Drew v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 24, 2019·No. 1:19-cv-04067·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KEITH DREW, Plaintiff, -against- NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF CORRECTION; NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORP.; CITY OF NEW YORK; CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR MR. RICKY – FEB. 14, 2019; DOCTOR OR P.A. SHIBLEE; DOCTOR OR P.A. LATUNJI; CAPTAIN ROWE, SHIELD 931; CAPTAIN KNIGHT, SHIELD 1260; CAPTAIN PHILLIPS, SHIELD 1448; CAPTAIN JEFFRIES – OTIS BANTUM 19-CV-4067 (CM) CORRECTIONAL CENTER (MAIN INTAKE CAPTAIN); CAPTAIN SOTO – SECURITY CAPTAIN; CORRECTION ORDER TO AMEND OFFICER DICOSTANZO, SHIELD 8666; CORRECTION OFFICER SMITH-WESSON, SHIELD 2088; CORRECTION OFFICER HOSEN, SHIELD 10699; CORRECTION OFFICER RICHARD, SHIELD 19276; CORRECTION OFFICER SCHLANGER, SHIELD 9797; CORRECTION OFFICER RODRIGUES, SHIELD 7454; CORRECTION OFFICER PUMAREJO, CHAPMAN, OTIS BANTUM; CORRECTION OFFICER RODRIGUEZ, GEORGE R. VIERNO; CORRECTION OFFICER RAMIREZ, SHIELD 11033; CAPTAIN CRUZ, SHIELD 814 (ADJUDICATION CAPTAIN 4-5-2019), Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Downstate Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, while he was detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center (OBCC) and the George R. Vierno Center (GRVC) on Rikers Island, Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated August 2, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought

by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Keith Drew’s complaint is not the model of clarity. He does not make clear his claims against each Defendant named in his complaint. Plaintiff also fails to make clear when the alleged constitutional violations occurred. The Court has closely scrutinized Plaintiff’s complaint and the relevant allegations described in each section below, and although Plaintiff presents a considerable amount of information, Plaintiff fails to state any claims against the named Defendants.

DISCUSSION To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1988). A. The New York City Department of Correction As an agency of the City of New York, the Department of Correction is not an entity that can be sued in its own name. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Instead, claims against the Department of Correction must be brought

against the City of New York. Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Correction must therefore be dismissed. B. The City of New York Plaintiff does name the City of New York as a Defendant. But when a plaintiff sues a municipality such as the City of New York under § 1983, however, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

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