Dragan v. LD CAULK CO., DIV. OF DENTSPLY INTERN.

625 F. Supp. 690, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12162
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedDecember 31, 1985
DocketCiv. A. 84-707-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 625 F. Supp. 690 (Dragan v. LD CAULK CO., DIV. OF DENTSPLY INTERN.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dragan v. LD CAULK CO., DIV. OF DENTSPLY INTERN., 625 F. Supp. 690, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12162 (D. Del. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

This patent action consists of two consolidated cases. The first case, Dentsply International, Inc. v. Centrix, Inc., Civil Action No. 84-708, is an action for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of three separate patents, U.S. Patent No. 3,581,399 (hereinafter the ’399 patent); U.S. Patent No. 3,900,954 (hereinafter the ’954 patent); and U.S. Patent No. 4,198,756 (hereinafter the ’756 patent). The second case, Dr. William V. Dragan v. L.D. Caulk Co., Division of Dentsply International, Inc., Civil Action No. 84- *691 707, alleges infringement of the ’756 patent, as well as related claims of unfair competition. Also, Centrix, Inc. (hereinafter “Centrix”), in its Answer and through Counterclaims in Civil Action 84-708, alleges infringement of the ’399 patent along with related claims of unfair competition, trade secret appropriation, impairment of contract, and breach of implied contract.

The matter before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Dents-ply and Caulk (hereinafter jointly “Dents-ply”) that Claim 10 of the ’399 patent is not infringed by the Caulk “compule”, that Claim 10 of the ’399 patent is invalid, and that the ’756 patent is not infringed by the Caulk compute. The motion also seeks dismissal of Centrix’s Counterclaim Count 1 in 84-708, asserting infringement by Dentsply of Claim 10 of the ’399 patent, Centrix’s counterclaim 6, asserting infringement by Dentsply of the ’756 patent, and Count 1 of 84-707, asserting infringement by Dentsply of the ’756 patent.

DISCUSSION.

Dr. Dragan is the inventor of the three patents at issue in these suits. These patents all relate to dental syringes and disposable tubes or tips used for placing composite resin filling materials in teeth. At issue in this motion is Claim 10 of the ’399 patent, and Claims 1-3 of the ’756 patent.

Standard for Summary Judgment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the District Court does not decide issues of fact, rather, it determines whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3rd Cir.1981). The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3rd Cir.1985). Any factual inferences drawn from the evidence submitted by the parties must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and any reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party must be made. Continental Insurance Co. v. Bodie, 682 F.2d 436, 438 (3rd Cir.1982); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3rd Cir.1976). Only where the facts are undisputed or “the evidence is so one-sided that it leaves no room for any reasonable differences of opinion as to any material fact,” should the District Court decide the case as a matter of law. Tunis Brothers Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1489 (3rd Cir.1985).

Non-infringement of Claim 10 of the ’399 patent.

The relevant portions of Claim 10 of the ’399 patent describe:

A carrier for dental material comprising: A plastic transparent body defining a capsule including a reservoir portion having a full open end and a connected discharge tip portion, ...
Said tip end tapering inwardly toward the initially sealed tip end.

Dentsply argues that its Caulk compule cannot infringe Claim 10 as a matter of law because, according to the undisputed facts, it does not have the “plastic transparent body” described in Claim 10. 1 Rather, it alleges that the compule is “opaque”, not “transparent”. Dentsply’s Appendix, D.I. 113A, at A6-A26. Also, Denstply argues that Dr. Dragan has admitted that the com-pule is “opaque”. Dragan Deposition, Dentsply’s Appendix, D.I. 184A, at A207. Thus, Dentsply argues that there is no issue that its compule is “opaque”, and not “transparent”, and thus cannot infringe Claim 10.

*692 Contrary to Denstply’s assertions, however, it appears that Dragan does contend that the Caulk eompule is not completely “opaque”. Dragan Affidavit, Dragan and Centrix’s Appendix, D.I. 175A, at A346. In support of this assertion, Dragan alleges that Dentsply prints warnings to dentists on eompule packages, that the eompule should be shielded from sunlight. Dragan Affidavit, D.I. 175A, Ex. 3, at A349.

Where an accused device embodies every element of the claim at issue, the device is said to “literally infringe” the claim. Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408, 420-21, 3 S.Ct. 236, 244-45, 27 L.Ed. 979 (1883); Builders Concrete v. Bremerton Concrete Products, 757 F.2d 255, 257 (Fed.Cir.1985). Although it is a close question, there is in this case a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Caulk com-pule is in fact “transparent”, and thus literally infringes Claim 10. 2 A fact finder might reasonably infer from the warning Dentsply allegedly prints on its boxes that the Caulk eompule was light-permeable, and not completely “opaque”. Although Denstply has presented other evidence that the Caulk eompule is in fact completely opaque, the Court’s function for purposes of summary judgment is not to weigh competing facts, but merely to decide whether a factual dispute exists. Since the Court must resolve all doubts and draw all inferences in favor of Dr. Dragan and Centrix, summary judgment for Dentsply on the issue of non-infringement of Claim 10 must be denied.

Dentsply also alleges that Dragan and Centrix are estopped, under the doctrine of “file wrapper estoppel”, from asserting a scope of Claim 10 which would cover the Caulk eompule.

The doctrine of “file wrapper estoppel” limits application of the doctrine of equivalents. A device which does not literally infringe a patent claim might still infringe the claim as an equivalent device if it “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result”. Graver Tank Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,

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Related

Dentsply International, Inc. v. Kerr Manufacturing Co.
732 F. Supp. 482 (D. Delaware, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
625 F. Supp. 690, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dragan-v-ld-caulk-co-div-of-dentsply-intern-ded-1985.