Douglas v. Hill

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 10, 2025
• Docket: 23-4324
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICK C. DOUGLAS, No. 23-4324 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00884-JLS-BGS v. MEMORANDUM* RICK HILL; ROB BONTA, Attorney General, State of California,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 21, 2025 San Diego, California

Before: WALLACE, McKEOWN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Patrick C. Douglas appeals from the district court’s denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

“We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo.” Panah v.

Chappell, 935 F.3d 657, 663 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. Douglas claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel during

sentencing due to his counsel’s failure to present his mental health history as a

mitigating factor. He raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Because

Douglas failed to raise this claim before the district court, it is not cognizable on

appeal, and we decline to consider it. See Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212,

1217 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. Douglas also asserts that the state court unreasonably applied

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to conclude that he did not

receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial

because his counsel failed to investigate his mental health issue and present a

diminished actuality defense. Under the deferential review mandated by

Strickland and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011), we cannot hold that the state

court unreasonably concluded that Douglas failed to establish prejudice, see

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Without resolving

whether trial counsel’s guilt-phase investigation was constitutionally deficient,

we hold that it is not objectively unreasonable to conclude that Crittenden has

not established prejudice.”).

3. Lastly, Douglas argues that the state court unreasonably applied

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), to hold that the trial court’s

2 23-4324 erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “Because

we cannot say that every fairminded jurist would conclude that the state court’s

harmlessness determination was objectively unreasonable, AEDPA forecloses

relief on this ground.” Frye v. Broomfield, 115 F.4th 1155, 1163 (9th Cir.

2024).

AFFIRMED.

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