Douglas v. State

490 N.E.2d 270, 1986 Ind. LEXIS 1044

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Decided: March 20, 1986
• Docket: 1184S466
• Status: Published

Opinions

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Petitioner Carrie Douglas appeals denial of relief in the trial court sought pursuant to the provisions of Ind.R.P.C. 1.

Petitioner was convicted in the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Two of the crime of rape, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court in a direct appeal. Douglas v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 957. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the same court and his petition was denied. He now presents three issues for our consideration:

1. the State failed to disclose at trial that a State's key witness was threatened in order to induce her cooperation; 2. ineffective assistance of counsel; and 3. his conviction is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Petitioner Carrie Douglas was convicted of having sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old daughter. Veronica Palfrey, wife of Petitioner and mother of the victim, was also charged with child neglect. She testified for the State at trial that the daughter told her Carrie Douglas had forced the daughter to have sexual relations with him.

In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof rests with the petitioner to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's decision will be reversed only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly to a result not reached by the trial court. McHugh v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 293, 294-295; Ind.R.P.C. 1, § 5.

I

Veronica Palfrey testified for the State at trial and in doing so stated she was not induced by any threats or promises to give her testimony. She later was found guilty of child neglect herself and received a sentence of two years but was put on probation for the entire period.

At the post-conviction relief proceedings, Veronica Palfrey stated that she testified for the State at trial because a detective told her that she would be in as much trouble as Carrie Douglas if she did not testify. Based on this testimony, Petitioner claims he has a right to have his conviection set aside since there was a failure by the State to disclose exculpatory evidence. He likens this situation to one considered in Newman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684, in which an accomplice had been given an agreement of leniency in return for his testimony against the defendant. Newman, provided that failure to disclose such an agreement of leniency required that the defendant's conviction be reversed. Such is not the case here. There is no evidence that there was ever an agreement of leniency between the State and Palfrey. This fact distinguishes the present case from Newman. Furthermore, there is no showing here that the State did fail to disclose any exculpatory evidence regarding the questionable credibility of one of its witnesses. Witness Veronica Palfrey did not claim that she ever communicated the statement made to her by the detective to anyone or that the content of her testimony was based on such statement. In fact, she testified to the contrary. In response to questions put to her by the judge at the post-conviction relief hearing, she testified that the detective did not tell her what to say, that her only testimony was that the victim had told her that Petitioner had had sexual intercourse with the victim, and that that testimony was truthful in every respect. There also was much other evidence from other witnesses that resulted in Petitioner's conviction. Petitioner has not carried his burden of demonstrating reversible error on this issue.

II & III

Petitioner attempts to raise an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction relief petition. This issue was raised and considered at great length in his original appeal, and is not the proper subject for re-litigation in post-conviction proceedings. Rinard v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 588, 592, 394 N.E.2d 160, 163.

Finally, Petitioner claims his conviection is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He makes no argument and cites no authority for this theory. No facts or circumstances are pointed out to support his contention other than his bare statement that it is so. Thus, no issue is presented for review. Reed v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1248, 1253.

The trial court is affirmed.

GIVAN, C.J., and SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion.