Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
This case stems from a wrongful-death action filed against Appellees Lawrence Hall Nursing Center and Lawrence Memorial Hospital by Appellant Brenda Chastain Downing, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Robert L. Harris. On appeal, Downing alleges that it was error for the trial court to dismiss her cause of action on the basis that she lacked standing to pursue the wrongful-death claim prior to the issuance of letters of administration. This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of Appeals, as involving issues of first impression, substantial public interest, and significant issues requiring clarification and development of the law; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l), (4), (5), and (6). We dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Mr. Harris resided at Lawrence Hall Nursing Center from June 6, 2000, until July 25, 2000. On July 25, he was transported to Lawrence Memorial Hospital and admitted as a patient. He remained there until July 28, 2000. Mr. Harris passed away on August 3, 2000.
Following the death of Mr. Harris, Downing filed a motion requesting to be appointed as Special Administrator of his estate in order to pursue a wrongful-death claim on behalf of the estate. The motion was granted by order entered on June 7, 2002. Thereafter, on June 10, 2002, Downing, in her capacity as Special Administrator, filed a wrongful-death suit against Appellees.1
Four months later, on October 10, 2002, Downing filed her acceptance of appointment as Special Administrator. It was not until December 30, 2004, however, that letters of administration were issued to Downing and subsequently filed with the Clerk of Lawrence County. As a result, Appellees, on October 19, 2005, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Downing lacked authority to file the wrongful-death action on behalf of the estate in the absence of the issuance of letters of administration. According to Appellees’ motion to dismiss, because Downing lacked authority to sue at the time she initiated the present action, the complaint she filed was a nullity and must be dismissed.
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order on November 22, 2005, granting Appellees’ motion and dismissing the complaint filed by Downing. A timely notice of appeal was filed, and the issue is now before this court.
Before addressing the merits of Downing’s claim on appeal, this court must first analyze whether the present appeal is from a final order. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree entered by the trial court. The question of whether an order is final and subject to appeal is a jurisdictional question that the court will raise on its own. Moses v. Hanna’s Candle Co., 353 Ark. 101, 110 S.W.3d 725 (2003). Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b), an order is not final that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Hambay v. Williams, 335 Ark. 352, 980 S.W.2d 263 (1998).
Ordinarily, an order granting a motion to dismiss one party to a lawsuit that involves multiple parties and multiple claims is not an appealable order. Guebert v. Williams, 319 Ark. 43, 889 S.W.2d 30 (1994); Davis v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 315 Ark. 330, 867 S.W.2d 444 (1993); Grooms v. Myers, 308 Ark. 324, 823 S.W.2d 901 (1992); Sherman v. G & H Transp., Inc., 287 Ark. 25, 695 S.W.2d 832 (1985). An appeal from such an order, however, is permissible under Rule 54(b) when the trial court directs the entry of a final judgment as to one or more of the claims or parties and makes express findings that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. Wallner v. McDonald, 308 Ark. 590, 825 S.W.2d 265 (1992).
Here, there were certain John Doe defendants named in the complaint; yet, no action was taken with regard to those defendants. At the beginning of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for Appellees notified the court that Downing had voluntarily dismissed her complaint against St. Bernard’s and Dr. Quevillon. The trial court then inquired as to the status of the “et al.” in the case caption. Counsel for Appellees responded that there were some John Doe defendants but that they “never got placed.” No further discussion occurred regarding the John Does and no action was taken to dismiss them from the case.
The present case is similar to the situation we addressed in Shackelford v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 334 Ark. 634, 976 S.W.2d 950 (1998). There, this court dismissed an appeal of an order of summary judgment because the appellant failed to obtain a final order as to two John Doe defendants. In so ruling, the court noted that there was no order in the record granting a dismissal to the two John Doe defendants, and, as a result, the court concluded that the claims against the two John Doe defendants were still pending. The court explained that “[b]ecause there is not a final order as to these two defendants or a Rule 54(b) certification, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this case.” Id. at 636, 976 S.W.2d at 952; see also Jones v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 239, 213 S.W.3d 11 (2005) (holding that appeal must be dismissed for lack of final order where no order was ever entered dismissingjohn Does 1-20); Black v. Crawley, 304 Ark. 716, 804 S.W.2d 366 (1991) (holding that dismissal of appeal under Rule 54(b) was required where order of trial court dismissed fewer than all the plaintiffs and no Rule 54(b) certification was entered); Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Vandiver, 279 Ark. 218, 650 S.W.2d 244 (1983) (holding that order dismissing just one defendant was not final, appealable order). Accordingly, because no order was entered with regard to the John Doe defendants, there is no final, appealable order before us.
Before leaving this point, we must note that the dissents engage in speculation that is unsupported by the record in an attempt to conclude that the trial court’s order somehow extends to all the original defendants in this case. The reliance on Nelson v. Weiss, 366 Ark. 361, 235 S.W.3d 891 (2006), is unavailing. As the dissent admits, the order in Nelson, even though filed by the doctor, specifically referenced the John Does. Here, while the motion to dismiss may have listed all parties, the order dismissing Downing’s complaint, listed only Lawrence Hall Nursing Center and Lawrence Memorial Hospital as defendants. Moreover, as previously pointed out, the trial court inquired about the status of other parties.
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Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
This case stems from a wrongful-death action filed against Appellees Lawrence Hall Nursing Center and Lawrence Memorial Hospital by Appellant Brenda Chastain Downing, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Robert L. Harris. On appeal, Downing alleges that it was error for the trial court to dismiss her cause of action on the basis that she lacked standing to pursue the wrongful-death claim prior to the issuance of letters of administration. This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of Appeals, as involving issues of first impression, substantial public interest, and significant issues requiring clarification and development of the law; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l), (4), (5), and (6). We dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Mr. Harris resided at Lawrence Hall Nursing Center from June 6, 2000, until July 25, 2000. On July 25, he was transported to Lawrence Memorial Hospital and admitted as a patient. He remained there until July 28, 2000. Mr. Harris passed away on August 3, 2000.
Following the death of Mr. Harris, Downing filed a motion requesting to be appointed as Special Administrator of his estate in order to pursue a wrongful-death claim on behalf of the estate. The motion was granted by order entered on June 7, 2002. Thereafter, on June 10, 2002, Downing, in her capacity as Special Administrator, filed a wrongful-death suit against Appellees.1
Four months later, on October 10, 2002, Downing filed her acceptance of appointment as Special Administrator. It was not until December 30, 2004, however, that letters of administration were issued to Downing and subsequently filed with the Clerk of Lawrence County. As a result, Appellees, on October 19, 2005, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Downing lacked authority to file the wrongful-death action on behalf of the estate in the absence of the issuance of letters of administration. According to Appellees’ motion to dismiss, because Downing lacked authority to sue at the time she initiated the present action, the complaint she filed was a nullity and must be dismissed.
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order on November 22, 2005, granting Appellees’ motion and dismissing the complaint filed by Downing. A timely notice of appeal was filed, and the issue is now before this court.
Before addressing the merits of Downing’s claim on appeal, this court must first analyze whether the present appeal is from a final order. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree entered by the trial court. The question of whether an order is final and subject to appeal is a jurisdictional question that the court will raise on its own. Moses v. Hanna’s Candle Co., 353 Ark. 101, 110 S.W.3d 725 (2003). Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b), an order is not final that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Hambay v. Williams, 335 Ark. 352, 980 S.W.2d 263 (1998).
Ordinarily, an order granting a motion to dismiss one party to a lawsuit that involves multiple parties and multiple claims is not an appealable order. Guebert v. Williams, 319 Ark. 43, 889 S.W.2d 30 (1994); Davis v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 315 Ark. 330, 867 S.W.2d 444 (1993); Grooms v. Myers, 308 Ark. 324, 823 S.W.2d 901 (1992); Sherman v. G & H Transp., Inc., 287 Ark. 25, 695 S.W.2d 832 (1985). An appeal from such an order, however, is permissible under Rule 54(b) when the trial court directs the entry of a final judgment as to one or more of the claims or parties and makes express findings that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. Wallner v. McDonald, 308 Ark. 590, 825 S.W.2d 265 (1992).
Here, there were certain John Doe defendants named in the complaint; yet, no action was taken with regard to those defendants. At the beginning of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for Appellees notified the court that Downing had voluntarily dismissed her complaint against St. Bernard’s and Dr. Quevillon. The trial court then inquired as to the status of the “et al.” in the case caption. Counsel for Appellees responded that there were some John Doe defendants but that they “never got placed.” No further discussion occurred regarding the John Does and no action was taken to dismiss them from the case.
The present case is similar to the situation we addressed in Shackelford v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 334 Ark. 634, 976 S.W.2d 950 (1998). There, this court dismissed an appeal of an order of summary judgment because the appellant failed to obtain a final order as to two John Doe defendants. In so ruling, the court noted that there was no order in the record granting a dismissal to the two John Doe defendants, and, as a result, the court concluded that the claims against the two John Doe defendants were still pending. The court explained that “[b]ecause there is not a final order as to these two defendants or a Rule 54(b) certification, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this case.” Id. at 636, 976 S.W.2d at 952; see also Jones v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 239, 213 S.W.3d 11 (2005) (holding that appeal must be dismissed for lack of final order where no order was ever entered dismissingjohn Does 1-20); Black v. Crawley, 304 Ark. 716, 804 S.W.2d 366 (1991) (holding that dismissal of appeal under Rule 54(b) was required where order of trial court dismissed fewer than all the plaintiffs and no Rule 54(b) certification was entered); Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Vandiver, 279 Ark. 218, 650 S.W.2d 244 (1983) (holding that order dismissing just one defendant was not final, appealable order). Accordingly, because no order was entered with regard to the John Doe defendants, there is no final, appealable order before us.
Before leaving this point, we must note that the dissents engage in speculation that is unsupported by the record in an attempt to conclude that the trial court’s order somehow extends to all the original defendants in this case. The reliance on Nelson v. Weiss, 366 Ark. 361, 235 S.W.3d 891 (2006), is unavailing. As the dissent admits, the order in Nelson, even though filed by the doctor, specifically referenced the John Does. Here, while the motion to dismiss may have listed all parties, the order dismissing Downing’s complaint, listed only Lawrence Hall Nursing Center and Lawrence Memorial Hospital as defendants. Moreover, as previously pointed out, the trial court inquired about the status of other parties. In response, counsel for Appellees informed the trial court that Downing had voluntarily nonsuited Dr. Quevillon and St. Bernard’s Hospital, and further stated that “there were some John Doe defendants, Judge, but never got placed.” Clearly, the trial court relied on this information in entering an order that listed the only two parties that it thought remained as defendants in its order dismissing Downing’s complaint.
The dissents suddenly want to narrow the scope of Rule 54(b) when our long-standing case law with regard to John Doe defendants requires that an order be entered regarding all parties in order to be final and appealable. If we were to accept the reasoning of the dissents that the trial court’s order dismissing Appellees applied to all of the original defendants, then the orders issued with regard to Dr. Quevillon and St. Bernard’s dismissing the complaint against them without prejudice would somehow be trumped by the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. This court will not speculate that such a result is what was intended by the trial court.
Finally, the fact that Appellees alleged that Downing’s complaint was a nullity is irrelevant to a determination that there are outstanding parties. In order to accept the position advanced by the dissents, one must assume that this court would agree with Appellees’ argument on the merits. Otherwise, if this court were to disagree and were to remand this case, the status of the John Does would remain unclear. The purpose of Rule 54 is to ensure finality for purposes of appeal. Such finality has not occurred in this case and, as such, we must dismiss the present appeal without prejudice.
Appeal dismissed without prejudice.
Hannah, C.J., Brown and Gunter, JJ., dissent.