of the opportunity to amend. This court therefore will not dispose of the questions made upon the petition and answer, but proceed to consider the liability of the appellees upon the facts presented in the record.

The appellees, the president and directors of the Harrods-burg Savings Institution, are sought to be made personally liable for large sums of money belonging to that institution, alleged to have been wrongfully and fraudulently misappropriated by the appellees and the agents and officers selected by them to aid in conducting its business. It is also alleged that the appellees failed to supervise and manage the funds of the institution with ordinary prudence and judgment, and by the .gross negligence of themselves and their agents caused great loss to the plaintiffs, by rendering their stock in the bank worthless; that they failed to take a bond or bonds from the officers and agents, and omitted other duties, on account of [136]*136which they say the appellees are liable. The shareholders or their representatives are the plaintiffs in the action.

The company was organized in the year 1854, with a capital stock of $50,000, and continued to dg business until the year 1867. J. ~W. Cardwell was the acting cashier from the year 1855 until the bank ceased to do business in 1867, at which time, by an act of the legislature, the. company was authorized to sell, and did sell and transfer all of its assets as well as its corporate privileges to E. Hutchison & Co. ' The fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of the bank by its cashier constitutes the principal cause of complaint, by the shareholders, against the directors. The appellees (directors) were also shareholders in the corporation.

The proof conduces to show that the shareholders sustained a heavy pecuniary loss by reason of the many false, erroneous, and fraudulent entries made on the books of the bank while Cardwell acted as cashier, as well as a loss by the wrongful misappropriation of the funds. The stock was rendered valueless. The frauds practiced by him occurred during the last four or five years of the period in which he discharged the duties as cashier, and were practiced with such adroitness as to enable him to escape detection, or even suspicion on the part of the directors, or any of them, for the entire period. A skillful accountant, with a suspicion resting on his mind as to the honesty of this man, would háve detected his frauds at once, and prevented these heavy losses to the parties in interest; but those who had such implicit confidence in him, as to place almost the sole control of the bank in his hands, he found but little difficulty in deceiving, and eluded by his shrewdness any suspicion even, although the preponderance of the proof shows that the appellees, in the discharge of their duties toward him and the bank, exercised at least ordinary diligence.

The appellants do not attempt to establish by the proof [137]*137that the board of directors had fraudulently or wrongfully misapplied the funds of the bank to their own use, or that they connived at the wrongful acts of the cashier, and the sole question, in the case, is the degree of care required of these officers in supervising and controlling the affairs of that institution.

In cases involving the direct action of the directors, Morse on Banking says: “But for excusable mistakes concerning the law, and for many errors strictly of discretion, they are not liable. Though in cases in which their action has been so grossly ill-advised as to warrant the imputation of fraud, or to show a want of the knowledge absolutely necessary for the performance of their duties, so great that they were not justified in assuming the office, they may be held responsible.” (Page 117.)

In Spring v. Smith, 21 Penn., Sharswood, judge, in discussing the liability of directors to stockholders says: “ Ought they to be held responsible for mistakes of judgment or want of skill and knowledge; They have been requested by their co-stockholders to take their positions, and they have given -~ their services without compensation. We are dealing now with their responsibility to stockholders, not to outside parties. Upon a close examination of all the reported cases, although there are many dicta not easily reconcilable, yet I have found no judgment or decree which has held directors to account, except when they have themselves been guilty of some fraud on the corporation, or have known and connived at some fraud in others, or when some fraud might have been prevented had they given ordinary attention in the discharge of their duties,” etc.

Cardwell, at the time he was appointed cashier, possessed a high character for integrity, having the confidence of the entire community in which he lived. He was selected by the directors on account of this character and his known quali[138]*138fications for the place he was called to occupy. The proof tends to show that the appellees knew but little if any thing of bank transactions. The stockholders now complaining lived in the same vicinity with the directors, and were fully aware of their business capacity in this regard. The directors were also stockholders, and all the parties in interest seem to have fixed upon Cardwell by reason of his peculiar fitness for the place, as well as the necessity for employing such a man, in the absence of any knowledge or experience by the members of the board, or any of them, in conducting such an institution. The capacity of the directors was known to the stockholders. They did not seek the appointment or profess to possess the financial ability requisite to run the bank. They were selected because they were stockholders, and lived perhaps convenient to the institution, and under such circumstances undertook to discharge with ordinary diligence the duties imposed upon them, to be measured by their capacity and their knowledge of bank transactions.

Cardwell, being the business man in whom all confided, managed this bank from the year 1855 till the year 1867, with a skillful and competent book-keeper, or assistant, to aid him much of the time, whose character for honesty is not questioned in the record. Neither this book-keeper, the president, directors, or stockholders ever discovered any of Card-well’s frauds, or even suspected any of his motives or actions with reference to any transaction connected with the bank. Large deposits of money were made, and seemingly a prosperous business carried on. The demands of depositors were always met.

A dividend of five per cent was semi-annually declared up to the very moment the institution was sold out, and not only declared, but paid over to the shareholders. The capital stock was $50,000, and the dividends actually paid to stockholders amounted to $68,000. It was not until after E. Hutchison & [139]*139Co.

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Bluebook (online)
77 Ky. 134, 14 Bush 134, 1878 Ky. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunns-admr-v-kyles-exr-kyctapp-1878.