Douglas White v. Department of Transportation

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 26, 2024
DocketDA-1221-21-0101-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Douglas White v. Department of Transportation (Douglas White v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas White v. Department of Transportation, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DOUGLAS R. WHITE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-1221-21-0101-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DATE: April 26, 2024 TRANSPORTATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jacque L. Pearsall , Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

Dolores Francis , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that the Board lacks jurisdiction because the appellant failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND At all times relevant, the appellant was a GS-15 Director of the Inspector Training and Qualifications Division (TQ) within the agency’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 16. The agency conducted climate surveys which uncovered allegations of unprofessional conduct by the appellant. IAF, Tab 8 at 11-50. Accordingly, the appellant’s supervisor involuntarily detailed him from TQ effective July 1, 2020, and directed him to report to the Director of Field Operations, Office of Pipeline Safety. IAF, Tab 1 at 40. On July 13, 2020, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that his supervisor had given unauthorized preference to two subordinates and had engaged in improper personnel actions in violation of the merit systems principles. IAF, Tab 1 at 22, Tab 6 at 34-44. On July 29, 2020, OSC issued a preliminary determination stating, in part, that it was unable to conclude that a prohibited personnel practice had taken place. IAF, Tab 1 at 22. The appellant’s attorney responded to the preliminary determination; however, on October 14, 2020, OSC issued a close-out letter reiterating that it could not 3

conclude that a prohibited personnel practice had taken place. Id. at 24-34, 38-39. The appellant responded to the close-out letter requesting that OSC reopen the matter, which it denied. Id. at 36-38. Subsequently, the appellant filed an IRA appeal, alleging that the agency retaliated against him for engaging in protected disclosures in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 16-21. The administrative judge issued a jurisdiction order, notifying the appellant of the applicable legal standards and ordering him to produce evidence and/or argument establishing that the Board had jurisdiction over his IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant responded to the order, and the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that, although the appellant had exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC, he failed to nonfrivolously allege that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity. IAF, Tab 6, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID), at 13, 21. The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative judge made factual errors and erred in finding that he failed to meet the nonfrivolous standard. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW In an IRA appeal, the Board may consider only matters that the appellant first raised before OSC. Mason v. Department of Homeland Security , 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through his initial OSC complaint, evidence that he amended the original complaint, including but not limited to OSC’s preliminary determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Id. To establish Board jurisdiction, the appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC by preponderant 4

evidence, not just present nonfrivolous allegations of exhaustion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1). The purpose of the requirement that an appellant exhaust his remedies with OSC prior to filing an IRA appeal with the Board is to give OSC “the opportunity to take corrective action before involving the Board in the case.” Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act provides that, if OSC finds that there is a substantial likelihood that the information received discloses a violation of the Act, it “shall transmit the information to the head of the agency involved for investigation and report.” Id. (making this finding based on the same language in the prior Whistleblower Protection Act); see 5 U.S.C. § 1213(b), (c). These inquiries by OSC and their transmittal to agencies for remedial action are a major component of OSC’s work. Ward, 981 F.2d at 526. Thus, the substantive requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation that might lead to corrective action. Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. We are unable to discern any evidence that the appellant raised to OSC the protected disclosures that he set forth in his response to the administrative judge’s jurisdiction order. 2 Compare IAF, Tab 1 at 34-44, with IAF, Tab 6 at 7-29.

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Related

F. Prescott Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board
981 F.2d 521 (Federal Circuit, 1992)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Dwyne Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security
2022 MSPB 8 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Douglas White v. Department of Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-white-v-department-of-transportation-mspb-2024.