NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3484-24
D.T. on behalf of L.T.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and RECORDS CUSTODIAN JEANETTE LARKINS,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________________
Argued May 13, 2026 – Decided July 13, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2374-24.
Walter M. Luers argued the cause for appellant (Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf and Jamie Epstein Law, attorneys; Walter M. Luers, Christina N. Stripp and Jamie Epstein, on the briefs).
Colin Klika, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park and Raymond R. Chance, III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel; Amna T. Toor, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff D.T., parent of minor L.T., appeals from the trial court's order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff filed an Open Public
Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, request for documents relating
to an earlier administrative claim for her child under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1400 to 1482. The trial court
initially found defendants violated OPRA and awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees
as the prevailing party. On reconsideration, the court found it misapplied the
prevailing law, including the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and the New Jersey Pupil Records
Act (NJPRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19. The trial court then dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice, finding that defendants produced records pursuant to
NJPRA and vacating its award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff under OPRA.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff
sought her own child's unredacted school records under NJPRA rather than
OPRA. Alternatively, plaintiff asserts the trial court abused its discretion in
granting defendants' motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
I.
A-3484-24 2 On December 29, 2021, plaintiff filed a due process petition pursuant to
IDEA against the Lawnside Board of Education. 1 It sought "development of an
appropriate Individualized Education Program (IEP), out-of-district placement,
and compensatory education due to Lawnside’s alleged failure to provide a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)." On January 11, 2022, Lawnside
forwarded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for
adjudication. On January 19, 2023, the OAL rendered a final decision, and
returned the physical file to defendants.
On September 26, 2023, plaintiff sought records associated with the final
decision pursuant to OPRA. On October 4, defendant the Department of
Education (DOE) and OPRA custodian, co-defendant Jeanette Larkin, produced
certain records to plaintiff. Plaintiff wrote on October 5 and October 12, 2023,
claiming the records provided were incomplete. She sought all related OAL
records, asserting there were 100 documents. On October 12, 2023, Larkin
notified plaintiff that "potentially responsive records" were being retrieved by
defendants from an offsite storage facility, extending the due date to October
1 See D.T. on behalf of L.T. v. Lawnside Board of Education, OAL Docket No. EDS 00267-22, DOE Docket No. 2022-33719 (2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 33). A-3484-24 3 20. Larkin then pursued six more extensions, pushing the due date for plaintiff's
OPRA request back to December 29, 2023.
On December 26, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint and order to show cause
(OTSC), alleging defendants violated N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) by failing to provide
the requested records before October 20, 2023, and seeking production of all the
requested records under OPRA. On December 28, the trial court granted
plaintiff's OTSC. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court
heard argument.
On May 1, 2024, the court granted plaintiff's OTSC, finding the request
for production of documents was moot due to plaintiff receiving all requested
documents, and noting all that remained was whether plaintiff was entitled to
attorneys' fees. The court then determined that defendants violated OPRA, and
that plaintiff was the prevailing party. Plaintiff moved for attorneys' fees, and
defendants cross-moved to reconsider the court's May 1 order.
After argument, the trial court granted defendants' motion for
reconsideration, dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and denied
plaintiff's application for prevailing party attorneys' fees. The trial court found
that it failed to consider the interactions between NJPRA, FERPA and OPRA,
erroneously finding defendants had violated OPRA. The court analyzed the
A-3484-24 4 relevant provisions of NJPRA, FERPA and OPRA, as well as relevant case law.
It stated:
Plaintiff sought access to student records under the NJPRA, specifically [p]laintiff requested L.T.'s unredacted special education records pertaining to her special education case. Plaintiff acknowledged that the documents were student records in the initial OPRA request. These records are expressly exempt from disclosure to the public under the regulations discussed above. Although [d]efendants provided some responsive records in September 2023, [d]efendants did not release the balance of the responsive records until [p]laintiff provided a parental consent release required by the NJPRA. The parental consent release allowed [p]laintiff access to L.T.’s student records through her position as L.T.’s parent via the NJPRA and FERPA, not as a general requestor under OPRA.
Because the [c]ourt finds that [d]efendants properly denied [p]laintiff access to the records [under] OPRA and then properly provided them to [p]laintiff under the NJPRA, [p]laintiff is not a prevailing party under OPRA. Plaintiff’s application for counsel fees is denied. Accordingly, the [c]ourt dismisses [p]laintiff’s complaint.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in applying NJPRA rather
than OPRA to her request for her child's records. In the alternative, plaintiff
claims the court abused its discretion in granting defendants' motion for
reconsideration.
A-3484-24 5 II.
"A trial court's 'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'"
McDermott v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 483 N.J. Super. 264, 284 (App. Div. 2025)
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)). Thus, we review questions of statutory interpretation by the trial
court de novo. State v. Carlton, 262 N.J. 629, 637 (2026).
Our review of a judge's grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration is
abuse of discretion pursuant to Rule 4:49-2. State v. Ellison, 482 N.J. Super.
357, 371 (App. Div. 2025); Branch v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3484-24
D.T. on behalf of L.T.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and RECORDS CUSTODIAN JEANETTE LARKINS,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________________
Argued May 13, 2026 – Decided July 13, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2374-24.
Walter M. Luers argued the cause for appellant (Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf and Jamie Epstein Law, attorneys; Walter M. Luers, Christina N. Stripp and Jamie Epstein, on the briefs).
Colin Klika, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park and Raymond R. Chance, III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel; Amna T. Toor, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff D.T., parent of minor L.T., appeals from the trial court's order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff filed an Open Public
Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, request for documents relating
to an earlier administrative claim for her child under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1400 to 1482. The trial court
initially found defendants violated OPRA and awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees
as the prevailing party. On reconsideration, the court found it misapplied the
prevailing law, including the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and the New Jersey Pupil Records
Act (NJPRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19. The trial court then dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice, finding that defendants produced records pursuant to
NJPRA and vacating its award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff under OPRA.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff
sought her own child's unredacted school records under NJPRA rather than
OPRA. Alternatively, plaintiff asserts the trial court abused its discretion in
granting defendants' motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
I.
A-3484-24 2 On December 29, 2021, plaintiff filed a due process petition pursuant to
IDEA against the Lawnside Board of Education. 1 It sought "development of an
appropriate Individualized Education Program (IEP), out-of-district placement,
and compensatory education due to Lawnside’s alleged failure to provide a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)." On January 11, 2022, Lawnside
forwarded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for
adjudication. On January 19, 2023, the OAL rendered a final decision, and
returned the physical file to defendants.
On September 26, 2023, plaintiff sought records associated with the final
decision pursuant to OPRA. On October 4, defendant the Department of
Education (DOE) and OPRA custodian, co-defendant Jeanette Larkin, produced
certain records to plaintiff. Plaintiff wrote on October 5 and October 12, 2023,
claiming the records provided were incomplete. She sought all related OAL
records, asserting there were 100 documents. On October 12, 2023, Larkin
notified plaintiff that "potentially responsive records" were being retrieved by
defendants from an offsite storage facility, extending the due date to October
1 See D.T. on behalf of L.T. v. Lawnside Board of Education, OAL Docket No. EDS 00267-22, DOE Docket No. 2022-33719 (2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 33). A-3484-24 3 20. Larkin then pursued six more extensions, pushing the due date for plaintiff's
OPRA request back to December 29, 2023.
On December 26, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint and order to show cause
(OTSC), alleging defendants violated N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) by failing to provide
the requested records before October 20, 2023, and seeking production of all the
requested records under OPRA. On December 28, the trial court granted
plaintiff's OTSC. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court
heard argument.
On May 1, 2024, the court granted plaintiff's OTSC, finding the request
for production of documents was moot due to plaintiff receiving all requested
documents, and noting all that remained was whether plaintiff was entitled to
attorneys' fees. The court then determined that defendants violated OPRA, and
that plaintiff was the prevailing party. Plaintiff moved for attorneys' fees, and
defendants cross-moved to reconsider the court's May 1 order.
After argument, the trial court granted defendants' motion for
reconsideration, dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and denied
plaintiff's application for prevailing party attorneys' fees. The trial court found
that it failed to consider the interactions between NJPRA, FERPA and OPRA,
erroneously finding defendants had violated OPRA. The court analyzed the
A-3484-24 4 relevant provisions of NJPRA, FERPA and OPRA, as well as relevant case law.
It stated:
Plaintiff sought access to student records under the NJPRA, specifically [p]laintiff requested L.T.'s unredacted special education records pertaining to her special education case. Plaintiff acknowledged that the documents were student records in the initial OPRA request. These records are expressly exempt from disclosure to the public under the regulations discussed above. Although [d]efendants provided some responsive records in September 2023, [d]efendants did not release the balance of the responsive records until [p]laintiff provided a parental consent release required by the NJPRA. The parental consent release allowed [p]laintiff access to L.T.’s student records through her position as L.T.’s parent via the NJPRA and FERPA, not as a general requestor under OPRA.
Because the [c]ourt finds that [d]efendants properly denied [p]laintiff access to the records [under] OPRA and then properly provided them to [p]laintiff under the NJPRA, [p]laintiff is not a prevailing party under OPRA. Plaintiff’s application for counsel fees is denied. Accordingly, the [c]ourt dismisses [p]laintiff’s complaint.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in applying NJPRA rather
than OPRA to her request for her child's records. In the alternative, plaintiff
claims the court abused its discretion in granting defendants' motion for
reconsideration.
A-3484-24 5 II.
"A trial court's 'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'"
McDermott v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 483 N.J. Super. 264, 284 (App. Div. 2025)
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)). Thus, we review questions of statutory interpretation by the trial
court de novo. State v. Carlton, 262 N.J. 629, 637 (2026).
Our review of a judge's grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration is
abuse of discretion pursuant to Rule 4:49-2. State v. Ellison, 482 N.J. Super.
357, 371 (App. Div. 2025); Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582
(2021). An abuse of discretion occurs when "a decision is made without a
rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested
on an impermissible basis." State v. Taylor, 261 N.J. 440, 449 (2025) (quoting
Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We have held a motion for reconsideration should be granted solely in
"those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt
has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or
2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the
A-3484-24 6 significance of probative competent evidence . . . ." Castano v. Augustine, 475
N.J. Super. 71, 78 (App. Div. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Triffin v.
SHS Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021)).
III.
A.
In interpreting a statute, "our 'paramount goal' is to discern the
Legislature's intent." Cano v. Cnty. Concrete Corp., 483 N.J. Super. 459, 471
(App. Div. 2026). "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result,
then our interpretive process is over." Carlton, 262 N.J. at 637 (quoting State v.
Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 177 (2019)).
Plaintiff contends that our jurisprudence following L.R. v. Camden City
Pub. Sch. Dist. (L.R. I), 452 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2017), makes OPRA the
sole means through which parents and guardians secure their child's student
records. We disagree, and we conclude that NJPRA, rather than OPRA, applies
here.
We first consider OPRA.
Under OPRA, "government records shall be readily accessible for
inspection, copying, or examination by the citizens of this State, with certain
exceptions, for the protection of the public interest, and any limitations on the
A-3484-24 7 right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s right of
access . . . ." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Regardless of the policy favoring a public right
of access, "a public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard
from public access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been
entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable
expectation of privacy . . . ." Ibid. Thus, OPRA provides that it will "not
abrogate any exemption of a public record or government record from public
access" under other statutes, regulations, court rules, and executive orders.
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(a). NJPRA is a statute that establishes a regulatory framework
for the "creation, maintenance and retention of 'pupil' records," 2 and to safeguard
them. The law codifies the right of access to student records for parents,
guardians, and students of all ages, and protects their privacy by limiting the
access of others. N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19. It follows that a public school's student
records in New Jersey implicates the "other law" exemption under OPRA,
through NJPRA. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(a), see Johnson et al., New Jersey Open
Public Records & Meetings § 12:6 (2026).
2 For ease of reference, we use the term "student" in lieu of "pupil" throughout this opinion. A-3484-24 8 Given the express intention of our Legislature, we conclude OPRA does
not control, since NJPRA explicitly exempts student records from the public
right of access. The trial court did not err in finding that NJPRA governs rather
than OPRA
We now turn to the application of the NJPRA on this record. We conclude
it applies to the release of L.T.'s unredacted student records.
The NJRA defines a student record as "information related to an
individual student gathered within or outside the school district and maintained
within the school district . . . . In the absence of any 'information related to an
individual student,' the document(s) no longer meets the definition . . . ."
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-2.1. NJPRA also establishes a list of authorized organizations,
agencies, and persons which can obtain limited access to student records.
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5. The relevant entry on this list is "a student who has the
written permission of a parent and the parent of a student under the age of 18,
regardless of whether the child resides with the parent. . . ." The regulation also
requires that the student record cannot disclose the student's place of residence
and provides that a court may still deny access to such a record. N.J.A.C. 6A:32-
7.5(e). Further, the NJPRA provides that:
1. When responding to OPRA requests from any party, including parties other than
A-3484-24 9 those listed at (e) above, a district board of education or charter school or renaissance school project board of trustees may release, without consent, records removed of all personally identifiable information, as such documents do not meet the definition of a student record.
[Id. at (g) (emphasis added).]
While the statute references OPRA, "it was not meant to undermine the
student privacy protections set forth elsewhere in the [NJPRA]." Johnson et al.,
§ 12:6; see L.R. II, 238 N.J. at 569 (Patterson, J., concurring). We have held the
language of N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(g) does not "signify" that OPRA and FERPA
"allow courts to disregard the access limitations within our State's regulations
concerning student records." L.R. I, 452 N.J. Super. at 85. This is so because
"even the redaction of all personally identifiable information would not preven t
reasonable persons 'in the school community' who lack personal knowledge of
the parties involved from identifying the student 'with reasonable certainty.'" Id.
at 90 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 99.3(f) (2017)).
While the Legislature could have based NJPRA on its federal counterpart,
it did not. See L.R. II, 238 N.J. at 563 (Patterson, J., concurring). Rather,
NJPRA stands as an exception to OPRA, requiring higher scrutiny in the release
of student records.
A-3484-24 10 Here, plaintiff sought unredacted student records of her child. NJPRA
requires strict compliance to protect the disclosure of such information from
public access. Plaintiff sought L.T.'s unredacted student records, thus requiring
a parental consent release under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(g). The sought-after
records were not fully released by defendants until plaintiff complied with the
NJPRA by providing a parental consent release. We agree with the trial court
that this "release allowed [p]laintiff access to L.T.’s student records through her
position as L.T.’s parent via NJPRA and FERPA, not as a general requestor
under OPRA."
We conclude NJPRA controls the release of L.T.'s unredacted student
records, not OPRA.
B.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
defendants' motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff seeks a remand, asking us to
direct the trial court to apply OPRA to compel production of the student records,
rather than NJPRA, and to further direct the trial court to award plaintiff
attorneys' fees and costs. We are unconvinced, and we affirm for the reasons
set forth in Judge Robert Lougy's comprehensive fourteen-page written
statement of reasons. We add the following brief comments.
A-3484-24 11 Our Supreme Court noted that New Jersey "could have based state
regulations on implemented and proposed federal standards," thus making it so
that "student records redacted to remove student and parent names, addresses,
social security numbers, and other personally identifiable information would be
subject to public disclosure, even if those records retained other information
relating to the individual student." L.R. II, 238 N.J. at 563 (Patterson, J.,
concurring). However, applying well-settled principles of statutory
construction, we easily conclude that the Legislature did not intend to base
NJPRA on its federal counterpart, FERPA. Ibid. Rather, the Legislature made
NJPRA an exception to OPRA.
Because NJPRA is the controlling law for issuance of plaintiff's child's
unredacted school records, there is no pathway to an attorneys' fees award. This
is consistent with our prior holding on the question. "Like FERPA, the NJPRA
and its governing regulations merely provide administrative remedies for a
violation and do not provide for a private right of action or suppression." State
v. J.S.G., 456 N.J. Super. 87, 105 (App. Div. 2018) (citing L.S. v. Mount Olive
Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 2d 648, 664 (D.N.J. 2011)).
Affirmed.
A-3484-24 12