Dreton Doan v. Great Venture Properties, LP

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 30, 2024
• Docket: 01-24-00306-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued August 30, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00306-CV ——————————— DRETON DOAN, Appellant V. GREAT VENTURE PROPERTIES, LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2021-77203

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Dreton Doan, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the

trial court’s March 18, 2024 order granting summary judgment in favor of

Appellee Great Venture Properties, LP. Because the clerk’s record indicates that

the trial court has not disposed of all parties and claims in the underling lawsuit, we notified Doan that his appeal could be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless,

by August 27, 2024, he filed a response or a supplemental clerk’s record

establishing that all claims against all parties were resolved in the underlying

litigation, and that the summary judgment from which he appeals is a final and

appealable judgment. Doan did not file a response by the indicated deadline.

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final

judgments. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC,

603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). A judgment issued without a conventional trial

is final for purposes of appeal only if it (1) actually disposes of all claims and

parties before the court, regardless of its language, or (2) states with unmistakable

clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. Lehmann v. Har-

Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001); see also Patel v. Nations

Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023) (“[A] final judgment must

dispose of all parties and all claims in the underlying case.”). If there is any doubt

as to a judgment’s finality, the question must be resolved by determining the trial

court’s intention as gathered from the language of the entire order and the record as

a whole, aided on occasion by the conduct of the parties. Vaughn v. Drennon, 324

S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. 2010) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203). Whether a

court has jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Bonsmara

Nat. Beef Co., 603 S.W.3d at 390.

2 Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, which is a limited exception to the

general rule, permits appellate courts to review certain trial court rulings even

when the case remains pending before the trial court. See id. We have jurisdiction

over an appeal of an interlocutory order, however, only if there is a statute

authorizing an appeal of the order. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444,

447 (Tex. 2011); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (authorizing

appeals from certain interlocutory orders); id. § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory

appeal of certain venue determinations).

Doan challenges the trial court’s March 18, 2024 order granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellee Great Venture Properties, LP. The record reflects,

however, that in addition to Great Venture Properties, LP, Doan also sued Angel

Restaurant, LLC, Cuon Pham, John Doe, Jane Doe, Loan Cao, and Thu Minh

Huyhn. The order from which Doan appeals states that after considering Great

Venture Property’s “No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) as to

[Doan’s] claims against it . . . the Motion should be GRANTED,” and it further

provides that the motion “as to each of [Doan’s] claims against [Great Venture

Properties’] is GRANTED.” The order does not reflect that the trial court disposed

of Doan’s claims against the remaining defendants, nor does it state with

unmistakable clarity that it is final as to all claims or parties. The order is thus not

3 a final and appealable judgment.1 See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93 (stating

judgment final only if order disposes of all claims and parties, or states with

unmistakable clarity that judgment is final as to all claims and parties).

A summary judgment that disposes of claims against only some parties is

interlocutory. Ehresman v. LF Tech. Dev. Corp. Ltd., No. 03-22-00433-CV, 2022

WL 17070807, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“[A]n order granting summary judgment in favor of only some of multiple

defendants is not an appealable interlocutory order.”); see also Dall. Symphony

Ass’n, Inc. v. Reyes, 571 S.W.3d 753, 763 (Tex. 2019) (stating interlocutory order

that grants summary judgment is not appealable). There is no indication in the

record that the trial court severed the order making it final and appealable. See

Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203 (noting that order granting summary judgment for

three of five remaining defendants became final for purposes of appeal when it was

severed).

Thus, because the order granting summary judgment in favor of

Great Venture Properties from which Doan appeals is not a final judgment and the

order is not subject to review by interlocutory appeal, we do not have jurisdiction

over the appeal. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93; Dall. Symphony Ass’n, 571

1 Although Appellant did not respond to this Court’s jurisdictional letter, on August 27, 2024, the Clerk of the District Court filed an information sheet stating she was “unable to locate . . . any documents establishing that all claims against all parties have been resolved” in the underlying lawsuit.

4 S.W.3d at 763 (“An interlocutory order granting summary judgment is not subject

to appeal.”) (emphasis in original); Falkenhorst v. Metro. Escrow & Title, LLC,

No. 01-22-00370-CV, 2023 WL 2576452 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding court lacked jurisdiction over appeal of

summary judgment that did not dispose of all claims against all parties).

Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a),

43.2(f).

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.