Duane Palm v. C. Pfeiffer, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 DUANE PALM, Case No. 1:25-cv-01045-EPG (PC)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 11 v. TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

12 C. PFEIFFER, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THIS CASE PROCEED ONLY ON 13 Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS E. 14 PEREZ AND J. GUERRA FOR BEING DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO HIS 15 SAFETY NEEDS

16 (ECF NO. 11)

17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS 18 19 20 Plaintiff Duane Palm is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 21 civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 6). His first amended complaint 22 alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by housing him at a 23 prison where he was at an elevated risk of contracting Valley Fever and were deliberately 24 indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to adequately diagnose and treat his Valley 25 Fever. (ECF No. 11). 26 The first amended complaint is now before the Court for screening. Upon review, the 27 Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint should proceed past screening only on his claims that 28 Defendants E. Perez and J. Guerra were deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by housing 1 him in a prison where he was at an elevated risk of contracting Valley Fever. All other claims 2 and Defendants should be dismissed without further leave to amend. 3 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 6 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 9 (2). Additionally, as Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a claim 10 on these same bases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). (ECF No. 6). 11 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 12 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 13 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 14 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 16 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 17 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 18 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 19 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 20 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 21 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 22 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 23 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 24 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 25 II. INITIAL COMPLAINT AND SCREENING ORDER1 26 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 11, 2025, about events occurring after his 27 28 1 For readability, minor alterations, such as changing capitalization, have been made to some of Plaintiff’s quotations without indicating each change. 1 transfer to Wasco State Prison (WSP), suing five WSP employees: (1) Warden C. Pfeiffer; (2) 2 Primary Care Physician Kai Chin-Jeng; (3) Correctional Counselor E. Perez; (4) Facility 3 Captain J. Guerra; and (5) John Doe 1, described as the Chief Medical Officer at WSP. (ECF 4 No. 1). 5 Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Chin-Jeng was deliberately indifferent to his serious 6 medical needs by not diagnosing and treating his Valley Fever, (id. at 18-19), and the 7 correctional Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by housing him at 8 WSP where he was at a higher risk of contracting Valley Fever, (id. at 19-20). 9 The Court screened the complaint on January 15, 2026, concluding that Plaintiff failed 10 to state a claim against any Defendant but provided the legal standards for his claims and 11 granted him leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 8). 12 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 13 Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on March 23, 2026. (ECF No. 11). He sues 14 the same five WSP Defendants from his initial complaint: (1) Warden C. Pfeiffer; (2) Primary 15 Care Physician Kai Chin-Jeng; (3) Correctional Counselor E. Perez; (4) Captain J. Guerra; and 16 (5) John Doe 1,2 described as the Chief Medical Officer at WSP. (Id. at 2-3). 17 Plaintiff brings two claims, alleging (1) deliberate indifference to his safety needs and 18 (2) deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He offers the following facts in support 19 of his first claim. 20 Plaintiff “is African American” and “CDCR had an exclusion policy restricting African 21 American inmates and those with cocci 2 risk factors from housing in hyperendemic 22 institutions such as [WSP] and Pleasant Valley [PVSP] due to Valley Fever risk.” (Id. at 4). 23 Plaintiff was previously housed at PVSP but was transferred from there under the “Valley 24 Fever exclusion criteria.” (Id.). “Plaintiff has a documented high risk chrono in his central file 25 reflecting such prior transfer to [WSP].” (Id.). 26 Plaintiff indicates that, while at WSP, he went before the classification committee for 27 28 2 Plaintiff uses “John Doe/Jane Doe” in the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 11, p. 3). The Court will use “John Doe” to describe this Defendant. 1 transfer. Defendants Perez and Guerra had access to his central file, “including documentation 2 reflecting Plaintiff was African American and had cocci 2 risk restrictions.” (Id.). He elsewhere 3 states that he “had a documented high-risk chrono and prior transfer due to cocci exclusions 4 policy” and “Perez and Guera had access to and reviewed [his] classification file.” (Id. at 6). 5 Perez and Guera knew that WSP was located “in a hyperendemic region” for Valley Fever. (Id. 6 at 4). However, despite knowledge of Plaintiff’s high-risk status and the CDCR exclusion 7 guidance, Plaintiff was delayed in being transferred for over a year and remained housed at 8 WSP for 15 months, ultimately contracting Valley Fever. 9 As to all the Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that they were aware of the serious risk of 10 harm posed to his health from Valley Fever but did not take reasonable measures to abate that 11 risk. Plaintiff contracted Valley Fever at WSP and suffered multiple symptoms, including 12 fever, cough, and headaches. 13 Citing Plata, Plaintiff alleges that it is evident that all Defendants knew since 2006 14 about Valley Fever’s presence. Further, he asserts that studies have suggested and shown that 15 “persons of African descent” are at higher risk for extrapulmonary complications, Plaintiff “is 16 such a person,” and prevention efforts are critical for such high-risk populations, which efforts 17 include physical removal “from highly endemic regions.” (Id. at 4-5). Although all Defendants 18 knew of the increased risk to African Americans, “at no time did they initiate precautions, such 19 as transferring the Plaintiff out.” (Id. at 5). 20 Plaintiff asserts that a 2012 report from the Receivers Public Health and Quality 21 Management Units found that WSP had higher cocci rates. Plaintiff says there is no question 22 that all Defendants were aware of the substantial risk of serous harm posed by Valley Fever and 23 asserts that, in Plata, the CDCR admitted it was “aware that Valley Fever presents a serious 24 risk to inmate health.” (Id.). He alleges that all Defendants “knew that failure to exclude 25 Plaintiff from being housed at [WSP] would keep him at risk of severe complications from his 26 Valley Fever infection, since it was found to be inside the hyperendemic Valley Fever area.” 27 (Id.). 28 After being housed at WSP, Plaintiff experienced symptoms, including cough, fever, 1 and weight loss, and submitted 7362s requesting Valley Fever testing and alerted “medical staff 2 of his symptoms” and that he was African American, at high risk, and had been transferred out 3 of PVSP due to cocci risk. (Id.). 4 Plaintiff told Defendant Dr. Chin-Jeng of his high-risk status and requested testing for 5 Valley Fever but Dr. Chin-Jeng “did not immediately order cocci serology testing” but instead 6 treated Plaintiff for pneumonia and prescribed antibiotics that caused severe adverse reactions. 7 (Id. at 6). About “one month passed between Plaintiff’s initial request for cocci testing and 8 confirmed diagnosis.” (Id.). Plaintiff deteriorated physically during this time, was hospitalized, 9 and was ultimately diagnosed with Valley Fever. Plaintiff is still on antifungal medication and 10 has permanent lung scarring and experiences shortness of breath upon overexertion and has 11 chronic joint pain. 12 In support of his second claim, Plaintiff repeats many of the allegations from his first 13 claim. For example, he repeats the facts about how he requested cocci testing from Dr. Chin- 14 Jeng, who allegedly delayed testing, leading to Plaintiff’s condition worsening. However, he 15 adds that his “numerous 7362s” also alerted the John Doe Defendant “to his symptoms of cocci 16 and his serious medical needs,” but John Doe, along with Dr. Chin-Jeng, employed a “wait- 17 and-see-approach” that was unreasonable. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff states that Dr. Chin-Jeng and John 18 Doe sent “him back to his cell” without giving him proper medical treatment and did not order 19 blood tests required for cocci screening when he showed symptoms consistent with Valley 20 Fever. (Id. at 9). 21 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that, at some point “prior to committee,” he informed Perez and 22 Guerra “that he feared for his safety medically and requested that he be transferred.” (Id. at 9). 23 He told them “of his susceptibility of contracting Valley Fever but his concerns went unheard 24 and ignored as he sat for 15 months after said committee and contracted Valley Fever.” (Id.). 25 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 26 A. Section 1983 27 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 28 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 1 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 2 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 3 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 4 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 5 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 6 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 7 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 8 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 10 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 11 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 12 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 13 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 14 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an 15 act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is 16 made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) 17 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 18 “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 19 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others 20 to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d 21 at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation 22 of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); 23 see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 24 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 25 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 26 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 27 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 28 691, 695 (1978). 1 B. Deliberate Indifference to Safety Needs 2 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants’ decision to house him at WSP was 3 deliberately indifferent to his safety needs. 4 Under the Eighth Amendment, “[p]rison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners 5 are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 6 Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state a claim under the Eighth 7 Amendment based on involuntary exposure to environmental hazards, an inmate must satisfy 8 both an objective and a subjective component. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 9 (1993) (addressing exposure to environmental tobacco smoke). 10 For the objective factor, inmates must establish “that it is contrary to current standards 11 of decency for anyone to be so exposed against his will” to the hazard. Id. This “requires more 12 than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the 13 likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused.” Id. at 36. Instead, courts must 14 “assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it 15 violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk,” 16 meaning that the risk “is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id. 17 For the subjective factor, inmates must show that prison officials are “deliberately 18 indifferent to [their] plight.” Id. at 35. This means that the prison official is liable “only if he 19 knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to 20 take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Deliberate 21 indifference “entails something more than mere negligence.” Id. at 835. 22 With these standards in mind, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Perez and Guerra had 23 access to, and reviewed, his file that documented his “high-risk chrono and prior transfer due to 24 cocci exclusions policy.” (ECF No. 1, p. 6; see id. at 4). Further, he indicates that they were 25 involved with the classification committee that decides whether inmates should be transferred. 26 (Id. at 4, 9). “Sometime prior to committee,” he told them of his susceptibility to contracting 27 Valley Fever and asked to be transferred. (Id.). However, they ignored his concerns and he 28 remained in WSP for 15 months, ultimately contracting Valley Fever and suffering severe 1 symptoms. 2 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations for the purposes of screening, the Court 3 concludes that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants E. Perez and J. Guerra were 4 deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by housing him in a prison where he was at an 5 elevated risk of contracting Valley Fever. 6 However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any other Defendant. Unlike Perez and 7 Guerra—who were part of the classification committee deciding whether Plaintiff should be 8 transferred—Plaintiff fails to state facts that any other Defendant had personal involvement in 9 continuing to house him at WSP. Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Pfeiffer, Dr. 10 Chin-Jeng, and John Doe were also part of the classification committee or had any other 11 involvement regarding his transfer decision. 12 Further, to the extent that he seeks to hold any of them liable in a supervisory capacity, 13 supervisory personnel are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a 14 theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 15 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for 16 relief under § 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege some facts 17 that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either: were personally involved in 18 the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 19 1989); “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 20 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy 21 itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional 22 violation,” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff 23 has not alleged any such facts and thus fails to state any claim against supervisory defendants. 24 Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that Pfeiffer, Dr. Chin-Jeng, and John Doe were 25 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs. Unlike with Perez and Guerra, Plaintiff does 26 not allege that the other Defendants knew of and disregarded information about his high-risk 27 status relating to Valley Fever. Plaintiff only alleges that they generally knew of risks posed by 28 Valley Fever from outside sources, such as the Plata case. (ECF No. 11, p. 4 – “Dating back to 1 2006, it is evident that [Defendants] knew of an were aware of Valley Fever’s presence as 2 evidenced in Plata v. Brown.”). However, a general awareness of the presence of, and risks 3 posed by, Valley Fever does not show that Defendants knew of and disregarded a particular 4 risk to Plaintiff. Swenson v. CDCR Sec’y, No. 2:24-CV-07164-JLS-AJR, 2025 WL 3152245, at 5 *4 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2025) (concluding that a plaintiff’s documented respiratory condition 6 and defendants’ general knowledge of presence of Valley Fever in an area “does not, by itself, 7 show that any Defendants had actual knowledge of a specific and substantial risk to Plaintiff’s 8 health from the transfer”). 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants E. Perez and J. Guerra were 10 deliberately indifferent to his safety needs, but fails to state such a claim against Defendants 11 Pfeiffer, Dr. Chin-Jeng, and John Doe. 12 C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 13 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious 14 medical needs because they failed to adequate diagnose and treat his Valley Fever. 15 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 16 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 17 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires 18 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a 19 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 20 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 21 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)), 22 overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 23 banc). 24 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of 25 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 26 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference can be established “by 27 showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need 28 and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil 1 recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known 2 or so obvious that it should be known”) is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment 3 violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37 & n.5 (citations omitted). 4 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between 5 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to 6 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 Additionally, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a 8 medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 9 Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because 10 the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. “To show deliberate indifference, the 11 plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the [official] chose was medically unacceptable 12 under the circumstances and that the [official] chose this course in conscious disregard of an 13 excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 14 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 With these standards in mind, Plaintiff alleges that he submitted several 7362s 16 requesting Valley Fever testing and alerted unspecified medical staff of his symptoms. (ECF 17 No. 1, pp. 5, 8). Likewise, Plaintiff contends that his 7362s alerted Dr. Chin-Jeng and John Doe 18 to his symptoms, but they took a “wait-and-see approach.” (Id. at 8). Elsewhere, he states that 19 they sent “him back to his cell” and did not provide proper treatment. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff also 20 states that he informed Dr. Chin-Jeng of his high-risk status and requested Valley Fever testing. 21 However, Dr. Chin-Jeng “did not immediately order cocci serology testing” but instead treated 22 Plaintiff for pneumonia, prescribing him antibiotics that led to severe adverse reactions. (Id. at 23 6). Plaintiff’s symptoms worsened, and about a month passed before his initial request for 24 testing and his “confirmed diagnosis.” (Id.). Elsewhere, Plaintiff implicates all Defendants in 25 being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, stating that they all knew that he 26 “faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable 27 measures to abate the risk by refusing to address the Valley Fever.” (Id. at 9). 28 Upon consideration of the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 1 deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs against any Defendant. Beginning 2 with Dr. Chin-Jeng and John Doe, Plaintiff alleges that he was provided medical care for his 3 symptoms. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Chin-Jeng initially treated him for potential 4 pneumonia by prescribing him antibiotics. Although Plaintiff did not get immediate testing for 5 Valley Fever, he alleges he was tested and diagnosed for Valley Fever relatively shortly 6 thereafter, about a month after requesting such testing. 7 Moreover, Plaintiff’ original complaint alleged that he was treated for Valley Fever 8 relatively soon after complaining of symptoms. Specifically, in Plaintiff’s initial complaint, 9 which he verified under penalty of perjury, Plaintiff provided a timeline of the treatment he 10 obtained. (ECF No. 1, pp. 16-18). Among other things, Plaintiff stated that (1) on November 11 18, 2024, he submitted a health services request form, (2) on December 6, 2024, he received a 12 tomography scan of his chest; (3) “on December 11, 2024, the results of the cocci screening 13 noted evidence of coccidioidomycosis and Fluconazole antifungal medication was ordered” 14 along with “additional diagnostic lab testing”; (4) on January 29, 2025, he had another 15 computed tomograpy scan of his chest; and (5) on February 26, 2025, Dr. Chin-Jeng “ordered 16 additional lab testing, including a cocci titer.” (Id. at 17-18). 17 Although Plaintiff has omitted these facts from his first amended complaint, the Court 18 may take them into consideration in determining if Plaintiff has stated a claim for deliberate 19 indifference to serious medical needs. See Clayton v. Smith, No. 1:17-CV-00309-BAM (PC), 20 2018 WL 3218366, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2018) (“The Court notes that . . . [Plaintiff] has 21 omitted factual allegations from his original complaint and first amended complaint regarding 22 treatments that he received. . . . Although a plaintiff may make clarifications in an amended 23 pleading, the Court is not required to ignore omissions of fact or contradictions of fact in later 24 pleadings. Thus, the Court will consider omitted factual allegations in the previous pleadings.”) 25 (internal citation omitted); Pickering v. California Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:13-CV-01164-DAD- 26 BAM (PC), 2016 WL 7104167, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (noting that “Plaintiff may not 27 omit relevant facts in his amended complaint in an effort to state a cognizable claim”); 28 Jefferson v. Medley, No. 1:13-CV-00035-LJO, 2014 WL 1747590, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 1 2014) (“Moreover, in his first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged, under penalty of perjury, 2 that he informed Dr. Jardini he was willing to give up his wheelchair and was then provided 3 with a walker. Upon screening his second amended complaint, the Court cautioned Plaintiff 4 that he could not simply omit facts in order to state a cognizable claim. As before, Plaintiff 5 leaves out any mention of his agreement regarding the wheelchair and makes only a passing 6 reference to the walker. Instead, Plaintiff suggests that correctional officers influenced 7 Plaintiff's placement in a walker. This is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Dr. 8 Jardini.”). 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not state a claim for deliberate 10 indifference to serious medical needs against Defendant Chin-Jeng, or John Doe. At most, 11 Plaintiff’s allegations would show that they were negligent in failing to properly diagnose and 12 treat his medical condition more quickly. However, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “[a] 13 showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional 14 deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060; see Hutchinson v. 15 United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a 16 medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment 17 rights.”).Further, Plaintiffs allegations do not establish that Defendants’ diagnosis and 18 treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that they chose their initial 19 treatment in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to his health. 20 As for the remaining Defendants—Pfeiffer, Perez, and Guerra—Plaintiff alleges no 21 facts showing that they were involved in his medical care at all. Plaintiff does not allege that 22 they knew of his Valley Fever or lack of treatment and then deliberately disregarded his serious 23 medical needs. Rather, he alleges only their general awareness of Valley Fever, which is not 24 sufficient to allege that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s particular serious 25 medical needs. 26 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that any Defendant was deliberately 27 indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 28 \\\ 1 IV. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and concludes that it 3 sufficiently alleged that Defendants E. Perez and J. Guerra were deliberately indifferent to his 4 safety needs by housing him in a prison where he was at an elevated risk of contracting Valley 5 Fever to proceed past screening. T 6 However, the Court will recommend that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed 7 without further leave to amend. Notably, the initial screening order addressed similar 8 allegations, advised Plaintiff how they were deficient, provided applicable legal standards, and 9 granted him leave to amend. Thus, granting further leave to amend would be futile. See 10 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that a 11 court need not grant leave to amend where it would be futile); Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 12 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to 13 amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad.”) 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall assign a District Judge to 16 this case. 17 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 18 1. This case proceed on Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants E. Perez and J. Guerra were 19 deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by housing him in a prison where he was at 20 an elevated risk of contracting Valley Fever. 21 2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed without further leave to amend. 22 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 23 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 24 thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 25 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 26 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 27 \\\ 28 \\\ ] Any objections shall be limited to no more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits. 2 || Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 3 || waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 4 || Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7|| Dated: _-March 30, 2026 [Je heey —— 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14