Doward v. USA
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Opinion
Doward v. USA CV-01-52-B 04/04/01
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John R. Doward
v. Civil No. 01-52-B Opinion N o . 2001DNH071 United States of America
O R D E R
John Doward seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He
argues that the court improperly enhanced his statutory maximum
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). His claims depend upon
the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v . New Jersey, 120 S.Ct.
2348 (2000).
I assume without deciding that: (1) Doward’s claims are not
barred by the statute of limitations that governs § 2255 motions
because he filed his motion within one year of “the date on which
the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court
. . . and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) Doward can establish “cause
and prejudice” that excuses his failure to raise his claims on
direct appeal. See Sustache-Rivera v . United States, 221 F.3d 8 , 17-18 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2001 WL 261805 (Mar. 1 9 ,
2001). Nevertheless, I reject Doward’s claims because they are
defective on their merits.
The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 120
S.Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). The Court did not overrule
its prior decision in Almendarez-Torres v . United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998), which held that, where provided by statute, a
judge may enhance a defendant’s sentence based upon prior
convictions which have not been presented to a jury and proved to
the jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at
239-48; see also Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362 (declining to
revisit the validity of Almendarez-Torres). Therefore, as both
the Tenth and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have
recognized, an enhancement of a statutory maximum sentence based
on 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) that results from prior convictions is
governed by Almendarez-Torres rather than Apprendi. See United
States v . Thomas, N o . 99-12367, 2001 WL 178506, *5 (11th Cir.
Feb. 2 3 , 2001); United States v . Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 587-88
-2- (10th Cir. 2000).
I enhanced Doward’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
based upon several prior convictions. Under prevailing Supreme
Court precedent, the applicability of this enhancement is a
matter for the judge rather than the jury. Petition dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
April 4 , 2001
cc: John R. Doward, pro se Peter E . Papps, Esq.
-3-
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