Doucet v. Texas Co.

17 So. 2d 340, 205 La. 312, 1944 La. LEXIS 675
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 7, 1944
DocketNo. 37036.
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 17 So. 2d 340 (Doucet v. Texas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doucet v. Texas Co., 17 So. 2d 340, 205 La. 312, 1944 La. LEXIS 675 (La. 1944).

Opinion

FOURNET, Justice.

The plaintiff, Ludwig Doucet, filed this suit in tort to recover $10,650 in damages from The Texas Company in solido with Shelly Pellegrin, in charge of the company’s oil operations in Lake Pelto, for the value of oysters allegedly killed during the 1932-1933 season in the beds leased by the plaintiff from the state as the result of the company’s pollution of the waters of this lake and surrounding bodies of water— Terrebonne Bay, Lake Barre, Timbalier Bay, and Bay Sainte Elaine — by its negligence in discharging into these waters during the course of its oil operations in Lake Barre and Lake Pelto large quantities of oil, waste, refuse, salt water waste, and poisonous gases.

The defendants filed an exception of misjoinder of parties defendant and of actions, and also exceptions of no cause and no right of action, all of which were overruled. The company, then answering, denied generally all of the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition, averring that it was operating under a state lease and that its operations were conducted under the best conditions, in accordance with approved practices and methods. The defendant Pellegrin admitted he was employed by The Texas Company and in charge of the Lake Pelto oil well, but he denied any and all liability.

There was judgment in the lower court rejecting plaintiff’s demands and dismissing his suit and he is appealing from that judgment. The defendants have answered the appeal asking that the judgment of the trial judge overruling their exceptions be reversed and that his judgment on the merits be affirmed, but they have apparently abandoned the exceptions of misjoinder of parties defendant and of *315 actions, for they have failed to present either a written or an oral argument in support thereof. In any- event, they are without merit.

The exceptions of no cause and no right of action are based on counsels’ contention that the plaintiff did not possess any right ■or ownership in the oysters at the time of ■their death and could not, therefore, recover damages for their value. It is their .alternative contention that the injury complained of is “damnum absque injuria,” for the defendant company conducted its operations in an arm of the Gulf of Mexico under and in accordance with a mineral lease from the state executed under the provisions of Act No. 30 of the Extra Session of 1915 and that all but one of plaintiff’s oyster leases had been granted him under statutes expressly reserving to the state the right to grant such mineral leases.

The plaintiff’s oyster operations were conducted in Lake Pelto under several leases from the state, the earliest of which, dated December 4, 1925, was granted under the provisions of Act No. 54 of 1914, as amended by Act No. 139 of 1924. All of the other leases were executed subsequent to March of 1928, under the provisions of Act No. 258 of 1926. It is true that in the 1914 act, as amended, and in the 1926 act, it is declared that “all beds and bottoms of rivers, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays and sounds and inlets bordering on, or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico,” are the property of the state to the low water mark, “including all natural oyster reefs and all oysters and all other shell fish growing thereon,” but in ' both of these acts is also contained the provision that the Department of Conservation may lease the use of such bottoms and reefs for the purpose of fishing, bedding, and raising oysters and other shell fish, subject to the restrictions imposed by law and the regulations of the commission, consequently, the plaintiff had a valuable property right in these oyster beds, for the loss of which he can recover against the one by whose fault the loss was incurred. Moreover, in the former act, the ownership of the oysters is specifically declared to be in the lessee and although the word “ownership” is omitted from a similar provision in the 1926 act, the import is the same, for in Section 8 of that act we find the provision that the failure of the tenant to pay the rental due thereon shall “ipso facto * * * terminate and cancel said lease and forfeit to the Department of Conservation of Louisiana, all the works, improvements, betterments and oysters on said leased water bottowis.” We think, therefore, that the plaintiff’s petition does state a right of action. (Italics ours.)

The alternative contention of the defendants in support of their exceptions is equally without merit. While it is true that the 1926 statute does expressly reserve to the state the right to lease for mineral purposes the beds and bottoms of the waters and streams bordering on, or connecting with, the Gulf of Mexico, a careful study of Section 1 of Act No. 258 of 1926 will disclose that it was the legislature’s intention to thereby permit the state to grant mineral leases in such beds and bottoms without the necessity of se *317 curing the consent of the persons to whom oyster leases were granted. It was.never the legislature's intention to give to the mineral lessees the right to operate or conduct their operations in such a manner as to pollute the waters over these beds and bottoms in utter disregard of the rights of the oyster lessees.

On the merits, it is the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden resting with him to prove that the alleged deleterious substances discharged by them into the. waters was of sufficient quantity and such a toxic or poisonous nature that it was harmful to the life of the oyster or that the substance did, in fact, actually cause the damage complained of.

The record in this case is very voluminous, comprising 19 volumes and consisting of 4,577 pages, 3,533 of which are testimony and 862 of which contain exhibits. The case was filed on October 13, 1933, and was argued here on October 7, 1943, thus covering a period of some ten years. The trial was not actually begun until some two years after the suit was filed, or on October, 1, 1935, and, after continuations from time to time,-was finally completed on March 28, 1939, the judgment of the court being rendered on October 15, 1942, some two and a half years thereafter. Counsel for plaintiff and defendant have elaborately briefed their respective views, discussing exhaustively and in detail their versions of the case, no doubt with the view of assisting the court, but notwithstanding this, we find the opinions expressed in these briefs to be very conflicting, necessitating, on our part, a careful analysis of all of the evidence in the case, particularly that of the experts.

After reviewing all of this mass of testimony and exhibits, we find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the defendant Texas Company did discharge thousands of barrels of bleed water (a substratal water of high salt content through its proximity to underlying salt domes that is separated from the oil upon its arrival at the surface and discarded, referred to scientifically as oil well brines) daily into the waters surrounding their producing wells, permitted the escape of poisonous gases, and negligently dispersed such a large quantity of crude oil around their operations that it spread in a film-like covering over these waters for miles and, shifting with winds and carried by tides, and currents, eventually reaching the oyster beds located in the coves and similar inlets near or against the shores, and remaining accumulated and hemmed in over these beds in appreciable quantities.

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Bluebook (online)
17 So. 2d 340, 205 La. 312, 1944 La. LEXIS 675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doucet-v-texas-co-la-1944.