DRAKE v. MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 15, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-01458
StatusUnknown

This text of DRAKE v. MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC. (DRAKE v. MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DRAKE v. MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC., (S.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRENDA DRAKE, on behalf of herself and ) others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:19-cv-01458-RLY-DML ) MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC., ) WOODFOREST NATIONAL BANK, ) ) Defendants. )

Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 62) This matter is before the court on plaintiff Brenda Drake's motion to compel defendant Mirand Response Systems, Inc. to answer certain document requests and interrogatories and to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent for certain topics. She contends the discovery is relevant and proportional to her putative class action claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and is needed to (i) file a brief to support a motion for class certification, (ii) explore the strength of Mirand's consent defense, and (iii) explore potential class damages. The discovery disputes concern: Document Requests (sometimes, "RFPs") 11-19, Interrogatories 9-14, and Rule 30(b)(6) topics 13-16. The court first provides context to the discovery disputes by summarizing the claims in this litigation, the discovery at issue, the dialing systems and technology used by Mirand, and Mirand's ability to identify and produce the kind of information requested by the plaintiff without manual review of accounts. Next, the court sets forth the legal principles that guide its resolution of the discovery disputes and, finally, rules on the disputes. Background

This background is taken from various filings made by the parties. It does not constitute findings of fact binding in this litigation but gives context to the discovery matters at issue. I. Ms. Drake's complaint seeks a class on her TCPA and FDCPA claims. This case arises under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Discovery directed specifically at the FDCPA claim is not at issue on the plaintiff's motion to compel, and that claim

will not be further addressed. It is unlawful under the TCPA for a caller to make a call to a cell phone using “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice,” unless the call is made with the express consent of the “called party” or for other excepted purposes not relevant to this case. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). “Automatic telephone dialing system” is a defined term that the Seventh Circuit recently

interpreted in Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2020).1 "Called party" is not defined in the TCPA, but the term recently has been construed by the Seventh Circuit in Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637, 639-43

1 There is a circuit split on the proper interpretation of "automatic telephone dialing system." See N.L. by Lemos v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 2020 WL 2893707 at *6 (9th Cir. June 3, 2020) (noting split between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and the Second and Ninth Circuits). (7th Cir. 2012) ("called party" is not the person the caller "intended" to receive the call but the subscriber to, or user of, the cell phone number at the time of the call). Plaintiff Brenda Drake alleges that defendant Mirand Response Systems,

Inc. is a debt collector, and it, acting as an agent for creditor Woodforest National Bank and using an automatic telephone dialing system (as defined in the TCPA) or an artificial or prerecorded voice, called her cell phone to collect a debt owed to Woodforest. It is not clear whether Ms. Drake still intends to prove that Mirand used an automatic telephone dialing system, as opposed to proof only that an artificial or prerecorded voice was used; that opacity does not affect the discovery issues. Her discovery motion states she anticipates removing from her class

definition any reference to an automatic telephone dialing system, and she intends to refer only to calls made to cell phone numbers through a platform used by DialConnection, the vendor Mirand uses to facilitate the making of calls using either an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. See Dkt. 62 at p. 2 n.1.2 The complaint alleges Mirand called Ms. Drake twice in March 2019, but Ms. Drake's discovery motion states Mirand called her 30 times "and left 30 prerecorded

voice messages" on her cell phone voicemail, a cell number Ms. Drake had been assigned in May 2018. (Dkt. 62 at p. 2). Ms. Drake asserts she never had an account with Woodforest and never gave consent to receive the calls, implying that

2 It is not clear whether Ms. Drake has concluded that DialConnection's platform does not meet the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system, as that statutory term has been interpreted in Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2020). Mirand was trying to reach a person who had had that cell phone number before it was assigned to Ms. Drake.3 Based on the amendments Ms. Drake states she anticipates making to her

TCPA class definition as explained in her motion to compel, Ms. Drake will ask the court to certify a class of all persons in the United States (1) to whom Mirand placed or caused to be placed a call on behalf of Woodforest,4 (2) directed to a cell number that was not assigned to the intended recipient at the time of the call, (3) by using an artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) from April 14, 2015, through the date of class certification. II. The discovery disputes concern written discovery and Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics.

The discovery requests at issue are RFPs 11-19, interrogatories 9-14, and Rule 30(b)(6) topics 13-16. The temporal period begins April 14, 2015. Further, the plaintiff seeks information about (1) telephone numbers called using the same hardware/software system that was used to call her (or her cell phone number) and

3 Ms. Drake's complaint states her belief that Mirand was trying to reach a person whose name is similar to hers and found her cell number through some sort of skip-tracing method. See Complaint, ¶ 40 (alleging that “it appears” Mirand intended to reach a person with a similar name to Ms. Drake but unrelated and unknown to her). She may no longer hold that belief (which would be unrelated to her having been assigned a new cell phone number) and may now believe that Mirand intended to call her cell phone number but did not know she was assigned that number when it called. According to Mirand's testimony, cell numbers obtained by Mirand via skip tracing are not called using its dialing system. See Affidavit of Linsy Goodson, Dkt. 64-1, ¶ 10.

4 Ms. Drake has learned in discovery that about 99.5% of the calls Mirand makes are on behalf of Woodforest. (2) telephone numbers called—whether or not using the system used to call her— using either an ATDS, predictive dialer, or artificial or prerecorded voice.5 The court will address the document requests; the extent to which the motion to compel

is granted as to those requests generally resolves the interrogatories and Rule 30(b)(6) topics. Document request 11 seeks documents and electronically stored information sufficient to identify the telephone numbers6 to which Mirand made, or caused to be made, calls by using an ATDS, predictive dialer, or artificial or prerecorded voice.7 Document request 12 seeks documents and electronically stored information sufficient to identify the telephone numbers to which Mirand made, or caused to be

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DRAKE v. MIRAND RESPONSE SYSTEMS, INC., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drake-v-mirand-response-systems-inc-insd-2020.