Riley, J.
Two questions are presented in this appeal. First, whether plaintiffs have actions for breach of contract on the basis that they were informed of a particular compensation system upon entering defendant’s work force, and the system was subsequently changed. A subissue is whether those plaintiffs who were promised the policy would remain in force "forever” have actions for breach of contract. The second question is [525]*525whether plaintiffs can maintain claims for unjust enrichment against defendant.
We hold that the Court of Appeals improperly determined that plaintiffs could maintain actions against defendant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In the instant case, approximately 180 plaintiffs are suing the Auto Club Insurance Association. Plaintiffs are current and past members of defendant’s insurance sales force.
Upon commencing employment, all plaintiffs were informed that they would be paid under the "Accrued Commission Plan.” Under the commission plan, they would receive seven percent1 commissions on insurance policies sold and upon policy renewals. The commission amounts were tied to policy premiums. Also, for the first year of employment, new salespersons received a base salary to supplant renewal commissions which were unavailable during the first year. All sales employees were on the same compensation system with regard to the seven percent commissions.
Early in 1977, defendant realized a substantial drop in its cash reserves and decided to address the problem. In the wake of analyses by defendant’s outside accounting firm, defendant concluded that the payment system for the commissioned sales force was a major contributor to its cash reserve problem.
On December 2, 1977, defendant notified its sales force in writing of its intent to change the compensation plan. Instead of commissions based [526]*526on a percentage of the premiums, salespersons would be paid a flat rate for each policy sold. Though the new plan was implemented by January 1, 1978, during the period from January to July, defendant adjusted compensation so that no employees would experience a reduction in income unless their volume of business fell. The new "unit commission plan” became fully effective July 1, 1978.
On February 8, 1978, a union was certified to represent defendant’s sales force. The union filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board in May of 1978, alleging unfair labor practices by defendant in unilaterally changing the commission system and refusing to bargain with the union. In August, 1979, the board ruled in favor of defendant, finding that the plan was instituted before the union was certified.
On May 26, 1983, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Civil Rights Act, fraud and misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.
On January 10, 1984, pursuant to a motion for summary disposition filed by defendant in July of 1983, the circuit court dismissed claims based on new policies, or renewals based on those policies, purchased after the date of the change in payment plans.
On January 18, 1984, plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing which was denied on February 29, 1984. Subsequently, plaintiffs’ application for interlocutory appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.
On August 19, 1986, the trial court ruled on motions for partial summary disposition filed by defendant and plaintiffs respectively. For the pur[527]*527pose of clarity, the court divided plaintiffs into three groups:
Group a consisted ,of 139 plaintiffs who were informed of the. seven percent commission system upon being hired. This group was not promised that the payment system would be in place for any particular duration.
Group b consisted of twenty plaintiffs who were told by defendant prior to or at the time of hiring that the seven percent commission plan would last "forever.”
Group c consisted of twenty plaintiffs. Group c began employment with the same understanding as Group a, but after they began work they were told by defendant that the seven percent plan would last "forever.”
With regard to Group a, the court determined that no claim for breach of contract existed and granted summary disposition for defendant. The court reasoned that defendant did not foreclose its right to change its compensation plan.
With regard to Group b, the trial court decided a factual issue existed regarding whether the word "forever” created an enforceable promise not to change the payment plan. However, the court dismissed the claims on the basis of the statute of frauds.
With regard to Group c, the court granted summary disposition for defendant because the oral promise subsequent to hiring lacked consideration.
The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims of fraud, misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, age discrimination, and unjust enrichment.2
On October 3, 1986, the trial court entered the final order regarding summary disposition. Plain[528]*528tiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition regarding the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 168 Mich App 619; 425 NW2d 480 (1988).
Defendant appealed, and this Court held Dumas in abeyance pending decisions in In re Certified Question, Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co, 432 Mich 438; 443 NW2d 112 (1989), and Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472; 444 NW2d 114 (1989). On May 4, 1990, subsequent to the issuance of opinions in those cases, this Court granted leave to appeal. 434 Mich 911 (1990).
ii
The first question to be addressed is whether plaintiffs can maintain claims for breach of contract where defendant unilaterally altered the terms upon which plaintiffs were compensated. Plaintiffs do not challenge the new system with regard to new policies purchased after the date of the change. Plaintiffs only challenge the system as it applies to renewals of old policies purchased before the change in compensation plan.
A. GROUP A
Group a was informed of the seven percent commission at the time of hiring, but defendant made no explicit promises to plaintiffs regarding the duration of the policy. In framing the breach of contract action with regard to Group A, it is important to note that because no express promises of permanency were made to plaintiffs, any contractual rights to that effect had to spring from the "legitimate expectations” leg of Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich [529]*529579, 598; 292 NW2d 880 (1980).3 Thus, the threshold inquiry for Group a should be whether to extend the "legitimate expectations” leg of Toussaint beyond wrongful discharge disputes to cover an employer’s compensation policy.4 We choose not to extend the "legitimate expectations” cause of action to this case.
In Toussaint, this Court held that a company’s written policy statements providing for dismissal for just cause may create contractual obligations if the statements give rise in the employee to legitimate expectations of dismissal for just cause. In Toussaint, this Court found that the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim based on written policy statements and express oral statements could be submitted to a jury.
While Toussaint created a "legitimate expectations” claim in the wrongful-discharge setting, earlier cases held that written policy statements could give rise to contractual obligations outside the discharge context.5 Although some of the cases dealt with compensation policies, those policies created contract rights with regard to deferred compensation. As Justice Ryan stated in his dissent in Toussaint, supra, p 648:_
[530]*530In each of the cases cited, policy statements by the employer announced the existence of bonus, profit-sharing or pension benefits and the employer or the claimant-employee satisfied the burden of proof that work already performed was in consideration of the announced beneñt and that what was sought was merely deferred compensation. [Emphasis added.]
In other words, a change in a compensation policy which affects vested rights already accrued may give rise to a cause of action in contract. In re Certiñed Question, supra, p 457, n 17. However, in the instant case, there were no representations made to plaintiffs with regard to deferred compensation. The right to renewal commissions depends on the contract between the agent and insurance company. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mutual Benefit, 317 Mich 575, 580; 27 NW2d 104 (1947). Unless otherwise provided by contract, renewal commissions or future commissions do not rest upon the sale of the original policy. Renewal contracts are separate from the originals, in part requiring additional effort and consideration by salespersons in keeping policies alive. Id. at 581. In the instant case, plaintiffs do not contend that their contracts provided for the vesting of renewal commissions upon the sale of original policies.
In fact, each of the cases cited in n 5 operate under traditional contract principles. For instance, in Cain v Allen Electric & Equipment Co, 346 Mich 568, 579-580; 78 NW2d 296 (1956), the Court stated:
In short, the adoption of the described policies by the company constituted an offer of a contract. This offer . . . "the plaintiff accepted ... by continuing in its employment beyond the 5-year period specified in exhibit b . . . .”
[531]*531While the deferred compensation cases are subject to contract law, the "legitimate expectations” doctrine of Toussaint does not follow traditional contract analysis. Therefore, it does not logically follow that Toussaint should be extended to the area of compensation. Also, since employees’ accrued benefits are protected by the presence of traditional contract remedies, there is no need to extend the expectations rationale to compensation.
In addition to the lack of precedent extending Toussaint to facts similar to those presented here, policy considerations weigh in favor of containing Toussaint to the wrongful-discharge scenario. Were we to extend the legitimate-expectations claim to every area governed by company policy, then each time a policy change took place contract rights would be called into question. The fear of courting litigation would result in a substantial impairment of a company’s operations and its ability to formulate policy. Justice Griffin’s majority opinion in In re Certified Question, supra, p 456, discussed the nature of a business policy:
In other words, a "policy” is commonly understood to be a flexible framework for operational guidance, not a perpetually binding contractual obligation. In the modern economic climate, the operating policies of a business enterprise must be adaptable and responsive to change.
Our opinion in In re Certified Question was in furtherance of this Court’s traditional reluctance to limit or second guess the decision-making ability of business management. As stated in In re Butterfield Estate, 418 Mich 241, 255; 341 NW2d 453 (1983), "[a] court should be most reluctant to interfere with the business judgment and discretion of directors in the conduct of corporate affairs.”
[532]*532Much the same conclusion was reached by Justice Griffin in Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, supra, pp 521-522:
Even if it can be said that policy considerations were sufficient to justify the Toussaint intervention to protect job security, it is difficult to imagine the scope of difficulties and mischief that would be encountered if Toussaint were to be extended beyond wrongful discharge into every facet of the employment relationship. Particularly in light of the enormous potential cost to the system that such an extension would entail, including damage to the delicate balance of the employee-employer relationship, I take this occasion to express the view that it would be prudent and wise to leave to the Legislature the public policy decision whether, or to what extent, Toussaint should be extended beyond wrongful discharge. [Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.]
Given the traditional reluctance of courts to interfere with management decisions and the needed flexibility of businesses to change their policies to respond to changing economic circumstances, we conclude that Toussaint should not be extended to create legitimate expectations of a permanent compensation plan. Previous cases have not extended the legitimate-expectations theory to facts similar to these, and we decline the opportunity to extend the theory to compensation terms.
B. GROUP B
Members of Group b claim they were told before or at the time of hiring that they would receive seven percent commissions "forever” on policies sold. Group B plaintiffs argue that defendant breached the express terms of their employment [533]*533contracts by changing the payment system to award a flat rate upon the sale of each renewal policy. We disagree. We find the claimed promise by defendant that the seven percent renewal commissions would last "forever” to be unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
The relevant section of the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132(a); MSA 26.922(a), provides in pertinent part:
In the following cases an agreement, contract or promise shall be void, unless that agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum thereof is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by a person authorized by him:
(a) An agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed within 1 year from the making thereof.
To determine whether an agreement comes within this section, the proper inquiry is whether the contract is capable of performance within one year of the agreement. This Court discussed the rule in Smalley v Mitchell, 110 Mich 650, 652; 68 NW 978 (1896):
The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute. The rule is that if, by any possibility, it is capable of being completed within a year, it is not within the statute .... [See also Fothergill v McKay Press, 361 Mich 666; 106 NW2d 215 (1960).]
In Drummey v Henry, 115 Mich App 107; 320 NW2d 309 (1982), the plaintiff sued the defendant for sales commissions allegedly owed under an oral employment contract. The defendant countered that any such agreement could not be performed [534]*534within one year and was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the basis of the statute of frauds.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the record was devoid of evidence showing that the agreement could not be performed within one year. The Court stated that it was possible, though unlikely, that the plaintiff would have made sales within the first year. Thus, the contract was capable of performance within one year and outside the statute of frauds.
Defendant argues that McLaughlin v Ford Motor Co, 269 F2d 120 (CA 6, 1959), controls this case. In McLaughlin, the plaintiff was promised by the defendant that after he worked for one year in the cost department, he would be offered a position in general management. Thé plaintiff began working several days after the oral agreement was reached. After working for more than three years, and without being offered a general management position, the plaintiff was discharged.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for failing to uphold its promise, and, subsequently, the jury found for the defendant. On appeal, the court affirmed, finding that the agreement was invalid under the statute of frauds. The court reasoned that the parol agreement was invalid because the plaintiff could not have become a general manager until more than one year had elapsed from the time of the agreement. The agreement was not capable of performance within one year. Thus, the agreement was barred by the statute of frauds.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals distinguished McLaughlin "because plaintiffs [in Dumas] were not seeking to enforce a promise that they would receive the renewal commissions. Instead, plaintiffs sought to enforce a promise that the [535]*535commissions would be paid as long as plaintiffs were employed by defendant.” 168 Mich App 632.
However, we are not persuaded by the Court of Appeals attempt to distinguish McLaughlin. We find that plaintiffs were seeking to enforce the payment of seven percent renewal commissions as long as they were employed by defendant. Similar to McLaughlin where the plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement with regard to the general management position, in the present case plaintiffs sued to enforce agreements encompassing promised renewal commissions which could not accrue until more than one year from the time of the agreement.
Nor are we persuaded by Justice Levin’s argument that McLaughlin is distinguishable from the present case because McLaughlin involves a contract for a definite term. Justice Levin states:
The Hodge [v Evans Financial Corp, 262 US App DC 151; 823 F2d 559 (1987)] court addressed the kind of contract considered in McLaughlin, and in the three Michigan cases on which McLaughlin relied, when it said:
"Under the conventional view of the statute, an oral employment contract for a stated, definite term of years exceeding one year (like those alleged in Prouty [v Nat’l R Passenger Corp, 572 F Supp 200 (D DC, 1983)] and Gebhard [v GAF Corp, 59 FRD 504 (DC, 1973)]) is unenforceable on the rationale that the employee’s possible death within one year would 'defeat’ rather than 'complete’ the express terms of the contract.” [Post, p 612.]
However, the contract in McLaughlin was clearly not one for a definite term. In McLaughlin, the plaintiff signed an employment agreement providing " 'I understand that my employment is not for any definite term and may be terminated [536]*536at any time 269 F2d 123. Furthermore, the court stated that "[i]t will be noticed that the oral contract does not provide for a specified period of employment.” Id. at 125.
We can certainly agree with Justice Levin that a contract for an indefinite term has traditionally been considered capable of performance within the first year. Thus, employment contracts for indefinite terms are generally outside the statute. We can also agree that the contracts involved in the instant case were of indefinite duration. However, we do not hold, as Justice Levin suggests (post, pp 574-575), that each plaintiff’s entire employment contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. We simply find that the asserted promises of seven percent renewal commissions "forever” are unenforceable. Furthermore, the dissent does not focus on the kind of promise at issue in this case. In the Hodge case relied on by the dissent, the primary issue was whether the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged. Thus, the focus was on the duration of the entire employment contract. The instant case differs from Hodge because the primary focus is on one term of the entire employment contract that plaintiffs are entitled to seven percent renewal commissions permanently. The dispute here is not over duration of an entire employment contract; nor is it over an employee’s discharge.6_
[537]*537In Michigan, if the terms of a contract are not severable, and part of a contract is within and part is outside the statute of frauds, the entire contract is unenforceable. Where a portion of a contract within the statute of frauds is severable from a part of the contract outside the statute, the severable portion alone will be rendered unenforceable. Cassidy v Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp, 285 Mich 426; 280 NW 814 (1938); 73 Am Jur 2d, Statute of Frauds, § 523, p 153.
In City of Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 658; 97 NW2d 804 (1959), the Court stated:
As a general rule, a contract is entire when, by its terms, nature and purpose, it contemplates that each and all of its parts are interdependent and common to one another and to the consideration, and is severable when, in its nature and purpose, it is susceptible of division and apportionment.
The singleness or apportionability of the consideration appears to be the principal test. The ques[538]*538tion is ordinarily determined by inquiring whether the contract embraces one or more subject matters, whether the obligation is due at the same time to the same person, and whether the consideration is entire or apportioned. If the consideration to be paid is single and entire, the contract must be held to be entire, although the subject thereof may consist of several distinct and wholly independent items.
In Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mutual Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 88; 19 NW2d 494 (1945), the Court found that the plaintiff had been properly dismissed under a just-cause contract. The plaintiff was a field representative for the defendant insurance company, and he claimed that despite his dismissal he was entitled to commissions, including renewals, which were due at the time he was discharged. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s breach barred him from recovery of commissions because the contract was indivisible. The Court quoted from Beach on the Modern Law of Contracts, § 731, p 887:
"A familiar and well-settled principle of the common law is that an entire contract cannot be apportioned. The good sense and reasonableness of the particular case must always guide and govern courts in determining whether a contract is divisible or entire. The question depends, to some extent, upon the intention of the parties, and this must be discovered in each case by considering the language employed and the subject matter of the contract. No precise rule can be laid down for the solution of the question. When the price is expressly apportioned by the contract, or the apportionment may be implied by law, to each item to be performed, the contract will generally be held to be severable.” [Emphasis in original.]
After viewing the circumstances surrounding the [539]*539agreement, the Court decided the contract was severable and the plaintiff could collect the commissions to which he was entitled at the time of his departure.
In the instant case, we find the provisions affording seven percent renewal commissions to plaintiffs severable from the remainder of the employment contracts. The agreements between the parties were that plaintiffs would receive a seven percent commission on each renewal of an old policy. The consideration for each renewal can be clearly and easily apportioned — for each policy successfully renewed by an employee, the employee is paid seven percent of the premium. There is no problem apportioning the consideration with regard to promised renewal commissions, and the nature of the contracts are such that they are "susceptible of division and apportionment.” City of Lansingsupra at 658.
We find the claimed promise that Group b would remain under the then-existing compensation plan "forever” fits squarely within the statute of frauds and is unenforceable. Members of Group b were allegedly promised before or at the time of hiring that seven percent renewals would last "forever.” Under the "Accrued Commission Plan,” the renewal commissions could not vest before one year had elapsed from the time of hiring. The agreement with regard to renewals was not capable of performance within one year because it was not possible for renewal commissions to accrue until after the first year. Thus, any promise that the renewal commission plan would last "forever” is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.7_
[540]*540Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of part performance removes the agreement from the statute of frauds. The doctrine is explained in Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633, 638-639; 2 NW2d 796 (1942):
If one party to an oral contract, in reliance upon the contract, has performed his obligation thereunder so that it would be a fraud upon him to allow the other party to repudiate the contract, by interposing the statute, equity will regard the contract as removed from the operation of the statute.
However, in support of their argument that part performance removes the case from the statute, plaintiffs only cite cases involving land. No cases are offered which apply the doctrine in an employment context.
In Oxley v Ralston Purina Co, 349 F2d 328, 332 (CA 6, 1965), the court stated that "[t]he doctrine of part performance has historically been applied only to contracts involving the sale of land . . . .” Citing 3 Williston, Contracts (3d ed), § 533, p 770.
In Ordon v Johnson, 346 Mich 38, 46; 77 NW2d 377 (1956), quoting Pomeroy, Specific Performance (3d ed), § 100, p 241, it was stated:
"The clause relating to contracts not to be performed within a year from the making thereof, seems by its very terms, to prevent any validating effect of part performance upon all agreements embraced within it. As the prohibition relates not [541]*541to the subject matter, nor to the nature of the undertaking, but to the time of the performance itself, it seems impossible for any part performance to alter the relations of the parties, by rendering the contract one which, by its terms, may be performed within the year.” [Emphasis in original.]
We find the doctrine of part performance to be inapplicable to this case. Plaintiffs offer no support that the doctrine applies to the situation presented by this case other than cases involving land. Furthermore, past decisions of this Court have declined to recognize that the part performance doctrine operates to remove a contract from the statute of frauds section concerning contracts not to be performed within a year. Ordon v Johnson, supra; Whipple v Parker, 29 Mich 369 (1874).8 Accordingly, we decline to apply the part performance doctrine to the facts of this case.9
There being no enforceable agreement that plaintiffs would be paid a seven percent commission "forever,” members of Group b find themselves in the same position as members of Group [542]*542A, and we have already determined that members of Group a cannot maintain actions for breach of contract against defendant.
c. group c
Members of Group c claim they were told at some point after they were hired that they would receive seven percent commissions "forever.” Group c plaintiffs also argue that defendant breached the express terms of their employment contracts by changing the payment system to award a flat rate upon the sale of each renewal policy. Again, we disagree.
When analyzing employment contracts, it is important to keep in mind that parties begin the relationship with complete freedom. Toussaint, supra, p 600. An employer retains its managerial powers and prerogatives unless they are limited by contract. As Justice Griffin stated in Bullock, supra, pp 519-520, "[a]n employer’s intention to give up permanently a right so fundamental as the ability to make changes in its method of compensation is not to be lightly inferred.” (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Our inquiry must focus on the intent of the parties and whether they intended to bind themselves to a seven percent renewal commission permanently. In deciding whether mutual assent existed to permanently freeze the renewal commission, we employ an objective test, "looking to the expressed words of the parties and their visible acts.” Goldman v Century Ins Co, 354 Mich 528, 535; 93 NW2d 240 (1958); Stark v Kent Products, Inc, 62 Mich App 546; 233 NW2d 643 (1975). It is proper to consider the circumstances at the time the asserted contracts were made to determine the intent of the parties. W J Howard & Sons, Inc v [543]*543Meyer, 367 Mich 300; 116 NW2d 752 (1962); Miller v Stevens, 224 Mich 626; 195 NW 481 (1923). This is especially true in oral contracts where the parol evidence rule does not impair consideration of extrinsic facts. Redinger v Standard Oil Co, 6 Mich App 74; 148 NW2d 225 (1967).
Upon reviewing the circumstances of the alleged promises to Group c, we find as a matter of law that mutual assent was lacking.
At the time of hiring, members of Group c were in the same position as members of Group a. No promises were made regarding the duration of the commission plan, yet plaintiffs in both Groups a and c accepted employment. Group c alleges that after accepting employment, defendant made extraordinary contractual promises that the commission system would be in place "forever.” However, it is not at all clear from the statements allegedly made to members of Group c that defendant intended to bargain away its right to change the method of compensation. The meaning of the statements could be interpreted in several ways falling short of a contractual commitment. The statements could have been intended to bolster morale and enhance employee pride in the company. It is also possible the statements were merely stated opinions of management representatives that the company would not change its commission rate. Another possible interpretation is that the statements were designed as assurances by management that in the foreseeable future, there were no rate changes planned.
Whether the statements rise to contractual obligations depends on the context and circumstances in which the statements were made. In analyzing the parties’ intent, we note that the record does not reflect that any negotiations took place between plaintiffs and defendant. All indications are [544]*544that the comments were isolated. Also, we find the term "forever” is inherently vague. If the parties had negotiated the duration of the compensation plan, it is unlikely they would have characterized the agreement with such a precatory expression. Furthermore, in the employment context, this Court has been reluctant to accept terms which connote permanent or lifetime employment at face value. In Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684; 273 NW 315 (1937), the Court determined that absent distinguishing features or consideration in addition to services to be performed, a contract for permanent employment should be interpreted to be terminable at the will of either party. Although Lynas deals with discharge as opposed to compensation terms, a contract which forever restricts an employer’s right to change compensation has the same effect of permanently tying an employer’s hands on a term of employment.
We note that nothing was offered by plaintiffs in addition to their continued employment that would reasonably prompt defendant to make such extraordinary contractual commitments.10 We are persuaded that it defies logic to believe that defendant would intend to bind itself to a specified renewal commission on the basis of isolated statements when plaintiffs had already accepted employment without the benefit of durational guarantees with regard to compensation. It also defies logic that defendant would enter into these commitments after, as opposed to before, being hired. It is more reasonable to believe that defendant would legally obligate itself to such a promise before hiring in order to attract an employee or induce acceptance of employment. In the case of Group c, we can perceive no manifest reason for [545]*545defendant to offer a permanently fixed rate on renewals.
We also find it relevant to our inquiry into mutual assent to examine the changes in the compensation and commission system with regard to sales representatives in the years leading up to the employment of plaintiffs. In 1940, defendant adopted a seven percent commission for all representatives.11 In 1958, the commission for out-state salespersons was changed to seven and one-half percent. From 1962 to 1976, most salespersons were hired pursuant to the "Accrued Commission Plan,” which is the system applicable to this case. In 1963, a merit commission plan was adopted which allowed a salesperson to earn more or less than seven percent on the basis of the individual’s productivity. This plan was discontinued after nine months. In 1964, defendant established a high-risk insurance company, but rather than base commissions on the higher premiums, defendant paid commissions on the basis of the lower premiums of the standard company. However, this plan was discontinued after a short while. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, defendant made several changes in its compensation and commission plan for membership sales.
These changes made throughout the years suggest that it is unlikely that defendant would permanently guarantee a particular renewal policy. The numerous recent fluctuations show the company’s changing compensation program and demonstrate that it was unreasonable for members of Group c to maintain any belief that their commission plan was to be locked in permanently. For these reasons, we find that in objectively reviewing [546]*546the circumstances of this case, there was no mutual assent to establish seven percent renewal commissions permanently. We are persuaded that defendant did not intend to bargain away its right to make adjustments in its compensation plan.
hi
Plaintiffs allege that defendant was unjustly enriched as a result of changing compensation plans. The trial court disagreed and granted summary disposition for defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals described the basis of an unjust enrichment claim:
The process of imposing a "contract-in-law” or a quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment is an activity which should be approached with some caution. The essential elements of such a claim are: (1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and, (2) which benefit it is inequitable that the defendant retain. [168 Mich App 638.]
With regard to Groups a and c, since we have determined that defendant had the right to impose a new compensation plan, we find that defendant, as a matter of law, was not unjustly enriched. Defendant simply exercised its prerogative to change compensation. With regard to members of Group b, the statute of frauds does not bar the assertion of an unjust enrichment claim.
The Restatement Restitution, § 1, comment c, p 13, states in part:
Unjust retention of beneñt. Even where a person has received a benefit from another, he is liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.
[547]*547In Hollowell v Career Decisions, Inc, 100 Mich App 561; 298 NW2d 915 (1980), the plaintiff sued the defendant for unjust enrichment after she was terminated from her job of vice president of an employment agency.12 The Court ruled that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper under GCR 1963, 117.2(3)13 because the plaintiff failed to offer any proof that the defendant benefited from her services, and she "failed to offer any proof to indicate that the value of the services she performed exceeded the compensation she received.” Id. at 571.
In the instant case, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the unjust enrichment issue and that members of Group b may not maintain actions for unjust enrichment.
Under the circumstances presented, no evidence suggests that defendant has unjustly benefited by the change in compensation policies. There is no dispute that a worsening financial condition within the company prompted the decision to change compensation plans. Continued significant decreases in the reserves of the business threatened availability of insurance funds. Also, the plaintiffs were well informed of the compensation policies in force at any given time, and there is no evidence to indicate that plaintiffs were not paid for any sale of a membership or policy. Furthermore, plaintiffs have offered no proof which would support a finding that the value of the services they performed exceeded the compensation received in return.
The dissent states
[548]*548the sales representatives are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their services in building the books of business if the promise to pay a seven percent commission on policy renewals of old sales was in part a promise to pay deferred compensation for making the new sale. [Post, pp 622-623. Emphasis in original.]
Plaintiffs do not argue that the renewals were a form of deferred compensation which vested at the time of the original sale. In fact, it is undisputed that to earn renewal commissions, plaintiffs had to continue to service and renew their policies.14 Given the good-faith actions of the company, the fact that plaintiffs were always compensated for their sales, the lack of evidence suggesting that the compensation was not in line with the services, and the absence of an agreement providing that renewals are a form of deferred compensation, we find that defendant was not unjustly enriched by the change in the policy. We note further that there is no factual basis supporting plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant confiscated and diminished the value of their books of business.15
IV. CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, we would hold that plaintiffs are unable to bring actions against defendant for breach of contract. With regard to Group a, there were no express contracts that plaintiffs would "forever” be entitled to seven percent renewal [549]*549commissions, and we decline to extend the legitimate-expectations theory beyond the wrongful-discharge context. Any promise made to members of Group b was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because the asserted agreement regarding renewal compensation was not capable of performance within one year. With regard to members of Group c, we find that the circumstances demonstrate that no mutual assent was reached on the permanency of the commission plan with respect to renewals.
Finally, we would hold that defendant was not unjustly enriched by virtue of changing its compensation scheme. The change was within the proper realm of its managerial powers with regard to members of Groups A and c. With regard to Group b, the record lacks evidence which would support a claim for unjust enrichment.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.16
Brickley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.