Dufresne v. Board of Trustees

428 A.2d 412, 1981 Me. LEXIS 787
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedApril 15, 1981
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 428 A.2d 412 (Dufresne v. Board of Trustees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dufresne v. Board of Trustees, 428 A.2d 412, 1981 Me. LEXIS 787 (Me. 1981).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

From a stipulation agreed to by the parties, the following facts are to be taken as established:

Plaintiffs are one active retired justice of the Supreme Judicial Court and three active retired judges of the District Court.1 In February, 1979, they appeared before the board of trustees of the state retirement system to ask the board to amend its regulations to permit active retired judges to participate in the group life insurance program under 5 M.R.S.A. § 1151 (1979 & Supp. 1980-81) in the same manner as. if they were fully active judges who had not retired. After hearing the judges’ arguments, the board passed unanimously the following resolution:

“That the Board’s rules and regulations be amended to grant active retired justices and judges continued life insurance coverages at the same level as when active, contingent upon approval by the Attorney General’s Office of the statute interpretation, and that the active retired justices and judges pay the premiums for said coverage.”

The resolution thus adopted did not specify the rate at which active retired judges would have to pay “premiums” as a condition to thus “continuing” their life insurance coverages.2 The stipulation of facts is silent on whether the parties intended the active retired judges’ “premiums” to be computed at the regular group rate applicable to eligible active non-retired employees and judges or at the higher, age-graded rates that the board must pay for the coverage of retirees.2 From the very fact that [414]*414the plaintiffs seek coverage on the same terms as active non-retired judges, it seems realistic to assume, and we do assume in reaching our decision, that the condition the board had in mind in adopting the resolution quoted above was that active retired judges would pay premiums at the same rate as fully active, non-retired judges as a condition to obtaining both basic and supplemental insurance coverages at the same level as fully active, non-retired judges.

On May 7, 1979, the attorney general’s office issued an opinion to the effect that under existing statutes the board does not have the authority to amend its regulations in the manner proposed in the board resolution of February 28. The opinion said, in sum, that active retired judges, though in active service, are nevertheless retired, and that the existing statutory provisions relating to the effect of retirement on the rights of judges to obtain insurance benefits are still applicable to active retired judges.

On June 13, 1979, the board of trustees formally voted to deny the plaintiffs’ request to amend the regulations, giving as its reason the attorney general’s opinion that the board lacked authority to do so. The record does not indicate whether the board gave any consideration to the financial impact on the Group Life Insurance Fund of treating active retired justices and judges as if they were active non-retired judges for the purpose of group life coverage.4

The plaintiffs then brought a complaint in Superior Court, Androscoggin County, seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The Superior Court denied relief, and plaintiffs appe,al. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 M.R.S.A., ch. 375, subch. 7 (1979), the Superior Court had jurisdiction to review the board’s decision as “final agency action” within the meaning of section 11002 of the act on a complaint alleging facts sufficient to state a claim that the board’s determination was an administrative decision “affected by error of law.” See 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4X0X4) (1979).

The plaintiffs correctly assume that they are not entitled under existing regulations of the board to the benefits they seek. The board’s formal regulations relating to group life insurance, adopted and filed pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. ch. 375, subch. 2, contain little that is pertinent to the present controversy. See Maine State Retirement System, Regulations ch. 601 (1980). However, regulation 3(A), pertaining to eligibility, in chapter 601 of those regulations, does require, as an overall condition of eligibility for group life insurance, that “employment” be for at least 20 hours or two and one-half normal working days per week during the employment year, and the regulation does explicitly include judges in that overall requirement.5 It may well be that an active retired judge is an “employee” within the meaning of the regulation when he per[415]*415forms assigned judicial duties.6 Nevertheless, in the absence of some statute, rule or regulation, court order or settled practice that active retired judges must work 20 hours or two and one-half days per week, section 3(A) of chapter 610 of the board regulations would have to be amended to exempt active retired judges from the generally applicable minimum work time as a condition of eligibility.

Although plaintiffs’ original request to the board took the form of asking the board to change its regulations, the true gravamen of their complaint is that the board has been erroneously applying to them the statutory provisions limiting the insurance rights of retirees rather than the provisions that make available to fully active, non-retired judges the basic and supplemental coverages under the group insurance program. The position of the plaintiffs is that they are entitled as a matter of right, because of certain language in the group life insurance statutes, to require the board to treat them in the same manner as fully active, non-retired judges. The attorney general, representing the board in this litigation, contends that the board lacks authority to do so.

The group life insurance program for state employees, teachers, judges and participating district employees is governed by 5 M.R.S.A. ch. 101, subch. 6 (§§ 1151-1153) (1979 & Supp. 1980-81).7 Subsection 2(A) of section 1151 affords “basic” and “additional”, or “supplemental”, life insurance coverage to eligible state employees, teachers and judges.8 Under the basic coverage each judge may be insured for an amount of group life insurance approximately his annual compensation, up to a ceiling of $25,000. Subsection 9(A) of section 1151 provides, however, that on retirement of a participating judge his basic insurance is continued at no cost to the judge, but, by the terms of the statute, the amount in force is reduced to an amount equal to his average basic coverage during the three [416]*416years immediately preceding his retirement. When the retired judge reaches age 70, the amount of basic coverage in force is further reduced to 25 percent of the three-year average. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1151(9)(A).9

The supplemental insurance provided for by subsection 2(A) is available to an eligible insured during his “active service”. Such an insured may purchase, at his own expense, supplemental coverage in an amount equal to the amount of his basic coverage, but any coverage so purchased remains in force only until the insured’s retirement.

Section 1151 thus creates two different levels of life insurance coverage for judges, depending on whether or not they are retired. Judges who have not retired may obtain both full basic coverage and full supplemental coverage.

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Bluebook (online)
428 A.2d 412, 1981 Me. LEXIS 787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dufresne-v-board-of-trustees-me-1981.