Dowdy v. State

700 So. 2d 409, 1997 WL 578035
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedSeptember 19, 1997
Docket97-576
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 700 So. 2d 409 (Dowdy v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dowdy v. State, 700 So. 2d 409, 1997 WL 578035 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

700 So.2d 409 (1997)

Joshua Lee DOWDY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 97-576.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

September 19, 1997.
Rehearing Denied October 24, 1997.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

Joshua Lee Dowdy was convicted of dealing in stolen property. He appeals claiming that restitution was inappropriate and that it was improper for the trial court, instead of individually listing each of his prior convictions on his scoresheet, to incorporate by attachment the list contained in his PSI. We affirm.

Dowdy first contends that since it was not proved that he committed the burglary in which the items he pawned were stolen, the victim's damages were not "caused" by him. We find, however, that Dowdy's receiving the stolen property and pawning it, is sufficiently "related" to the victim's loss to justify restitution. See section 775.089(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes. He also contends that the trial court erred in continuing the restitution hearing to permit the victim to obtain a receipt from the pawn shop in order to establish his damages. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's action.

We will set out Dowdy's entire argument in his brief on his second contention:

It is impermissible, as the trial court recognized, to attach a PSI to the scoresheet as a substitute for listing the individual prior convictions in the "Prior Record" portion of the scoresheet. Williams v. State, 658 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Despite recognition of Williams as controlling authority, the trial court attached the PSI to the scoresheet, and did not individually list the defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions. The effect of this error is to elevate the PSI to undisputed evidence of the defendant's prior convictions, which the PSI was never intended to be. Williams supra.

Thus, it is apparent that Dowdy does not contend that the scoring of his record was in *410 error. Indeed, the transcript shows that every objection made by Dowdy to the scoresheet was sustained and that he agreed with the final score. It is also obvious that Dowdy, neither in his brief nor at his sentencing, objected to the attachment of a portion of the PSI because of its confidential nature. Although the PSI is "confidential," we disagree with the dissent that the public record disclosures contained in the PSI are confidential. Keep in mind, the contents of the PSI are openly discussed at the public sentencing in the presence of the public and a court reporter.

The majority judges herein are well aware of the pressures on the sentencing judge. Case loads require that a large number of sentences be set in a block. Further, because of the nature of the animal, the scoresheet remains fluid up to the moment of sentencing. It is apparent in this record, for instance, that the judge was making changes to the scoresheet up until the actual sentencing. The judge's response to the contention that Williamsrequires that he list individually each misdemeanor on the scoresheet is, under the circumstances, most reasonable. He stated:

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I'll do on that, in that case—that case makes absolutely no sense. I know I'm required to follow this appellate decision. And I'll follow it in this sense: I'll instruct the Clerk to make a Xerox copy of the defendant's record, and we'll staple it to the scoresheet. And I'll circle—I'll have the Clerk circle all the misdemeanors, all nine of them. So that any person with any intelligence at all can add those circles up and see what that says. But I'm not going to sit here and list them all, because that's ridiculous. We have guideline scoresheets and everything else.
And as you know, that, in and of itself, if you have to spell out each and every misdemeanor here when you've got the full list right in front of us. We're all looking at it. If that's reversible error. then so be it.

In Williams, the court was concerned with a listing of "various" under the heading of Prior Record on the scoresheet. But in Williams, the defendant contested the scoring of these misdemeanors. The court did require a "properly prepared guideline scoresheet" but it was because: "[w]ithout the specificity we find lacking, we are unable to discern which entries in this criminal history may be scored." In our case, there is no contention that any offense was scored that should not have been. The Williamscourt chose not to search the PSI for this information because: "[i]t is the scoresheet that controls the guidelines calculations, and not the [PSI]."

In Cobb v. State, 691 So.2d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), we disagreed with Williams and held that multiple scoring under a single category would be, at most, harmless error so long as the required information was in the record.

Now we hold that it was not error to incorporate by attachment the defendant's record (which was taken from the public records) contained in the PSI. Even a complaint, which often must be pled with specificity, may incorporate matters by reference or by attachment. We see no reason why a scoresheet, often prepared on the spot and under severe time restraints, cannot incorporate information contained in the public records even if taken from a PSI.

The matter relating to the confidentiality of the PSI was not objected to below, was not raised on appeal, was not briefed by the parties and is not before us for review. We acknowledge that the dissent has made a valid point that certain portions of the PSI should not be so attached. We would suggest that trial courts that decide to attach the criminal record from the PSI to the scoresheet make sure that all other information is removed from the attachment.

AFFIRMED.

ANTOON, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.

GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

ANTOON, Judge, concurring and concurring specially.

I write only to emphasize that, ironically, this issue arose due to the thoroughness of *411 the sentencing court. On the authority of Williams v. State, 658 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the defendant requested that the misdemeanors used to calculate the total misdemeanor points be specifically identified. He made this request without challenging the correctness of the scoresheet calculation. Although not required to do so for the reasons given in majority opinion, the trial court complied with the defendant's request by circling the misdemeanors on the presentence investigation report. The defendant raised no objection to this procedure and did not ask the trial court to redact any portion of the attachment. Accordingly, the defendant should not now be heard to complain.

The criminal record compiled as a part of the presentence investigation report is often used to correct errors in sentencing guidelines scoresheets. A reversal of the instant sentence imposed by the conscientious sentencing court, which attached the defendant's criminal record to the scoresheet to explain its arithmetical calculations, would confirm the complaints of critics who say that appellate courts too often place form over substance. This is especially so since the defendant does not challenge the correctness of the calculations, and the sentence imposed after remand would undoubtedly be the same.

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Bluebook (online)
700 So. 2d 409, 1997 WL 578035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dowdy-v-state-fladistctapp-1997.