SUONUITTEHDE RSNTA DTIESTS RDIICSTT ROIFC TFL COORUIDRTA
CASE NO. 0:26-60258-CIV-DAMIAN
DUGLAS FUNES MEJIA,
Petitioner, v.
TODD LYONS, et al.,
Respondents. _______________________________/
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Petitioner, Duglas Funes Mejia’s (“Petitioner”), Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [(the “Petition”) [ECF No. 1], filed January 30, 2026. Respondents filed a Response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 4] on February 13, 2026 [(the “Response”) ECF No. 5]. Petitioner did not file a Reply at of the date of this Order. THIS COURT has reviewed the Petition, the parties’ briefing, the relevant legal authorities, and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised. I. BACKGROUND The background relevant to Petitioner’s immigration status and proceedings before the Immigration Court is set forth in the parties’ submissions. See generally Pet., Resp. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. He first entered the United States in 2004 and has resided here continuously since that time. On November 7, 2025, the Collier County Sheriff’s Office arrested Petitioner for operating a moving vehicle without a valid license. On November 12, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear. On February 4, 2026, the immigration court held a Master Calendar hearing at which Petitioner filed applications for relief, including an Application for Cancellation of Removal and an Application for Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents. Petitioner has since been detained at the Broward Transitional Detention Center. He has requested a bond hearing, and the Immigration Judge determined that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). On January 30, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant habeas Petition, challenging his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). In the Petition, Petitioner argues, generally, that he is entitled to a bond determination hearing and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to
individuals in his circumstances, that is, aliens in the United States who were not lawfully admitted, rather than § 1225, which applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States. See generally Pet. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Petitioner is properly detained as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or 1226(a). See generally Resp. Nonetheless, Respondents acknowledge that courts in this District, including the undersigned, have reached the opposite conclusion. See id. at 3–4 (citing cases concluding that jurisdiction is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252, exhaustion was not required, and that the petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)); Espinal Encarnacion v. ICE Field Office Director, et al., No. 25-61898-CIV- DAMIAN, ECF No. 29 (Dec. 23, 2025) (“[T]his Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations govern Petitioner’s detention, and not Section 1225(b)).”. II. LEGAL STANDARD District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See § 2241(c)(3). This Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving immigration-related detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). III. DISCUSSION At the outset, as noted by Respondents, this Court has previously addressed the issues raised in the Petition in this case in numerous other cases,1 and as previously indicated, the undersigned agrees with the analysis set forth in Puga v. Assistant Field Office Director, Krome North Service Processing Center, in which Chief Judge Cecilia Altonaga determined that “the
statutory text, context, and scheme of Section 1225 do not support a finding that a noncitizen is ‘seeking admission’ when he never sought to do so.” No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (Altonaga, C.J.). As the Eleventh Circuit recently acknowledged, the majority of District Courts throughout the country that have analyzed this issue have rejected the Government’s position in Matter of Hurtado, and “the federal appellate courts are divided as to the applicability of §§ 1225(a) and 1226(a).” Labrada-Hechavarria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-13664, 2026 WL 496486, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).2 This Court
1 See, e.g., Espinal Encarnacion v. ICE Field Office Director, et al., No. 25-61898-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 29 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2025); Martinez Gomez v. Diaz, et al., No. 25-62236-CIV- DAMIAN, ECF No. 21 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2026); Irure-Rodriguez v. Lyons, et al., No. 25-62585- CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026); Sultany v. Ripa, et al., No. 25-62586- CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026); Gonzalez Ramon v. Lyons, et al., No. 26-60064-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2026); Rorres Arevalo v. Noem, et al., No. 26-60155-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2026); Torres-Martinez v. Assistant Dir., et al., No. 26-60166-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2026); Arcia Alfonso v. GEO Group, Inc., et al., No. 26-60286-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2026).
2 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007). finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations govern Petitioner’s detention, and not Section 1225(b). Therefore, this Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing as a detainee under Section 1226(a). This Court points out that it is aware that in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), the Fifth Circuit adopted the BIA’s analysis in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. This Court is also aware that the Respondents have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit district court judgments that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs detentions under circumstances similar to those presented here. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami, No. 25-14065 (11th Cir.), and Cerro Perez v. Assistant Field Office Director, No. 25-14075 (11th Cir.). In the
absence of a binding decision from the Eleventh Circuit or the United States Supreme Court, this Court’s analysis does not change based on these cases.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SUONUITTEHDE RSNTA DTIESTS RDIICSTT ROIFC TFL COORUIDRTA
CASE NO. 0:26-60258-CIV-DAMIAN
DUGLAS FUNES MEJIA,
Petitioner, v.
TODD LYONS, et al.,
Respondents. _______________________________/
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Petitioner, Duglas Funes Mejia’s (“Petitioner”), Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [(the “Petition”) [ECF No. 1], filed January 30, 2026. Respondents filed a Response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 4] on February 13, 2026 [(the “Response”) ECF No. 5]. Petitioner did not file a Reply at of the date of this Order. THIS COURT has reviewed the Petition, the parties’ briefing, the relevant legal authorities, and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised. I. BACKGROUND The background relevant to Petitioner’s immigration status and proceedings before the Immigration Court is set forth in the parties’ submissions. See generally Pet., Resp. Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. He first entered the United States in 2004 and has resided here continuously since that time. On November 7, 2025, the Collier County Sheriff’s Office arrested Petitioner for operating a moving vehicle without a valid license. On November 12, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear. On February 4, 2026, the immigration court held a Master Calendar hearing at which Petitioner filed applications for relief, including an Application for Cancellation of Removal and an Application for Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents. Petitioner has since been detained at the Broward Transitional Detention Center. He has requested a bond hearing, and the Immigration Judge determined that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). On January 30, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant habeas Petition, challenging his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). In the Petition, Petitioner argues, generally, that he is entitled to a bond determination hearing and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to
individuals in his circumstances, that is, aliens in the United States who were not lawfully admitted, rather than § 1225, which applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States. See generally Pet. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Petitioner is properly detained as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or 1226(a). See generally Resp. Nonetheless, Respondents acknowledge that courts in this District, including the undersigned, have reached the opposite conclusion. See id. at 3–4 (citing cases concluding that jurisdiction is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252, exhaustion was not required, and that the petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)); Espinal Encarnacion v. ICE Field Office Director, et al., No. 25-61898-CIV- DAMIAN, ECF No. 29 (Dec. 23, 2025) (“[T]his Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations govern Petitioner’s detention, and not Section 1225(b)).”. II. LEGAL STANDARD District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See § 2241(c)(3). This Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving immigration-related detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). III. DISCUSSION At the outset, as noted by Respondents, this Court has previously addressed the issues raised in the Petition in this case in numerous other cases,1 and as previously indicated, the undersigned agrees with the analysis set forth in Puga v. Assistant Field Office Director, Krome North Service Processing Center, in which Chief Judge Cecilia Altonaga determined that “the
statutory text, context, and scheme of Section 1225 do not support a finding that a noncitizen is ‘seeking admission’ when he never sought to do so.” No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (Altonaga, C.J.). As the Eleventh Circuit recently acknowledged, the majority of District Courts throughout the country that have analyzed this issue have rejected the Government’s position in Matter of Hurtado, and “the federal appellate courts are divided as to the applicability of §§ 1225(a) and 1226(a).” Labrada-Hechavarria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-13664, 2026 WL 496486, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).2 This Court
1 See, e.g., Espinal Encarnacion v. ICE Field Office Director, et al., No. 25-61898-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 29 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2025); Martinez Gomez v. Diaz, et al., No. 25-62236-CIV- DAMIAN, ECF No. 21 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2026); Irure-Rodriguez v. Lyons, et al., No. 25-62585- CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026); Sultany v. Ripa, et al., No. 25-62586- CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026); Gonzalez Ramon v. Lyons, et al., No. 26-60064-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2026); Rorres Arevalo v. Noem, et al., No. 26-60155-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2026); Torres-Martinez v. Assistant Dir., et al., No. 26-60166-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2026); Arcia Alfonso v. GEO Group, Inc., et al., No. 26-60286-CIV-DAMIAN, ECF No. 9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2026).
2 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007). finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations govern Petitioner’s detention, and not Section 1225(b). Therefore, this Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing as a detainee under Section 1226(a). This Court points out that it is aware that in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), the Fifth Circuit adopted the BIA’s analysis in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. This Court is also aware that the Respondents have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit district court judgments that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs detentions under circumstances similar to those presented here. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami, No. 25-14065 (11th Cir.), and Cerro Perez v. Assistant Field Office Director, No. 25-14075 (11th Cir.). In the
absence of a binding decision from the Eleventh Circuit or the United States Supreme Court, this Court’s analysis does not change based on these cases. This Court has also previously addressed Respondents’ argument regarding the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under circumstances like those presented here. The exhaustion requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) “is not jurisdictional,” but prudential. Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023). Generally, “exhaustion is not required where no genuine opportunity for adequate relief exists. . . or an administrative appeal would be futile[.]” Linfors v. United States, 673 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1982) (alterations added; citations omitted); see also United States v. Barbieri, No. 18-cr-20060, 2021
WL 2646604, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2021) (Scola, J.) (“The Court recognizes . . . that administrative exhaustion may be unnecessary where the administrative process would be incapable of granting adequate relief.” (alteration added; citation omitted)). The BIA issued Matter of Yajure Hurtado as a published decision, and such decisions “serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2); see id. § 1003.1(d)(1). Thus, considering Matter of Yajure Hurtado, it is obvious that an alien in Petitioner’s situation, who has resided in the United States for years prior to his recent detention, but has not been admitted or paroled, will be subject to mandatory detention without bond under Section 1225(b)(2) upon review by the BIA. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 221. Many other courts, including those in this District, have found that any exhaustion requirements are excused for futility because the result of Petitioner’s bond appeal to the BIA is a foregone conclusion under Matter of Yajure Hurtado. See, e.g., Puga v. Assistant Field Office Dir., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (Altonaga, C.J.); Ardon-Quiroz v. Assistant Field Dir., No. 25-cv-25290, 2025 WL 3451645, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (Becerra, J.); Inlago Tocagon v. Moniz, No. 25-
cv-12453, 2025 WL 2778023, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 25-cv- 01542, 2025 WL 2676082, at *9–10 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025). This Court concurs with the majority of district courts that have addressed the issue that administrative exhaustion would have been futile in these circumstances and that a failure to exhaust does not strip this Court of jurisdiction over the Petition. Because this Court finds in favor of Petitioner on the first grounds raised in the Petition and will grant the relief he seeks, this Court declines to analyze the other bases for relief asserted in the Petition. IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that Petitioner requests this Court to direct the immigration court to give him a bond hearing. It is further ORDERED that Respondents shall FORTHWITH afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise release Petitioner. The bond hearing must take place no later than Monday, April 13, 2026. It is further ORDERED that on or before April 23, 2026, Petitioner shall file a Joint Status Report informing this Court of whether Petitioner was given a bond hearing, and if so, the outcome of Petitioner’s bond hearing and the status of matters relevant to the Petition. Counsel for the Petitioner shall confer with counsel for the Respondents prior to filing the Status Report and must include a certification therein that the Respondents do not object to the representations made regarding the status of this case. It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case for administrative and statistical purposes only pending compliance with the instant Order and until further Order of this Court. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT. This Court retains jurisdiction to address matters that may arise with respect to the Petition, and either party may file a motion to reopen the case should additional relief be sought relating to the Petition or this Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 3rd day of April, 2026.
pila UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CC: Counsel of Record