DOUGLAS v. WESOLOWSKI

• Court: District Court, S.D. Indiana
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00818
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

ETIENNE DOUGLAS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00818-JPH-MKK ) LAURA WESOLOWSKI, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER I. Granting in forma pauperis status Plaintiff Etienne Douglas's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Dkt. [2]; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). While in forma pauperis status allows Mr. Douglas to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, he remains liable for the full fees. Rosas v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chi., 748 F. App'x 64, 65 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a district court may allow a litigant to proceed 'without prepayment of fees,' . . . but not without ever paying fees."). No payment is due at this time. II. Screening the Complaint

A. Screening standard The Court has the inherent authority to screen Mr. Douglas's complaint. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[D]istrict courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status."). The Court may dismiss claims within a complaint that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal, [the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). B. The complaint Mr. Douglas brings a gender discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. Mr. Douglas brings these claims against seven individual employees of Organon, his former employer: (1) Laura Wesolowski; (2) Thomas Fitzgibbon; (3) Christine DiDomenico; (4) Anda Pittman; (5) Mary Faulkner; (6) Poonam; and (7) Steve Hinz. Dkt. 1 at 3–4, 9. Mr. Douglas alleges that while working at Organon from November 2021 to January 2023, he was subjected to various discriminatory remarks and microaggressions. Id. at 9–13. These included demeaning comments about his age and discriminatory treatment from his teammates as the only male on his team. Id. He further alleges that when he reported these events, his colleagues retaliated against him by continuing to treat him poorly and preparing a

Performance Expectations document that Mr. Douglas refused to sign due to "gross inaccuracy." Id. Mr. Douglas seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7. C. Discussion of claims Mr. Douglas's claims must be dismissed. Title VII and the ADEA do not authorize suit against individual employees alleged to have engaged in discriminatory conduct in the course of their employment. See Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Congress intended only

for employers to be liable for their agent's actions under the traditional respondeat superior doctrine, not for agents to be personally liable."); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[A] supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of employer."); Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to decide whether the ADEA permits individual liability but explaining that "[b]ecause the relevant language in the ADA and ADEA are identical, it is likely that [defendant], as an individual, could not be liable under the ADEA."). Instead,

the proper defendant is the employing entity itself, not its individual employees. See Williams, 72 F.3d at 554. Mr. Douglas therefore cannot proceed against the individual Defendants named in his complaint. D. Conclusion Mr. Douglas's complaint must be dismissed for the reasons in this Order. He shall have through June 6, 2025 to file an amended complaint. Because an amended complaint completely replaces previous pleadings, it must be a complete statement of his claims. See Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture."). The clerk is directed to senda form complaint with Mr. Douglas's copy of the Order. SO ORDERED. Date: 5/6/2025 . James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana Distribution: ETIENNE DOUGLAS 3553 Founders Rd. Indianapolis, IN 46268