Dougherty v. Dougherty

443 N.W.2d 193, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 826, 1989 WL 80730
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 25, 1989
DocketC0-89-320
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 443 N.W.2d 193 (Dougherty v. Dougherty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dougherty v. Dougherty, 443 N.W.2d 193, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 826, 1989 WL 80730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions

OPINION

HUSPENI, Judge.

The trial court affirmed the family court referee’s order increasing spousal mainte[194]*194nance. Thomas Dougherty appealed and Joyce Dougherty filed a notice of review. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Respondent Joyce Dougherty and appellant Thomas Dougherty’s marriage was dissolved in 1972. The dissolution decree adopted the provisions of the parties’ written stipulation and obligated appellant to pay $1,000 per month in spousal maintenance, $790 per month in child support, and $50,000 in property settlement. In addition, respondent was awarded the family’s homestead and appellant was awarded his interest in the law firm where he practices.

In June 1988, respondent moved the trial court for an increase in spousal maintenance to $2,000 per month and for an award of attorney fees. A family court referee’s recommendation that the spousal maintenance obligation be increased to $1,650 per month was affirmed by the trial court.

Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in increasing the spousal maintenance obligation. Respondent’s notice of review contends the court erred in denying her an award of attorney fees.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by increasing appellant’s spousal maintenance obligation from $1,000 to $1,650 per month?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying respondent attorney fees and is respondent entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

ANALYSIS

A trial court’s final order affirming a referee’s order is appealable. Coady v. Jurek, 366 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 27, 1985).

I.

On appeal from a trial court’s determination of maintenance, the standard of review is whether that court abused its broad discretion. Stick v. Stick, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn.1989). Although a trial court should exercise its discretion to modify maintenance cautiously in cases where the parties have stipulated in regard to that issue, we recognize that, nonetheless, the trial court does retain authority to determine whether changed circumstances warrant revision. See Claybaugh v. Claybaugh, 312 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn.1981). However, an appellate court will reverse when it is unable to determine from the findings whether the statutory requirements were properly considered.1 Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53.

A trial court may modify the terms of a maintenance decree upon a showing of one or more of the following:

(1) substantially increased or decreased earnings of a party; (2) substantially increased or decreased need of a party; (3) receipt of assistance under sections 256.-72 to 256.87; or (4) a change in the cost of living for either party as measured by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, any of which makes the terms unreasonable and unfair.

Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1988). If modification is warranted, the basic issue becomes balancing the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance against the financial conditions of the spouse providing maintenance. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn.1982). In doing so, “the trial court shall apply, in addition to all other relevant factors, the statutory factors for an award of maintenance that exist at the time of the motion.” Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2. Moreover, a trial court’s order “shall contain particularized findings of fact sufficient to support the [195]*195determination of * * * maintenance.” Minn.R.Fam.Ct.P. 7.05.

1. The trial court found appellant’s 1972 gross income to be $83,620 and his 1988 salary to be $90,000. The court additionally found appellant’s average income for the last five years to be $135,000. It made no specific finding on how “gross income” in 1972 related to “salary” sixteen years later, nor did it make any finding on whether appellant had experienced a substantial increase in earnings which rendered the original maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. Without these necessary findings, appellate review of the statutory requirements of Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 cannot be made. See Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53.

We also note that the trial court’s finding that appellant has more “monies available” to him now as compared to 1972 due to the cessation of his child support obligations was inappropriate. See Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (maintenance may be modified upon a showing of substantially increased earnings of a party).

2. The trial court found that respondent’s monthly living expenses had increased and that she had been forced to invade her property settlement to meet those increased expenses. It is established law that spouses are not required to invade the principal of their property settlement to meet their monthly needs. Fink v. Fink, 366 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). However, because the trial court made no finding on whether these changed circumstances were substantial and rendered the original maintenance award unreasonable and unfair, we cannot conduct effective appellate review. See Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53.

3. The trial court determined that there has been a 62% increase in the cost of living since the parties’ dissolution and found that increase to be substantial.

Inflation is merely a factor that can be examined along with other factors in modification cases. The fact that inflation rises does not necessarily lead to a correlating increase in salary and, thus, ability to pay an increased obligation. Martin v. Martin, 382 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Minn.Ct.App.1986).

Again, the trial court failed to make a finding on whether the change in the cost of living was a factor rendering the original decree’s provisions unreasonable and unfair, and is instructed to do so on remand.

II.

The courts must consider the financial resources of both parties and award reasonable [attorney] fees if one party will otherwise be unable to contest the proceeding.

Roehrdanz v. Roehrdanz, 438 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989). The record reveals that respondent had the financial resources to bring this action and to contest it on appeal. Accordingly, no error was committed by the trial court, and no award of attorney fees is warranted on appeal.

DECISION

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Dougherty v. Dougherty
443 N.W.2d 193 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
443 N.W.2d 193, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 826, 1989 WL 80730, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dougherty-v-dougherty-minnctapp-1989.