Dunn v. Chappelle

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 13, 2022
Docket21-03423
StatusUnknown

This text of Dunn v. Chappelle (Dunn v. Chappelle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunn v. Chappelle, (Tex. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT October 13, 2022 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

IN RE: § § CASE NO: 19-35133 ALTA MESA RESOURCES, INC., et al., § § CHAPTER 11 Debtors. § § DAVID DUNN, § § Plaintiff, § § VS. § ADVERSARY NO. 21-3423 § HARLAN H. CHAPPELLE, et al., § § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION David Dunn, the Trustee of the Alta Mesa Holdings Litigation Trust, brought this suit against certain former directors and officers of Alta Mesa Holdings, LP (“Alta Mesa”), Alta Mesa Resources, Inc. (“AMR”), and Alta Mesa, LLC (“Alta Mesa GP”). Dunn alleges the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Alta Mesa by approving and continuing to operate a drilling program despite early indications of lower-than-predicted production levels. Certain defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that (i) they did not owe fiduciary duties to Alta Mesa; or (ii) the business judgment rule protects their actions. The Court dismisses Dunn’s claims against Hackett, Lapeyre, Leuschen, and Dimitrievich. The claims against Chappelle, Ellis, and Turner are not dismissed. BACKGROUND At the time of the alleged breaches, the defendants held various positions as officers and directors of Alta Mesa, AMR, and Alta Mesa GP. (ECF No. 50 at 13). The defendants approved and operated a drilling program in early 2018. (ECF No. 50 at 26–27). The drilling program proved unsuccessful and strained Alta Mesa financially. (ECF No. 50 at 47–48). Dunn argues that the approval and continued operation of the drilling program constituted a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duties. (ECF No. 50). In February 2018, Alta Mesa received approximately $700 million in cash as the result of

a merger with a special purpose acquisition company and a midstream company. Alta Mesa used the cash to pay off debts and to fund operations, including the drilling program at the heart of this dispute. (ECF No. 50 at 24). I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Court begins with an overview of the organizational structure of Alta Mesa and its affiliates. A. The Affiliates’ Relationship to Alta Mesa Alta Mesa, a Texas limited partnership, had a multi-layered ownership structure. At the

top was AMR, a Delaware corporation, which owned and controlled SRII OpCo GP, LLC. (ECF No. 50 at 13). SRII OpCo GP, LLC was the general partner of SRII OpCo, LP. (ECF No. 50 at 13). SRII OpCo, LP held Alta Mesa’s limited partnership interests while Alta Mesa GP, a Delaware limited liability company, was Alta Mesa’s general partner. (ECF No. 50 at 13). B. The Defendants’ Relationship to Alta Mesa and its Affiliates Harlan Chappelle served as CEO of Alta Mesa and as CEO, President, and director of Alta Mesa GP until his resignation on December 26, 2018. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Chappelle also acted as CEO of AMR and sat on AMR’s board of directors until his resignation. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Michael Ellis served as COO of Alta Mesa and as a director of Alta Mesa GP until his resignation on December 26, 2018. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Ellis also served as the COO of Alta Mesa GP and sat on the AMR board of directors until his resignation. (ECF No. 50 at 14). James Hackett served as executive chairman of the AMR board of directors and as a director of Alta Mesa GP. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Hackett also served as interim CEO of Alta Mesa

GP from Chappelle’s resignation until September 11, 2019. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Donald Dimitrievich, Pierre Lapeyre, and David Leuschen each served on AMR’s board of directors. (ECF No. 50 at 14). Tim Turner served as Vice President of Corporate Development and Reserves at Alta Mesa. (ECF No. 50 at 15). There are three defendant categories: (1) the AMR board of directors (Chapelle, Ellis, Hackett, Dimitrievich, Lapeyre, and Leuschen); (2) the Alta Mesa GP officers (Chapelle, Ellis, and Hackett); and (3) the Alta Mesa officers (Chapelle, Ellis, and Turner).

C. The Drilling Program Prior to the business combination and implementation of the drilling program, the Alta Mesa officers allegedly knew of or were involved in testing at certain drilling sites in contemplation of a new drilling program in the Oklahoma STACK1. (ECF No. 50 at 19–21). Alta Mesa’s testing began in 2014 and involved drilling multi-well test patterns containing both “child” and “sibling” wells. (ECF No. 50 at 18). A “child” well is drilled on a site with a pre-existing well. (ECF No. 50 at 18). A “sibling” well is the contemporaneous drilling of more than one well on a site. (ECF No. 50 at 18). Alta Mesa had seven producing multi-well test patterns by the time of the merger, including two patterns which involved child wells and five which involved only

1 “STACK” is an acronym for “Sooner Trend, Anadarko, Canadian and Kingfisher”, a geographic area in Northern Oklahoma. siblings. (ECF No. 50 at 18–19). Both child and sibling drilling patterns pose an inherent risk that the drilling of close proximity wells may result in lower average production. (ECF No. 50 at 18). Upstream companies like Alta Mesa conduct testing to determine the optimum number of wells that should be drilled to develop a site. (ECF No. 50 at 17). Dunn contends that testing at the time of merger indicated that only two of the sibling

patterns produced results in line with Alta Mesa’s type curve. Type curves are projections of how a well will perform based on historical data and by comparison to wells with similar characteristics. (ECF No. 50 at 19). As of December 2017, the average estimated ultimate recovery from each of the five sibling patterns was below the 250 thousand barrels of oil that Alta Mesa had originally projected. (ECF No. 50 at 19). The highest number of wells drilled on any one of the seven test patterns was five wells. (ECF No. 50 at 19). The drilling program proposed drilling 12 wells per section and projected an average recovery of 250 thousand barrels per well. (ECF No. 50 at 24). Alta Mesa planned to drill almost twice as many wells in 2018 as it had in 2017. (ECF No. 50 at 24). The drilling program focused on drilling child wells because many of the sites already

contained wells, despite most of the testing involving only sibling wells. (ECF No. 50 at 24). Additionally, the program proposed increasing the number of operating rigs, which would require large upfront costs. (ECF No. 50 at 24). The AMR board met in February 2018 to approve the drilling program. (ECF No. 50 at 25). The board allegedly did not consider—or did not adequately consider—the test pattern data before or during this meeting. (ECF No. 50 at 25–26). Dunn argues that the data did not support the design of the 2018 drilling program, and certain defendants knew or should have known that drilling multi-well patterns in the proposed formation would reduce overall production. (ECF No. 50 at 25–26). However, the AMR board approved a $566 million budget for the drilling program on the assumption that the new wells would recover an average of 250 thousand barrels. (ECF No. 50 at 27). Turner and Ellis allegedly learned by March 2018 that several of the child well patterns’ productions were insufficient to justify the drilling program. (ECF No. 50 at 29). Dunn alleges that neither Turner nor Ellis brought these results to the attention of the board, nor did they take

measures to alter the drilling program. (ECF No. 50 at 29). Instead, Chappelle and Turner omitted the poor results in a “cleaned up” version of the data. (ECF No. 50 at 32). They also allegedly re- calculated pattern averages to exclude the lowest-producing wells. (ECF No. 50 at 32). Chappelle, Ellis, and Turner knew that the Alta Mesa child wells would have ultimate recoveries at least 20% lower than their parent wells, and some data showed an average ultimate recovery of 183 thousand barrels. (ECF No. 50 at 35–36).

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