Dudley v. Motel 6 Operating LP

2021 IL App (1st) 191674-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 31, 2021
• Docket: 1-19-1674
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 191674-U

THIRD DIVISION Rule 23 Order Filed March 31, 2021 Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing August 11, 2021

No. 1-19-1674

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

JOHN D. DUDLEY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 L 12406 ) MOTEL 6 OPERATING LP, ) Honorable ) Catherine A. Schneider, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of one count of his complaint after the trial court entered a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to send the remaining counts to arbitration.

¶2 Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against defendant stemming from defendant’s

removal of plaintiff from a hotel room that plaintiff resided in for several years. The trial court

dismissed count IV of the complaint with prejudice. The court denied plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration and entered a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that pertained to the

dismissal of count IV of the complaint. The court then sent the matter to arbitration. Plaintiff 1-19-1674

appealed the dismissal of count IV pursuant to the 304(a) finding. While plaintiff’s appeal of the

dismissed count was pending, an arbitration panel entered an award in favor of defendant. The

trial court entered judgment on the arbitration award, expressly noting that the judgment

pertained to counts I, II, and III. Plaintiff appealed the judgment on the arbitration award while

the separate appeal of the judgment dismissing count IV of the complaint was still pending. In

his second appeal, plaintiff claims that the court did not have jurisdiction to send the three

remaining counts to arbitration while the dismissal of Count IV was pending on appeal. For the

reasons that follow, we find that the arbitration panel did have jurisdiction to enter an arbitration

award in favor of defendant, that arbitration award applied only to counts I, II, and III of

plaintiff’s complaint, and to the extent plaintiff’s appeal challenges the substance of that award,

plaintiff forfeited his right to challenge the substance of the arbitration award. Therefore, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment on the arbitration award and the order denying the motion to

vacate that arbitration award.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Plaintiff, John D. Dudley, filed a first amended complaint against defendant, Motel 6

Operating LP, arguing the defendant unlawfully locked plaintiff out of the room he occupied.

Plaintiff asserted four claims against defendant: breach of contract (count I), wrongful eviction

(count II), conversion (count III), and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices

Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2018)) (count IV). Defendant filed a motion pursuant to

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) to dismiss the

complaint for “failure to state his claims and for failure to comply with [the trial court’s] clear

Orders and directions.” Plaintiff’s complaint is based on plaintiff’s former residence in a Motel

6 motel room. -2- 1-19-1674

¶5 In May 2018, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss as to count IV of the

first amended complaint with prejudice. The order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss

concludes “this order is final and appealable pursuant to [Rule] 304” as to the ruling dismissing

count IV with prejudice. After disposing of count IV, the trial court assigned what was left of the

case to mandatory arbitration.

¶6 In June 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the order dismissing count IV of

plaintiff’s first amended complaint. In November 2018, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion

to reconsider the order dismissing count IV with prejudice.

¶7 Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s orders dismissing count IV

with prejudice and denying the motion to reconsider. This court docketed that appeal as

appellate case number 1-18-2570.

¶8 In February 2019, the mandatory arbitration panel entered an award in favor of

defendant. The arbitration award does not expressly state to what claims it applies. The basis for

the award was a finding that plaintiff did not appear in person or through counsel for the

arbitration hearing. In March 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. In his

motion to vacate the arbitration award, plaintiff argued that the trial court failed to enter a proper

order assigning the case to arbitration following a transfer of the case, and the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over counts I, II, and III of the complaint in light of the pending appeal.

¶9 The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and entered

judgment on the award in favor of defendant “as to counts I, II and III only” consistent with the

fact that count IV had already been dismissed and was subject to an appeal. Following the

hearing on plaintiff’s motion to vacate, the trial court stated, in part, that “[t]here was already a

discovery and mandatory arbitration order entered *** and that order was never vacated.” The -3- 1-19-1674

court also found that “when an appeal is interlocutory in nature, it does not divest the trial court

of all jurisdiction or services. It does restrain the court from entering orders that change or

modify the order under appeal.” The court also stated “No order addressing these separate

Counts I, II, and III, which were the only matters sent to arbitration in light of the previous

dismissal of Count 4, changes or modifies the order that is under appeal as to Count IV.”

(Emphasis added.) The case was never removed from arbitration after it was initially assigned to

arbitration. The case was transferred to a different division for a limited purpose then transferred

back to the division in which the arbitration order was entered.

¶ 10 In August 2019, plaintiff filed a second notice of appeal. Plaintiff’s second notice of

appeal, from which this appeal arises, states that it is an appeal from the February 2019

arbitration award, the July 2019 order denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award, and the

July 2019 judgment on the arbitration award. That second appeal is docketed as appellate case

number 1-19-1674.

¶ 11 This court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing count IV of plaintiff’s

first amended complaint with prejudice. We held that “plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts

establishing a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.” Dudley v. Motel 6, 2020 IL App

(1st) 182570-U, ¶ 38. We now address plaintiff’s second appeal that concerns counts I, II, and III

of the operative complaint—the claims that were sent to arbitration.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 In the instant appeal, plaintiff argues (1) the arbitration panel did not have jurisdiction to

enter an arbitration award in favor of defendant because, under the rules, the panel’s award

disposed of “all claims” in the case and one of those claims, count IV of the complaint, was

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pending on interlocutory appeal, and (2) that because the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction, the

trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on the award of arbitration.

¶ 14 Defendant responds, first, that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the arbitration award

itself; and second, that the trial court did have jurisdiction to enter judgment on the arbitration

award. In response to plaintiff’s argument, defendant argues this court should decline to review

the merits of the arbitration award pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 91(a) (eff. Jun. 1,

1993). Defendant argues that, having failed to appear at the arbitration hearing, plaintiff is not

entitled to reject the award and no legal authority exists suggesting he is entitled to have this

court directly review the merits of the award. We agree with defendant that plaintiff is not

entitled to a review of the merits of the award for failure to appear at the arbitration.

¶ 15 Rule 91(a) reads, in part, as follows:

“The arbitration hearing shall proceed in the absence of any party who,

after due notice, fails to be present. *** The failure of a party to be present, either

in person or by counsel, at an arbitration hearing shall constitute a waiver of the

right to reject the award and a consent to the entry by the court of a judgment on

the award. In the event the party who fails to be present thereafter moves, or files

a petition to the court, to vacate the judgment as provided therefor under the

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure for the vacation of judgments by

default, sections 2-1301 and 2-1401, the court, in its discretion, in addition to

vacating the judgment, may order the matter for rehearing in arbitration, and may

also impose the sanction of costs and fees as a condition for granting such relief.”

Ill. S. Ct. R. 91(a).

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¶ 16 A party who is voluntarily absent from the arbitration hearing “thereby consents to the

panel’s entry of an award, as well as the trial court’s entry of judgment upon that award.” Lewis

ex rel. Lewis v. Collinsville Unit No. 10 School District, 311 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1026 (2000)

(citing Arnett v. Young, 269 Ill. App. 3d 858, 860 (1995)). “[A] trial court’s entry of judgment

upon an arbitrator’s award constitutes a final disposition of the case.” Id. (citing Arnett, 269 Ill.

App. 3d at 860-61). Here, the arbitration award indicates that plaintiff failed to participate;

therefore, plaintiff is procedurally barred from challenging the award other than through sections

2-1301 or 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

¶ 17 Furthermore, the arbitration award is not independently reviewable by this court.

Department of Central Management Services v. A.F.S.C.M.E., 182 Ill. 2d 234, 239 (1998) (“an

order must then be granted by the court confirming the award. [Citation.] Only after the court

grants such an order, or orders that the award be modified or corrected, is judgment finally

entered. [Citation.]”); see also In re Marriage of Haleas, 2017 IL App (2d) 160799, ¶ 24 (“an

appellate court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a trial court’s judgment confirming,

vacating, or modifying an arbitration award, filed within 30 days of the judgment, the same as in

other civil cases.”); Arnett, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 860-61 (“Entering judgment on an arbitrator’s

award constitutes a final disposition of a case ***.”). To the extent plaintiff seeks independent

review of the arbitrator’s award, as distinguished from the trial court’s judgment on that award,

we are without jurisdiction to do so.

¶ 18 Nonetheless, we find that, in this appeal, plaintiff does not seek to challenge the

substance of the arbitration award itself. Instead, plaintiff challenges whether the arbitration

panel had jurisdiction to proceed with a hearing in the case while plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal

of the trial court’s judgment dismissing one count of his complaint was pending on appeal. -6- 1-19-1674

Plaintiff argues that because an arbitration award “disposes of all claims” absent a “prospective

determination to limit the scope of claims reviewed by the arbitrators,” which the trial court did

not enter, the arbitration award purportedly “disposed of all claims” (regardless that the judgment

on the award says the opposite), including the claim that was pending on appeal to this court.

Plaintiff argues that because of the pending appeal of one count in the complaint, the arbitration

panel’s arbitration award disposing of all the counts in this case and the trial court’s judgment on

that award are void.

¶ 19 In Babcock v. Wallace, 2012 IL App (1st) 111090, this court distinguished between a

void order and an order that is merely voidable. Babcock, 2012 IL App (1st) 111090, ¶ 14. In

Babcock it was undisputed that the case was properly referred to arbitration (id.); therefore, the

matter was properly before the arbitrators. See id. This court held that the arbitrator’s award

was not void “even though it exceeded the monetary limit” imposed by Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 92(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) which requires “strict compliance” with monetary limits on

arbitration awards. See id. ¶ 11. Nonetheless, “despite the fact that the arbitrators exceeded their

powers by rendering an award over the monetary limit, the circuit court was correct to deny

defendant’s motion to set aside the arbitration award and to enter judgment on the award.”

Babcock, 2012 IL App (1st) 111090, ¶ 30.

¶ 20 Furthermore, “the mandatory arbitration rules take precedence over ordinary rules of the

Code of Civil Procedure. [Citation.] In the limited context of mandatory arbitration, the rules

put efficiency and finality over any concerns about the details of an award or the actions of the

arbitrators. In the event that the arbitrators exceed their powers, the rules give litigants an easy

remedy: reject the award. But those litigants who fail to timely reject the award must content

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themselves with bringing the matter to the circuit court’s attention in a petition in a separate

proceeding under section 2-1401.” Babcock, 2012 IL App (1st) 111090, ¶ 27.

¶ 21 In this case we find that the arbitration award is not void. Additionally, the arbitration

award extends only to counts I, II, and III of the complaint despite the absence of an order

entered pursuant to Rule 86(d). When plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count IV of the first

amended complaint, the remaining counts in plaintiff’s first amended complaint remained

pending before the trial court. Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to Rule 304(a) did not deprive the trial

court or the arbitration panel of their authority to proceed on the remaining counts. A Rule

304(a) finding vests jurisdiction in this court over the appeal, while allowing the trial court to

retain jurisdiction over remaining claims. See F.H. Prince Co., Inc. v. Towers Financial Corp.,

266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 989 (1994). “The filing of a Rule 304(a) appeal serves only to deprive the

circuit court of jurisdiction to modify the judgment appealed from or rule on matters of substance

which are the subject of the appeal.” F.H. Prince Co., Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 989, citing

American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Bus, 212 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1991). The

committee comment (which, although persuasive, is not binding on this court (People v. Ross,

168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995)) on which plaintiff relies for his position reads, in total, as follows:

“A claimant who believes he has a reasonable basis for having the matter

removed from an arbitration track may move the court for such relief prior to

hearing. Where there are multiple claims in the action, the court may exercise its

discretion to determine whether all meet the requirements of eligibility for

arbitration and if not whether a severance could be made of any or several without

prejudice to the parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 86(d), Committee Comments.

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¶ 22 The language plaintiff relies upon (the second sentence of the comment) appears to be

predicated upon a motion to remove a matter from an arbitration track. Plaintiff filed no such

motion in this case. “It is well settled that the construction of our rules is comparable to this

court’s construction of statutes.” Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002). “Supreme

court rules, like statutes, should be construed as a whole, with individual provisions interpreted

in light of other relevant provisions.” Id. at 339. Applying that rationale here, construing the

committee comment to Rule 86 as a whole does not lead to the result that the Rule requires a

limiting order when one count of a complaint is dismissed and subsequently appealed and the

trial court, consistently with it retaining jurisdiction over the remainder of the case, continues to

address those claims, including by referring the non-dismissed claims to arbitration. Plaintiff

cites no authority for his implicit argument that for the arbitration panel to be limited to counts I,

II, and III the trial court had to enter a new order referring the matter to arbitration. Furthermore,

the language of the Rules suggests the trial court was obliged to refer the remaining counts, over

which it undoubtedly had jurisdiction, to arbitration. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 86(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1994)

(“A civil action shall be subject to mandatory arbitration if each claim therein is exclusively for

money in an amount or of a value not in excess of the monetary limit authorized by the Supreme

Court.” (Emphases added.)).

¶ 23 We hold the arbitration award did not dispose of count IV of the complaint. As stated

above, plaintiff concedes there is no direct authority that an arbitration award, not restrained by a

Rule 86(d) order, can dispose of a dismissed claim that is on appeal. Further, we find nothing in

the language of the Rules to support that interpretation. Moreover, plaintiff cannot be heard to

complain that the arbitration panel reached count IV of his complaint when he did not appear for

the arbitration and defaulted, resulting in the adverse finding. -9- 1-19-1674

¶ 24 This leaves only the trial court’s judgment denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate the

arbitration award and judgment on the arbitration award. Plaintiff argues “the arbitrators here

lacked authority to enter an award disposing of all the claims in this case and the trial court

lacked authority to enter a judgment on that award.” The judgment is on a form order. The

preprinted portion of the form states “The judgment on the award is entered in favor of” and in a

space provided the trial court wrote next to that language “Motel 6 Operating LP as to Counts I,

the II and III only.” The court also hand-wrote “Dudley’s motion to vacate arb award is denied

for reasons stated in the record.” As stated above, defendant forfeited his right to challenge the

arbitration award and the judgment thereon as “void.” Furthermore, the arbitrators did not “enter

an award disposing of all the claims” (specifically count IV of the complaint). Accordingly,

plaintiff’s argument fails, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

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