Douglas v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Douglas v. State

731 S.E.2d 109, 317 Ga. App. 425, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2660, 2012 WL 3290019, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 722

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedAugust 14, 2012

DocketA12A1263

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 731 S.E.2d 109 (Douglas v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Douglas v. State, 731 S.E.2d 109, 317 Ga. App. 425, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2660, 2012 WL 3290019, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

McFadden, Judge.

Troy Douglas appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Because, as the state concedes, the record does not reflect that Douglas knowingly waived his right to counsel during the plea withdrawal proceedings, we reverse the order denying his motion and remand the case for further proceedings.

Douglas was represented by counsel when he entered his guilty plea. Twenty-four days later, he filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Without addressing the merits of Douglas’s motion, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that Douglas — who was proceeding pro se and was presumably incarcerated at the time — failed to appear at the hearing. Douglas appealed.

1. In Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457 (532 SE2d 102) (2000), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a proceeding to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution, id. at 459 (1), and that “the right to counsel attaches when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, thus entitling that defendant to assistance of counsel.” Id. at 460 (1). The court further held that the trial court has an obligation [426]*426to provide counsel or to obtain a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel from a defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 459 (1).

Decided August 14, 2012. Mark A. Yurachek, for appellant. Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Blair D. Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Because [Douglas] was not appointed counsel for his motion to withdraw his plea, the record does not reveal that the court informed him of his right to counsel, and no waiver of counsel appears in the record, “we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a re-hearing on [Douglas’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea to be conducted in conformity with this opinion.” Fortson, supra, 272 Ga. at 461 (2); Kennedy v. State, 267 Ga. App. 314, 314-315 (599 SE2d 290) (2004).

Ford v. State, 312 Ga. App. 80, 81 (1) (717 SE2d 676) (2011).

2. Douglas’s remaining enumerations of error are rendered moot by our holding in Division 1. Ford, 312 Ga. App. at 81 (2).

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Barnes, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

McFadden, Judge.

Troy Douglas appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Because, as the state concedes, the record does not reflect that Douglas knowingly waived his right to counsel during the plea withdrawal proceedings, we reverse the order denying his motion and remand the case for further proceedings.

Douglas was represented by counsel when he entered his guilty plea. Twenty-four days later, he filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Without addressing the merits of Douglas’s motion, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that Douglas — who was proceeding pro se and was presumably incarcerated at the time — failed to appear at the hearing. Douglas appealed.

1. In Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457 (532 SE2d 102) (2000), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a proceeding to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution, id. at 459 (1), and that “the right to counsel attaches when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, thus entitling that defendant to assistance of counsel.” Id. at 460 (1). The court further held that the trial court has an obligation [426]*426to provide counsel or to obtain a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel from a defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 459 (1).

Decided August 14, 2012. Mark A. Yurachek, for appellant. Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Blair D. Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Because [Douglas] was not appointed counsel for his motion to withdraw his plea, the record does not reveal that the court informed him of his right to counsel, and no waiver of counsel appears in the record, “we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a re-hearing on [Douglas’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea to be conducted in conformity with this opinion.” Fortson, supra, 272 Ga. at 461 (2); Kennedy v. State, 267 Ga. App. 314, 314-315 (599 SE2d 290) (2004).

Ford v. State, 312 Ga. App. 80, 81 (1) (717 SE2d 676) (2011).

2. Douglas’s remaining enumerations of error are rendered moot by our holding in Division 1. Ford, 312 Ga. App. at 81 (2).

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Barnes, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

731 S.E.2d 109, 317 Ga. App. 425, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2660, 2012 WL 3290019, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 722, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-v-state-gactapp-2012.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack