FORT, J.
This is an appeal from a post-conviction order denying the petitioner relief from his entry of a plea of guilty. He appeals.
The record establishes that the interrelationship of two problems underlies this appeal. One is the effect of plea bargaining leading to a guilty plea; the other, that of adequacy of counsel.
The post-convietion court made an express finding of fact:
“2. Trial counsel for petitioner advised him that if the sole basis of his guilty plea was the denial of his Motion to Suppress, he could have the denial of that motion reviewed through post-conviction proceedings.”
[606]*606The state here does not contend that this- advice was not erroneous.
Accordingly, it concludes, as did the post-conviction court, that he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s erroneous advice, and thus, under the rule of Dixon v. Gladden, 250 Or 580, 444 P2d 11 (1968), the judgment should be affirmed.
This case is further complicated, however, by the fact that the evidence is uncontradicted that prior to entry of the plea, a substantial plea bargaining process was carried on between the state and petitioner’s counsel. It is also uncontradicted that in the course of this the deputy district attorney expressly advised petitioner’s counsel that under the law the petitioner would not, provided he pleaded guilty solely on that ground, waive his right to have the correctness of the trial court’s rulings on the motions to suppress evidence reviewed in the post-conviction court. Obviously such advice was given to petitioner’s counsel with full awareness that it wo.uld influence the petitioner in his decision to plead guilty, since it related to the only legal consideration upon which at that point he might base an appeal.
Counsel also testified that he relied on that [607]*607representation, told the petitioner of it and made no independent investigation of the law.② He also testified that although he had had wide experience in criminal trial defense work, he had never handled an appeal in a criminal case and had no experience with post-conviction matters.
Since the state does not here contend that the statement of the law made by both the deputy district [608]*608attorney and by petitioner’s trial counsel was not erroneous, it, in effect, concedes that the state itself was not only a party to, but the originator of, that error. This seems particularly significant when, as here, it is uncontradicted that extensive plea bargaining③ between the state and petitioner’s trial counsel preceded the entry of the plea, and that this erroneous advice was given and relied upon in connection therewith. We note that this conclusion seems inescapable from the testimony in the post-conviction hearing, despite the fact that the trial court at the time the defendant pleaded guilty was otherwise informed.④
[609]*609In Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 92 S Ct 495, 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), the United States [610]*610Supreme Court recently considered a case where ás a part .of the plea bargaining process the state had agreed to make no recommendation to the trial court concerning the length of sentence to be imposed. At the time of sentence the state was represented by different counsel who was unaware of the agreement. He did make a recommendation to the court. The trial court itself said at the time it was entirely unaffected by that recommendation and that it was imposing sentence solely on the basis of the presentence report and other material in the record.
Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Burger, the court concluded:
“On this record, petitioner ‘bargained’ and negotiated for a particular plea in order to secure dismissal of more serious charges, but also on condition that no sentence recommendation would be made by the prosecutor. It is now conceded that the promise to abstain from a recommendation was made, and at this stage the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent breach of agreement is immaterial. The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.
“We need not reach the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for the plea. He stated that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in .relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration. The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we [611]*611leave to the discretion of the state court which is in a better position, to decide whether the. circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitionér, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. We emphasize that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing judge.” 404 US at 262-63.
See also: Arrastia v. United States, 455 F2d 736, (5th Cir 1972).
- 1, 2. It is equally implicit that when the state makes an express representation concerning his rights of- appeal. Or. to post-conviction relief under the law to a defendant or to his counsel, under circumstances where such advice is not only accepted but substantially influences the defendant to waive important rights- and enter a plea of guilty, and such advice is conceded, as here* to have been erroneous, whether inadvertently so or not, thén the. defendant should be entitled to appropriate-relief- under the Post-Conviction Act. Here, this simply means the opportunity to have tested on appeal the- trial court rulings on the motions to suppress. .
Wé -think the foregoing reasoning is not inconsistent with-the-views expressed by the Oregon Supreme Court in North v. Cupp, 254 Or 451, 456-59, 461 P2d 271 (1969), cert denied 397 US 1054 (1970); and State v. Abel, 241 Or 465, 469, 406 P2d 902 (1965), See also, Annotation, 25 L Ed 2d 1025, 1038, 1053 (1971), and cases cited therein.
Paraphrasing Santobello, nothing less, fulfills “the [612]*612interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to * * * [representations] made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty” under these circumstances.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FORT, J.
This is an appeal from a post-conviction order denying the petitioner relief from his entry of a plea of guilty. He appeals.
The record establishes that the interrelationship of two problems underlies this appeal. One is the effect of plea bargaining leading to a guilty plea; the other, that of adequacy of counsel.
The post-convietion court made an express finding of fact:
“2. Trial counsel for petitioner advised him that if the sole basis of his guilty plea was the denial of his Motion to Suppress, he could have the denial of that motion reviewed through post-conviction proceedings.”
[606]*606The state here does not contend that this- advice was not erroneous.
Accordingly, it concludes, as did the post-conviction court, that he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s erroneous advice, and thus, under the rule of Dixon v. Gladden, 250 Or 580, 444 P2d 11 (1968), the judgment should be affirmed.
This case is further complicated, however, by the fact that the evidence is uncontradicted that prior to entry of the plea, a substantial plea bargaining process was carried on between the state and petitioner’s counsel. It is also uncontradicted that in the course of this the deputy district attorney expressly advised petitioner’s counsel that under the law the petitioner would not, provided he pleaded guilty solely on that ground, waive his right to have the correctness of the trial court’s rulings on the motions to suppress evidence reviewed in the post-conviction court. Obviously such advice was given to petitioner’s counsel with full awareness that it wo.uld influence the petitioner in his decision to plead guilty, since it related to the only legal consideration upon which at that point he might base an appeal.
Counsel also testified that he relied on that [607]*607representation, told the petitioner of it and made no independent investigation of the law.② He also testified that although he had had wide experience in criminal trial defense work, he had never handled an appeal in a criminal case and had no experience with post-conviction matters.
Since the state does not here contend that the statement of the law made by both the deputy district [608]*608attorney and by petitioner’s trial counsel was not erroneous, it, in effect, concedes that the state itself was not only a party to, but the originator of, that error. This seems particularly significant when, as here, it is uncontradicted that extensive plea bargaining③ between the state and petitioner’s trial counsel preceded the entry of the plea, and that this erroneous advice was given and relied upon in connection therewith. We note that this conclusion seems inescapable from the testimony in the post-conviction hearing, despite the fact that the trial court at the time the defendant pleaded guilty was otherwise informed.④
[609]*609In Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 92 S Ct 495, 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), the United States [610]*610Supreme Court recently considered a case where ás a part .of the plea bargaining process the state had agreed to make no recommendation to the trial court concerning the length of sentence to be imposed. At the time of sentence the state was represented by different counsel who was unaware of the agreement. He did make a recommendation to the court. The trial court itself said at the time it was entirely unaffected by that recommendation and that it was imposing sentence solely on the basis of the presentence report and other material in the record.
Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Burger, the court concluded:
“On this record, petitioner ‘bargained’ and negotiated for a particular plea in order to secure dismissal of more serious charges, but also on condition that no sentence recommendation would be made by the prosecutor. It is now conceded that the promise to abstain from a recommendation was made, and at this stage the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent breach of agreement is immaterial. The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.
“We need not reach the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for the plea. He stated that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in .relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration. The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we [611]*611leave to the discretion of the state court which is in a better position, to decide whether the. circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitionér, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. We emphasize that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing judge.” 404 US at 262-63.
See also: Arrastia v. United States, 455 F2d 736, (5th Cir 1972).
- 1, 2. It is equally implicit that when the state makes an express representation concerning his rights of- appeal. Or. to post-conviction relief under the law to a defendant or to his counsel, under circumstances where such advice is not only accepted but substantially influences the defendant to waive important rights- and enter a plea of guilty, and such advice is conceded, as here* to have been erroneous, whether inadvertently so or not, thén the. defendant should be entitled to appropriate-relief- under the Post-Conviction Act. Here, this simply means the opportunity to have tested on appeal the- trial court rulings on the motions to suppress. .
Wé -think the foregoing reasoning is not inconsistent with-the-views expressed by the Oregon Supreme Court in North v. Cupp, 254 Or 451, 456-59, 461 P2d 271 (1969), cert denied 397 US 1054 (1970); and State v. Abel, 241 Or 465, 469, 406 P2d 902 (1965), See also, Annotation, 25 L Ed 2d 1025, 1038, 1053 (1971), and cases cited therein.
Paraphrasing Santobello, nothing less, fulfills “the [612]*612interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to * * * [representations] made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty” under these circumstances.
Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed with directions to remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment, and, since no other procedure is available to petitioner to allow the testing on appeal⑤ of the denial of the motions to suppress, to vacate the plea of guilty.
In Richardson v. Williard, 241 Or 376, 377, 406 P2d 156 (1965), the court said:
“The only question that this court could have considered on an appeal from the original judgment was whether the punishment was cruel and unusual or not proportioned to the offense. ORS 138.050. State v. Gidley, 1962, 231 Or 89, 371 P2d 992. Hi *