Douglas MacKenzie v. Brandon Price

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 18, 2025
Docket22-55991
StatusUnpublished

This text of Douglas MacKenzie v. Brandon Price (Douglas MacKenzie v. Brandon Price) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas MacKenzie v. Brandon Price, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS MACKENZIE, No. 22-55991 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 8:21-cv-01852-VBF-JC v. MEMORANDUM* BRANDON PRICE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Valerie Baker Fairbank, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 13, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: WALLACE, GRABER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges

Appellant Douglas MacKenzie appeals from the district court’s dismissal of

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. MacKenzie is in pre-trial detention in a California hospital,

awaiting his civil commitment trial under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act

(“SVPA”) to determine whether he is “currently” likely to “engage in sexually

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(3). MacKenzie

claims that pre-trial detention violates his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The district court dismissed the petition under the abstention doctrine of Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We affirm.

1. MacKenzie first argues that he lacks an “adequate opportunity” to bring his

federal claims in state court because his state-court counsel refused to file state

habeas petitions raising his federal constitutional challenges to pretrial detention.

See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing four-part

standard for Younger abstention). The California courts dismissed his pro se

petitions without prejudice under a state rule that individuals represented by counsel

cannot simultaneously proceed pro se. See In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 1110 (Cal.

2003).

The difference of opinion over legal strategy between MacKenzie and his

former counsel is far from a state-imposed procedural bar to federal claims. See

Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.) (“Younger requires only the

absence of procedural bars to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings.”

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)), as amended 326 F.3d 1030 (9th

Cir. 2003). And MacKenzie has recently been appointed new state counsel. He may

still raise his federal claims in the state courts with his new counsel. So Younger

abstention applies.

2 2. MacKenzie next argues that his petition falls within the two exceptions

recognized by Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019): “(1) the procedure

challenged in the petition is distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and

the challenge would not interfere with the prosecution,” and “(2) full vindication of

the petitioner’s pretrial rights requires intervention before trial.” Id. at 903.

Neither Page exception applies. First, if we held that MacKenzie is no longer

“currently” a sexually violent predator, we would interfere with the state proceedings

by deciding the exact issue to be litigated in his upcoming SVPA trial. See id. at 904

(holding that the first exception applies only when “an issue . . . could not be raised

in defense of the criminal prosecution” (simplified)).

Second, the full vindication of MacKenzie’s pre-trial rights does not require

intervention before trial. MacKenzie—unlike the petitioner in Page—does not

assert that California failed to hold a constitutionally adequate probable cause

hearing when he was first detained in 2011. Instead, he argues that the SVPA is

unconstitutional. Given that MacKenzie challenges the constitutionality of the state

law as a whole, he may vindicate his constitutional rights post-trial. If he is ordered

detained under the SVPA post-trial, a federal court may later pronounce the SVPA

unconstitutional.

3 3. Because we do not “find[] any ambiguity” as to the nature of MacKenzie’s

claims, there is—by MacKenzie’s own admission—no need for the district court to

have granted leave to amend.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Meredith v. Oregon
321 F.3d 807 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
In Re Barnett
73 P.3d 1106 (California Supreme Court, 2003)
Erick Arevalo v. Vicki Hennessy
882 F.3d 763 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Sammy Page v. Audrey King
932 F.3d 898 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

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