Dudrow v. Ernst Young, No. X01 Cv 98 0144211s (Jan. 14, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 280
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 14, 1999
DocketNo. X01 CV 98 0144211S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 280 (Dudrow v. Ernst Young, No. X01 Cv 98 0144211s (Jan. 14, 1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dudrow v. Ernst Young, No. X01 Cv 98 0144211s (Jan. 14, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE CRSA DEFENDANTS
Two motions for summary judgment has been filed by defendants Cooperative Retirement Services of America, Inc., Monarch Management, Inc., Kedney Associates, Inc., M. Earl Wade, Bruce Cannon, Martin R. Satava, H. B. "Skip" Kedney, Ron Rukstad, and Bruce Byers (collectively, "the CRSA defendants"). These defendants are alleged to have provided management and marketing services with regard to units in the East Hill Woods continuing care facility after Retirement Centers of America, Inc. ceased performing those functions on January 18, 1991.

The CRSA defendants allege in one of their motions for summary judgment that the claims of certain of the plaintiffs set forth at Counts 28, 30, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42 and 44 of the revised amended complaint (alleging fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation) and at Counts 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81 and 83 (alleging negligent misrepresentation) are barred by the three-year statutes of limitations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-577 and 52-584. They allege in their other motion that the claims of some plaintiffs in Counts 3 to 6 and 15 to 18 are barred by the six-year statute of limitation set forth in Conn. CT Page 281 Gen. Stat. § 17b-529(a).

The CRSA defendants assert that the claims made in the counts enumerated above all relate to disclosures made and information given to them before the plaintiffs entered into continuing care contracts with East Hill Woods and that the allegations of the complaint indicate that all of the contracts were entered into more than three years before the commencement of this lawsuit on January 8, 1998.

Many of the counts challenged in the two motions for summary judgment have been stricken by this court in a memorandum of decision dated November 4, 1998, on motions to strike filed by various of the CRSA defendants. At the time of the motions to strike, the CRSA defendants divided themselves into two groups, the "individual CRSA defendants" and the "corporate CRSA defendants," and this court adopted that dichotomy in ruling on the motions to strike. Having characterized themselves as a single group making the same claims for purposes of the motions for summary judgment, the movants necessitate a summary of the prior rulings.

The following counts have already been stricken as to both the individual and the corporate CRSA defendants, and thus as to all the CRSA defendants: Counts 3, 15, and 18. The plaintiffs re-pleaded counts 15 and 18 but not count 3.

The following counts have been stricken as to the individual CRSA defendants, but not as to the corporate CRSA defendants: Counts 4, 5, 6, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, and 44. In pleading over after the adjudication of the motion to strike, the plaintiffs did not replead their claims against the individual CRSA defendants.

Accordingly, all of the counts identified in the two motions for summary judgment require adjudication except Count 3, and all of the challenged counts are confined to the corporate CRSA defendants, that is, to Cooperative Retirement Services of America, Inc., Monarch Management, Inc., and Kedney Associates. The claims against Wade, Cannon, Satava, H.B. Kedney, Rukstad and Byers have been stricken and only Counts 15 and 18 have been repleaded.

Standard of review CT Page 282
Summary judgment is to be rendered if the pleading, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book §17-49. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246 (1990); Burns v.Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 246-47; Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.,193 Conn. 313, 317 (1984). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Batick v.Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647 (1982).

Issues concerning the applicability or lack of applicability of defenses that involve factual issues are subject to the analysis described above. See Connell v. Colwell, supra,214 Conn. 242 (standard applied to claim of tolling of statute of limitation based on fraudulent concealment).

Counts 4 to 6, 15 and 18, alleging violations of the Continuing Care Act
The movants seek summary judgment as to claims in these counts of persons who signed continuing care contracts with East Hill Woods more than six years before the commencement of suit, that is, more than six years before January 8, 1998, thus, before January 8, 1992. The movants and plaintiffs have organized those claimants into various lists on various exhibits but have then filed amendments indicating errors on their lists. In the hope of clarity, the court attaches hereto a list, Court List # 1, of those plaintiffs who have alleged that they signed a continuing care contract before January 8, 1992, and whose claims in the above counts are therefore time-barred.

The Continuing Care Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-52, et seq., at § 17b-529 creates a cause of action in persons contracting with continuing care facilities who are not provided with disclosure statements or who are provided with misleading disclosure statements before they sign a continuing care agreement. Section 17b-529(a) provides: "[a]n action to enforce CT Page 283 liability pursuant to this section shall not be maintained unless brought within six years after the execution of the contract for continuing care giving rise to the liability." In Counts 4 through 6 the plaintiffs allege liability for failure to provide either accurate disclosure or any disclosure at all; in Counts 15 and 18 they claim that the CRSA corporate defendants are liable for aiding and abetting a violation of § 17b-529(a) by others, specifically, East Hill Woods.

The limitation period is explicit and clear in the words of the statute, set forth above. The time for bringing a claim based on faulty or nonexistent disclosure runs from the date of signing the continuing care contract, not from the date of discovery of the omission or misleading nature of the disclosure. While the plaintiffs have invoked various tolling doctrines with regard to their claims of aiding and abetting (Counts 15 and 18), the Supreme Court rejected a similar position in a closely analagous case: Fichera v. Mine Hill Corporation, 207 Conn. 204 (1988).

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Related

Alaimo v. Royer
448 A.2d 207 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Batick v. Seymour
443 A.2d 471 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Burns v. Hartford Hospital
472 A.2d 1257 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1984)
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
477 A.2d 1005 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1984)
Dunham v. Dunham
528 A.2d 1123 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1987)
Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp.
541 A.2d 472 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Connell v. Colwell
571 A.2d 116 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller
635 A.2d 798 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1994)
Blanchette v. Barrett
640 A.2d 74 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dudrow-v-ernst-young-no-x01-cv-98-0144211s-jan-14-1999-connsuperct-1999.