Driscoll's, Inc. v. California Berry Cultivars, LLC

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 20, 2025·No. 2:19-cv-00493·Unknown

Opinion

DRISCOLL’S, INC., and DRISCOLL’S No. 2:19-cv-00493-TLN-CKD OF EUROPE B.V., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA BERRY CULTIVARS, LLC, and DOUGLAS SHAW, Defendants. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Driscoll’s, Inc. and Driscoll’s of Europe B.V.’s (collectively, “Driscoll’s”1) Motion for Leave to Amend. (ECF No. 96.) Defendants California Berry Cultivars, LLC (“CBC”) and Douglas Shaw (“Shaw”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 106.) Driscoll’s filed a reply. (ECF No. 111.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Driscoll’s motion. /// /// ///

1 The singular “Driscoll’s” is how Plaintiffs Driscoll’s, Inc. and Driscoll’s of Europe B.V. refer to themselves in the Second Amended Complaint, and the Court refers to them the same here. Driscoll’s holds various strawberry patents and alleges Defendants infringed on several of these patents. Driscoll’s began as the Strawberry Institute of California and received the first patent on a strawberry variety in 1958. (ECF No. 59 at ¶ 5.) Driscoll’s continues to breed new berry varieties today, which are grown by independent farmer growers and then sold exclusively by Driscoll’s. (Id.) Driscoll’s uses contracts “to maintain control over its proprietary strawberry varieties.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) The contracts specify farmers “only have the right to grow the varieties for sale of the fruit by Driscoll’s under Driscoll’s brand.” (Id.) The contracts also “do not permit growers or nurseries to use the varieties for any other purpose, expressly exclude breeding as a permitted purpose, and prevent the growers of nurseries from transferring the varieties to others and from disclosing any proprietary information about the varieties.” (Id.) Shaw, the former head of the University of California, Davis (the “University”) strawberry breeding program, left the University in 2014 and established CBC, a private strawberry breeding program. (Id. at ¶ 8.) In 2016, the Regents of the University sued CBC regarding CBC’s right to use the patented and unpatented strawberry varieties Shaw developed during his time at the University. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Cal. Berry Cultivars, LLC, No. 16-CV-02477-VC, 2017 WL 9531948 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017). In May 2017, a jury found Defendants “committed willful patent infringement by using eleven of the [University’s] patented varieties in CBC’s breeding program without the University’s permission” and also “engaged in conversion by interfering with the University’s property interests in its proprietary strawberry breeding material.” (ECF No. 59 at ¶ 9.) Driscoll’s alleges evidence from the trial in Regents revealed that CBC not only improperly used the University’s proprietary strawberry varieties in its breeding program, but also those of Driscoll’s and others. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Specifically, “at least four Driscoll’s patented varieties — Camarillo[™], Amesti™, Lusa™, and Marquis™ — were used in CBC’s breeding program.” (Id.) In the instant case, Driscoll’s alleges “Shaw prepared CBC’s breeding plans and directed the use of Driscoll’s proprietary strawberry varieties in these plans.” (Id.) In other words, Driscoll’s alleges Shaw unlawfully used Driscoll’s patented strawberry varieties in CBC’s breeding plans. (Id.) Driscoll’s further alleges “CBC or Shaw could not have obtained these varieties except in contravention of Driscoll’s agreements with its growers and nurseries.” (Id.) Specifically, Driscoll’s alleges “Shaw, CBC, CBC’s members or agents, and/or others acting in concert with CBC or Shaw have had, and still have, possession of progeny that resulted from unauthorized crossbreeding with Driscoll’s proprietary strawberry varieties within this district, including at CBC’s French Camp facilities.” (Id.) Driscoll’s does not allege how or where CBC or Shaw obtained these patented strawberry varieties. On March 29, 2019, Driscoll’s initiated the instant action. (ECF No. 1.) On April 29, 2022, Driscoll’s filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), alleging the following claims: (1) declaratory relief in the form of a judgment from this Court; (2) infringement of U.S. Plant Patent No. 18,878 (“Amnesti™”); (3) infringement of U.S. Plant Patent No. 22,247 (“Lusa™”); (4) infringement of U.S. Plant Patent No. 23,400 (“Marquis™”); (5) intentional interference with a contract; and (6) unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–17210. (ECF No. 59.) On March 30, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the intentional interference with contract and unfair competition claims with leave to amend. (ECF No. 77.) Driscoll’s opted not to file an amended complaint, and the case proceeded on the remaining claims in the SAC. Defendants filed answers with counterclaims on May 19, 2023, and Driscoll’s answered the counterclaims on June 28, 2023. (ECF Nos. 78–81.) Driscoll’s filed the instant motion for leave to amend the SAC on April 22, 2024. (ECF No. 96.) Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). When the Court issues a scheduling order that establishes a timetable to amend the complaint, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16 governs any amendments to the complaint. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). To allow for amendment under Rule 16, a plaintiff must show good cause for not having amended the complaint before the time specified in the scheduling order. Id. The good cause standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recs., Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Even if the good cause standard is met under Rule 16, the Court has the discretion to refuse amendment if it finds reasons to deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a). Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. Under Rule 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” and the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” The Ninth Circuit has considered five factors in determining whether leave to amend should be given: “(1) bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Driscoll’s seeks leave to allege additional facts to support its intentional interference with contract and unfair competition claims, which have been dismissed three times. (ECF No. 96-1 at 6.) The Court dismissed the unfair competition claim because it was derivative of the intentional interference with contract claim. (ECF No. 77 at 10.) As such, the Court only addresses the intentional interference with contract claim in this Order. The elements of a claim for the tort of intentional interference with a contract include: “(1) a valid contract between a plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” United Nat. Maint., v. San Diego Convention Ctr., Inc., 766 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1119 (1990)). In an order dated March 30, 2023, the Court dismissed Driscol

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Driscoll's, Inc. v. California Berry Cultivars, LLC, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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