Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

57 Fed. Cl. 403, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 215, 2003 WL 22049540
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJuly 30, 2003
DocketNo. 19-83C
StatusPublished

This text of 57 Fed. Cl. 403 (Dow Chemical Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 403, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 215, 2003 WL 22049540 (uscfc 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

SMITH, Senior Judge.

The Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) brought this patent infringement suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1) and 1498(a). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1498(a) (1983). Dow alleged that the government had infringed claims 1 through 3 of U.S. Patent No. 3,817,039 (“ ’039 patent”). In the alternative, Dow claimed that the government had breached a licensing agreement for use of the ’039 patent. At trial, we found, in pertinent part, that the government had infringed the disputed claims of the ’039 patent, that the claims were not invalid, and that the government’s repudiation of the license constituted a material breach of the licensing agreement that required voiding the license ab initio. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 623 (1990) (“Dow I”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed.Cl. 11 (1994) (“Dow II ”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 36 Fed.Cl. 15 (1996) (“Dow III”). We therefore awarded Dow damages for unlicensed infringement of the claims, rather than breach of contract. See Dow III, 36 Fed.Cl. at 15.

The parties appealed our decision to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit vacated this Court’s infringement and damages findings, and remanded the case to determine if the government had infringed the disputed claims, and to determine the appropriate damages due to Dow if infringement had occurred. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334 (Fed.Cir.2000). After reviewing the parties’ briefs and holding oral argument, and in consideration of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the Court finds on remand that the government did not infringe the relevant claims, and that Dow therefore cannot recover damages.

FACTS

Facts essential to understanding this opinion are discussed below. Additional background facts are located in the trial and appellate opinions that lead to the instant opinion on remand. See Dow I, 20 Cl.Ct. at 623; Dow II, 32 Fed.Cl. at 11; Dow III, 36 Fed.Cl. at 15; Dow Chem. Co., 226 F.3d at 1334.

In the early 1970’s, Dow submitted a patent application concerning an improved method for backfilling1 abandoned mines to prevent surface subsidence caused by the collapse of underground voids. The improved method entailed pumping a suspension 2 of water and particles through a closed pressurized system into the underground void produced by subsurface mining. See ’039 patent, col. 2, 11. 59-68, col. 3, 11. 1-36. The method required that the injection [405]*405rate of the suspension into the system be at least equal to the suspension’s minimum linear velocity (“MLV”).3 Id. When the suspension was thus transported through the system and into the void, the difference in the cross-sectional areas between the system and the void resulted in the suspension’s velocity dropping below the suspension’s MLV. Id. This decrease in velocity caused solid particles in the suspension to form a stable mound on the void’s floor. Id. The mound grew as the suspension entered the void. Id. However, the progressive decrease in the void’s cross-sectional area caused by the gradual increase in the mound’s height ultimately caused the suspension’s velocity to reach MLV. Id. When this finally happened, suspension that was newly injected into the void through the closed system moved over the forward slope of the mound into a space of greater cross-sectional area. Id. The greater cross-sectional area slowed down the suspension’s movement until the suspension again fell below its MLV, whereupon additional particles were once more deposited onto the void’s floor. Id. This deposition thereby increased the mound’s girth. Id. The foregoing process repeated itself from injection of the suspension, to increase in the mound’s height, to increase in the mound’s bulk, until the void was substantially filled. Id.

On May 11, 1972, before Dow received a patent for the new backfilling method, the government, via its agent, the U.S. Bureau of Mines, and Dow entered a contract that licensed the government to use the method for subsidence control at Scranton, Pennsylvania. After completion of the Scranton project, the government initiated a program of mine backfilling using independent contractors other than Dow.

Meanwhile, on June 18, 1974, Dow obtained the ’039 patent, which protected Dow’s ownership rights in the improved method. The ’039 patent included 8 claims, 3 of which are presently in dispute: independent claim 1, and claims 2 and 3, which incorporate, and are therefore dependent upon claim l.4

On July 9, 1975, Dow requested an accounting from the government for royalties due under the license. The government informed Dow on December 28, 1976, that the government had not practiced the improved method, and that therefore Dow did not merit royalties under the contract. In January 1983, Dow filed suit in this Court seeking a reasonable royalty for the government’s infringement of claims 1 through 3 of the ’039 patent in twenty-five projects. Alternatively, Dow claimed damages for the government’s breach of the license in the projects.

We decided Dow’s claims in a series of opinions. First, we held that the ’039 patent was not invalid, and that the government had infringed claims 1 through 3 of the ’039 pat[406]*406ent. Dow I, 20 Cl.Ct. at 628. In particular, we did not construe claim 1 to require the injection of suspension into a void at a particular rate. See id. (“Once a slurry is injected into the void at MLV or above through a closed pressurized system no more can be done.”) (internal citations omitted).

Second, we held that the government repudiated the contract by failing to pay royalties, and by challenging the ’039 patent’s validity and the viability of the license contract. Dow II, 32 Fed.Cl. at 18. We farther held that this breach justified Dow’s termination of the contact, and considered the contract void ab initio because the government had never performed under the contract. Id. Thus, we awarded damages to Dow because of unlicensed infringement of the ’039 patent, and disallowed recovery for breach of contract. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, No. 19-83C (Cl.Ct. Nov. 9, 1992) (Order); Dow II, 32 Fed.Cl. at 11. We further determined that the six year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 did not bar Dow’s infringement claim because of the tolling provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 286. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1994); Dow II, 32 Fed.Cl. at 11.

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57 Fed. Cl. 403, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 215, 2003 WL 22049540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dow-chemical-co-v-united-states-uscfc-2003.