Dugar v. Board of County Commissioners

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: October 4, 2022
• Docket: 21-1380
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 21-1380 Document: 010110748501 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 4, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court AARON DUGAR,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 21-1380 (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-03053-WJM-NYW) BOARD OF COUNTY (D. Colo.) COMMISSIONERS FOR CLEAR CREEK COUNTY, COLORADO; SHERIFF RICK ALBERS, in his individual capacity, and JOHN DOE SHERIFF’S OFFICERS 1-10, in their individual and official capacities,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, KELLY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Aaron Dugar appeals the dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Board of County Commissioners for Clear Creek

County (the County), Sheriff Rick Albers, and several unnamed sheriff’s officers,

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 21-1380 Document: 010110748501 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 2

after another detainee severely injured him in a jailhouse assault. Exercising

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The facts we set forth come from Mr. Dugar’s Amended Complaint, the well-

pleaded allegations of which we take as true when we evaluate a motion to dismiss.

See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019).

Mr. Dugar was a pretrial detainee at Clear Creek Detention Facility (CCDF).

Demontrae Wilson was also a detainee at CCDF. Mr. Wilson was detained on

charges of attempted first-degree murder. CCDF housed Mr. Dugar and Mr. Wilson

in the same pod along with 18 to 20 other detainees. CCDF staff could see the

detainees via video camera, but did not have a direct line of sight to the pod. Two

sheriff’s officers supervised an area of CCDF including Mr. Dugar’s pod housing 120

detainees.

One evening Mr. Wilson, unprovoked, violently attacked Mr. Dugar. Other

detainees in the pod intervened and stopped the attack. CCDF staff entered the pod

two minutes after the attack began. Mr. Dugar survived, but the attack left him with

serious injuries, including fractures to his face, a broken jaw, dismembered teeth,

head and neck trauma, and stab wounds. About two weeks before the attack one

officer said to another officer that CCDF was undermanned, that two officers were

not enough to oversee 120 detainees, and that a change was forthcoming so four

officers would supervise 120 detainees.

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Mr. Dugar alleged that the County and Sheriff Albers developed policies

resulting in overcrowding and understaffing, and that the resulting jail conditions

caused the attack. He further alleged that the John Doe sheriff’s officers were

deliberately indifferent when they placed him and Mr. Wilson close to each other and

when they failed to step in more quickly to stop the attack. He concluded that each

of the defendants thereby violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment.1

The County and Sheriff Albers moved to dismiss, and the district court granted

the motion. The district court dismissed the official-capacity claim against Sheriff

Albers as duplicative of the claim against the County. It dismissed the

individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Albers for failure to allege personal

participation in the constitutional violation.

The court dismissed the claims against the County because, even assuming

Mr. Dugar had adequately alleged that an official policy or custom caused the attack,

he failed to allege the County enacted such policy with deliberate indifference toward

1 Mr. Dugar invoked the Eighth Amendment in his amended complaint, but because the alleged violations occurred in a jail rather than a prison, his claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the district court stated that Mr. Dugar’s “claims properly arise under the Fourteenth Amendment,” it cited earlier authority from this court applying the analytical framework applicable to Eighth Amendment claims. Aplt. App. at 75 n.2 (citing Barron v. Macy, 268 F. App’x 800, 801 (10th Cir. 2008)). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), however, we have held that there are times when the relevant lines of analysis are not coextensive. See Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2020) (excessive-force claim). But for claims like Mr. Dugar’s that complain of official inaction, we continue to apply the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate- indifference standard. See Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 312 (2021). 3 Appellate Case: 21-1380 Document: 010110748501 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 4

an inevitable constitutional injury. In particular, he failed to allege the County knew

its staffing levels would result in attacks such as the one he faced, or that it was

aware of the risk posed by housing detainees charged with violent offenses (such as

Mr. Wilson) in the general population.2

Finally, the district court dismissed the claims against the Doe defendants

because Mr. Dugar failed to allege any of them subjectively knew of and disregarded

a risk to his health and safety. Mr. Dugar does not challenge on appeal the dismissal

of the Doe defendants.

DISCUSSION

“We review de novo a district court’s decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for

dismissal for failure to state a claim. Under this standard, we must accept all the

well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277,

1282 (10th Cir. 2019) (italics, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To meet this

standard, the plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

2 We also note that Mr. Dugar did not allege that his detention at CCDF stemmed from a nonviolent charge. So even if the County adopted a policy of housing detainees charged with violent crimes in a separate area from those charged with nonviolent crimes, this would not necessarily have resulted in Mr. Dugar’s separation from Mr. Wilson. 4 Appellate Case: 21-1380 Document: 010110748501 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 5

Mr. Dugar argues that the court erred when it concluded he failed to plead

sufficient facts to state an individual-liability claim against Sheriff Albers. “Because

vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676. To “succeed in a § 1983 suit against a

defendant-supervisor,” a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that the

defendant-supervisor “acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199

(10th Cir. 2010). The state of mind required to establish an Eighth Amendment

violation is deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). To be deliberately indifferent, “the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

The allegations in the amended complaint do not suggest that Sheriff Albers

acted with deliberate indifference. Mr. Dugar alleged merely that (1) Sheriff Albers

had high-level policymaking authority at CCDF, and (2) conditions at the facility

(including overcrowding, the lack of a direct line-of-sight between officers and

detainees, and the housing of Mr. Dugar and Mr. Wilson in the same unit) resulted in

the attack. (Mr. Dugar does not contest the district court’s conclusion that his

official-capacity claim against Sheriff Albers is duplicative of his claim against the

County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“There is no

longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for

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under Monell [v. Department of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)]

, . . . local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or

declaratory relief.”).)

Mr. Dugar argues that “it is clear that Defendant Sheriff, as a policymaker,

was deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously fails to act when

presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which will almost inevitably

result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by the plaintiff,” Aplt. Opening

Br. at 16; but his assertion that there existed an “obvious risk of constitutional harm”

at CCDF is entirely devoid of factual support in the complaint. Even taking as true

the allegation that one officer mentioned to another officer two weeks before the

attack that the facility was understaffed, Mr. Dugar pleaded no facts indicating

Sheriff Albers was aware of this assessment, let alone that he regarded it as true and

consciously chose to disregard it. The district court therefore correctly dismissed the

individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Albers.

Mr. Dugar’s claims against the County likewise fail. To establish municipal

liability for a constitutional violation, Mr. Dugar must show an official policy or

custom “that . . . was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost

inevitable constitutional injury.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t,

717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013). Assuming he adequately pleaded that the County

maintained a policy that caused his injury, he did not plead that the County made its

staffing decisions at CCDF with deliberate indifference to the “known or obvious

consequences” of its actions. Id. at 770. He pleaded no facts showing the County

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was aware its staffing posed a threat to detainees or that monitoring detainees via

remote camera as opposed to direct line-of-sight created an “almost inevitable

constitutional injury.” Id. at 769. And he pleaded no facts showing the County

should have been aware Mr. Wilson posed a risk to other detainees merely by virtue

of the charges pending against him. The district court therefore correctly dismissed

Mr. Dugar’s § 1983 claims against the County.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge