Downey v. Perkins

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 7, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00508
StatusUnknown

This text of Downey v. Perkins (Downey v. Perkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Downey v. Perkins, (M.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

United States District Court Middle District of Florida Jacksonville Division

BRYAN DOWNEY,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 3:24-cv-508-MMH-LLL

DUVAL COUNTY JAIL, ET AL.,

Defendants. ________________________________________________________________________

Order

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding on a pro se complaint for the violation of civil rights against the Duval County Jail and six officers, doc. 1, moves to amend his complaint, doc. 12, for appointment of counsel, doc. 13, and for service of the summons and amended complaint, doc. 14.1 In his motion to amend, doc. 12, plaintiff explains he seeks to add the following: “another claim of legal mail violations”; a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and a request for declaratory judgement. Upon review of the motion to amend and the proposed amended complaint, doc. 12-1, the Court concludes the motion is due to be denied. Plaintiff’s

1 Plaintiff previously moved to amend his complaint, doc. 10, but he failed to sign the proposed amended complaint, doc. 10-1. On August 26, 2024, the Court granted plaintiff’s first motion to amend but directed him to submit a signed amended complaint for docketing. See Order, doc. 11. Before the Court issued that Order, however, plaintiff submitted a second motion to amend, doc. 12, with a signed proposed amended complaint, doc. 12-1, which he mailed on August 23, 2024. Under the mailbox rule, plaintiff filed his second motion to amend before the Court issued its Order on his first motion to amend. As such, the Court will vacate the portion of its August 26, 2024 Order granting plaintiff’s first motion to amend. original complaint, doc. 1, is deficient, and the proposed amended complaint, doc. 12- 1, which incorporates all original claims and allegations, does not cure the deficiencies. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in pertinent part, “[a] pleading

that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “[a] party must state [his] claims in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Additionally, a plaintiff may set forth only related claims in one civil rights complaint; he may not join unrelated claims

and various defendants unless the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, “a claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence if there is a ‘logical relationship’ between the claims.” Constr. Aggregates,

Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F. 3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark Hosps. of Florida, Inc., 755 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985)). A complaint must allege facts that, accepted as true, state a claim “that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard asks for less than a probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Though a plaintiff is not required to provide “detailed factual allegations,” he must offer more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual 2 enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He should provide enough detail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in

original). A court must hold a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than a lawyer, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but may not rewrite a deficient complaint for a pro se plaintiff or otherwise serve as his de facto counsel, GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on

other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. A sheriff’s office or jail is not a legal entity subject to suit under §

1983. Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of the sheriff’s office because that entity did not have “the capacity to be sued”).2 To state a claim for a denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by

demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated

2 Unpublished decisions are not binding. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 2022). Any unpublished decisions cited in this order are deemed persuasive on the relevant point of law. 3 or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has held a prisoner asserting an access-to-courts violation must allege the defendant’s conduct interfered with a criminal appeal, a petition for habeas

corpus, or a civil rights action. Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]rison officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate’s right of access to the courts must have impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” (quoting Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th

Cir. 1998))). With respect to inmates’ privacy rights, the Supreme Court has held that cell searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (“No one can rationally doubt that [cell] searches represent an appropriate security measure.”). Finally, claims challenging criminal proceedings, including

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, are not cognizable in a civil rights action. Rather, such claims should be pursued through a habeas corpus action after available state remedies are exhausted. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475

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Related

GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia
132 F.3d 1359 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
Tannenbaum v. United States
148 F.3d 1262 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
Wilson v. Blankenship
163 F.3d 1284 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
Christopher Barbour v. Michael Haley
471 F.3d 1222 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Al-Amin v. Smith
511 F.3d 1317 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Al-Amin v. Warden Hugh Smith
637 F.3d 1192 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.
654 F.3d 1194 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Faulkner v. Monroe County Sheriff's Department
523 F. App'x 696 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
Fred Dalton Brooks v. Warden
800 F.3d 1295 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Glenn C. Smith v. Florida Department of Corrections
713 F.3d 1059 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)

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