Doward v. USA

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedApril 4, 2001
DocketCV-01-52-B
StatusPublished

This text of Doward v. USA (Doward v. USA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Doward v. USA, (D.N.H. 2001).

Opinion

Doward v. USA CV-01-52-B 04/04/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John R. Doward

v. Civil No. 01-52-B Opinion N o . 2001DNH071 United States of America

O R D E R

John Doward seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He

argues that the court improperly enhanced his statutory maximum

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). His claims depend upon

the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v . New Jersey, 120 S.Ct.

2348 (2000).

I assume without deciding that: (1) Doward’s claims are not

barred by the statute of limitations that governs § 2255 motions

because he filed his motion within one year of “the date on which

the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court

. . . and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) Doward can establish “cause

and prejudice” that excuses his failure to raise his claims on

direct appeal. See Sustache-Rivera v . United States, 221 F.3d 8 , 17-18 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2001 WL 261805 (Mar. 1 9 ,

2001). Nevertheless, I reject Doward’s claims because they are

defective on their merits.

The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than the

fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 120

S.Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). The Court did not overrule

its prior decision in Almendarez-Torres v . United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998), which held that, where provided by statute, a

judge may enhance a defendant’s sentence based upon prior

convictions which have not been presented to a jury and proved to

the jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at

239-48; see also Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362 (declining to

revisit the validity of Almendarez-Torres). Therefore, as both

the Tenth and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have

recognized, an enhancement of a statutory maximum sentence based

on 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) that results from prior convictions is

governed by Almendarez-Torres rather than Apprendi. See United

States v . Thomas, N o . 99-12367, 2001 WL 178506, *5 (11th Cir.

Feb. 2 3 , 2001); United States v . Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 587-88

-2- (10th Cir. 2000).

I enhanced Doward’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

based upon several prior convictions. Under prevailing Supreme

Court precedent, the applicability of this enhancement is a

matter for the judge rather than the jury. Petition dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

April 4 , 2001

cc: John R. Doward, pro se Peter E . Papps, Esq.

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Related

Almendarez-Torres v. United States
523 U.S. 224 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (Supreme Court, 2000)
United States v. Dorris
236 F.3d 582 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Sustache-Rivera v. United States
221 F.3d 8 (First Circuit, 2000)

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