DOZIER v. CENTRAL STATE PRISON

District Court, M.D. Georgia·Decided December 12, 2023·No. 5:23-cv-00418·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

KWANE DOZIER, : : Plaintiff, : VS. : NO. 5:23-CV-418-MTT-CHW : CENTRAL STATE PRISON, et al., : : Defendants. : ________________________________ :

ORDER Plaintiff Kwane Dozier, an inmate currently housed at the Augusta State Medical Prison in Grovetown, Georgia1, has filed a pro se Complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and numerous affidavits in support of that Complaint. Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and has filed two motions to release funds from his prison trust fund account (ECF Nos. 3, 12). For the following reasons, Plaintiff is ORDERED (1) to pay the Court’s $405.00 filing fee in full or submit a complete and proper motion to proceed in forma pauperis and (2) to recast his Complaint on the Court’s standard form to include each claim he wants the Court to consider in this action. Plaintiff’s motions to release funds are DENIED as moot.

1 Although Plaintiff has not notified the Court of any change in his mailing address, Plaintiff’s most recent correspondence was mailed from the Augusta State Medical Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections online offender query confirms that Plaintiff is housed in that facility. See https://services.gdc.ga.gov/GDC/OffenderQuery/jsp/OffQry Redirector.jsp (searched “Dozier, Kwane”) (last accessed Dec. 6, 2023). The Clerk is thus DIRECTED to update the docket to reflect Plaintiff’s current mailing address. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Plaintiff has moved for leave to proceed in this action without prepayment of the

Court’s filing fee. A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis must submit (1) an affidavit in support of his claim of indigence and (2) “a certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)-(2). Plaintiff failed to submit a copy of his prison trust fund account information, certified by the appropriate prison official. Accordingly, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to either pay the Court’s $405.00

filing fee in full or submit a complete and proper motion to proceed without the prepayment of the filing fee, which should include a certified copy of his trust fund account statement. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the appropriate forms for this purpose, marked with the case number for the above-captioned action. Plaintiff has also filed two motions requesting that the Court direct prison officials

to release funds from his prison trust fund account to pay the filing fee. Once Plaintiff submits a complete and proper motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court will review Plaintiff’s submissions and determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis and whether he will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee before further processing of his case. If the Court determines that funds need to be deducted from

Plaintiff’s prison trust fund account, the Court will direct prison officials to do so. Plaintiff’s motions requesting an order directing prison officials to deduct funds at this time (ECF Nos. 3, 12) are therefore premature, and they are DENIED as such. ORDER TO RECAST The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint arise from his incarceration at the Central,

Dooly, and Baldwin State Prisons, and he names more than two dozen individuals as Defendants in this action. Compl. 6-7, ECF No. 1. As best as the Court can tell, Plaintiff is claiming that Debra Collins, the mother of the individual Plaintiff was convicted of murdering, “has persistently tried to have [Plaintiff] killed” in prison. Id. at 11. Plaintiff contends he was diagnosed with a sleeping disorder in June of 2020, “which unfortunately played into [Defendant Collins’] hands.” Id. Plaintiff alleges “Collins paid multiple

inmates to sexually assault [Plaintiff] while [he] slept, taking advantage of [his] condition and using it as a form of revenge.” Id. In addition, Plaintiff contends Defendant Collins “had a device implanted in [Plaintiff’s] right ear that not only has the ability to read [Plaintiff’s] thoughts but also to delve into [his] past and future.” Id. Plaintiff believes Defendant Collins “used this device to determine if [Plaintiff] possessed any knowledge

about her son’s murder, taking the law into her own hands and seeking her own form of justice.” Id. Plaintiff also suggests Defendant Collins is manipulating Plaintiff’s legal mail and attempting to interfere in the prosecution of this lawsuit. See, e.g., id. at 12. Plaintiff’s contentions that Defendant Collins orchestrated the attacks on Plaintiff, inserted a mind-reading device into Plaintiff’s brain, and has otherwise interfered with

Plaintiff’s incarceration are quite frankly delusional, and they could be dismissed as such. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (district court has discretion to dismiss “factually frivolous” claims, i.e., where facts alleged are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”). Even if these claims were plausible, they are against a private party not acting under color of state law, and therefore do not raise a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

At the same time, however, some of Plaintiff’s allegations could give rise to plausible claims. For example, Plaintiff contends he was attacked multiple times at the prisons in which he was housed, denied adequate medical care, and intentionally placed near at least one of his attackers to provide “entertainment” for the officers. See, e.g., Compl. 14, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also contends his food was tampered with, his phone privileges were improperly restricted, he did not have running water in one of his cells, and

his mail was interfered with, among other things. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow Plaintiff to include every imaginable claim that he may have against any state official in a single complaint. Instead, the rules permit a plaintiff to join only related claims and defendants in a single complaint. To properly join defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), the plaintiff

must establish that he is asserting a right to relief against them “jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and that “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” The Eleventh Circuit applies the “logical relationship” test to determine whether claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence for joinder

purposes. See, e.g., Smith v. Trans-Siberian Orchestra, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark Hosp. Corp. of Fla., 755 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985)).2 “Under this test, there is a logical relationship when the same operative facts serve as the basis of both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

DOZIER v. CENTRAL STATE PRISON, (M.D. Ga. 2023).

DOZIER v. CENTRAL STATE PRISON (DOZIER v. CENTRAL STATE PRISON) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related