BELSON, Associate Judge.
The reconsideration of this appeal gives the en banc court an opportunity to consid[458]*458er this jurisdiction’s law on impeachment of defendants by previous convictions.
Appellant contends that the sequence of the prosecutor’s questions during appellant’s cross-examination suggested to the jury that because appellant had been convicted of past offenses he must be guilty of the charged offense. A majority of a division of this court affirmed appellant’s conviction of petit larceny, D.C.Code § 22-2202 (1981). Dorman v. United States, 460 A.2d 986 (D.C.1983). We vacated that opinion and granted rehearing en banc. We now affirm.1
I
D.C.Code § 14-305(b)(1) (1981) controls the admission into evidence of a defendant’s previous convictions. The section reads, in part:
[F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde, but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment). A party establishing conviction by means of cross-examination shall not be bound by the witness’ answers as to matters relating to the conviction.
The jury can infer from a witness’ previous convictions that the witness may be untruthful in his present testimony. When the defendant is a witness in his own case, there is a danger that the jury will draw the impermissible inference from the defendant’s past convictions that he is guilty of the current offense. The danger is especially great if the past crimes are similar to the current offense. But this court is not free to decide that the danger of prejudice to the defendant warrants barring impeachment by previous convictions. Congress has prescribed that certain convictions are relevant to a factfinder’s credibility determinations. We are bound by Congress’ policy decision. Hill v. United States, 434 A.2d 422, 429 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151, 102 S.Ct. 1020, 71 L.Ed.2d 307 (1982).
It is within our province, however, to require procedures that minimize the risk that a jury will misuse the evidence of previous convictions which Congress has declared admissible. In that way we accommodate both Congressional policy and the interest of avoiding unnecessary prejudice to defendants. In past cases we have [459]*459recognized that the sequence of the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination can prompt the impermissible inference. For example, in Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522 (D.C.1978), appellant was charged with various armed offenses and with carrying a pistol without a license. The prosecutor opened his cross-examination of the appellant by asking:
Q. Now, Mr. Fields, you had a gun with, you that night; didn’t you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Are you the same Jesse Fields that was convicted in 1969 of carrying a pistol without a license?
Appellant replied that he was. Id. at 526. The prosecutor repeated the sequence, asking about appellant’s previous conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm. We held that the questions about appellant’s previous weapon convictions, asked “immediately after appellant had denied possessing a gun on the occasion of the offense charged, likely gave the jury the impression that evidence of appellant’s prior conviction was being offered to rebut appellant’s .denial.” Id. at 527. The questioning constituted reversible error.
In Bailey v. United States, 447 A.2d 779 (D.C.1982), a division of this court held that the following set of questions at the end of government cross-examination was plain error:
Q. You didn’t try to rape her down there, is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Are you the same Phillip Bailey who on May 14, 1971, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of armed rape?
A. Yes, I am.
Id. at 781. We disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s pause before the question about the previous conviction provided a buffer sufficient to avoid a prejudicial juxtaposition of general denial and impeachment by conviction of a similar offense. Id. at 783.
In Baptist v. United States, 466 A.2d 452 (D.C.1983), we distilled some general rules from Fields, Bailey, and two nonbinding D.C. Circuit cases, United States v. Henry, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 528 F.2d 661 (1976), and United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149, 482 F.2d 738 (1973). We now approve most of Baptist’s analysis. There are two general prohibitions. First, the government may not pair questions about a defendant’s previous convictions for offenses similar to those charged with questions that elicit his general denial of the charged crime. Bailey exemplifies this prohibition. Second, the government may not pair questions about similar previous convictions with questions that elicit defendant’s denial of a key element of the charged offense. Fields exemplifies this rule. The second proscription will be the more difficult to apply, because many cross-examination questions necessarily refer to elements of the charged crime, and a defendant’s answer may imply a denial of the element.2
[460]*460We observe that in some instances impeachment by previous convictions not similar to the charged crime may be so obviously misused as to become objectionable. On the other hand, impeachment by previous convictions juxtaposed with examination on matters related solely to credibility will ordinarily be unobjectionable.3 Obviously we cannot set out in advance specific rules governing the innumerable varieties of examination that may take place in particular cases.4 We can articulate only a general standard by which particular instances of impeachment can be judged. The test is whether the prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s previous conviction is such that, under the circumstances, reasonable jurors would naturally and necessarily regard the manner in which the impeachment is accomplished as implying that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged because he was guilty of past crimes.5 Our test focuses on the manner of impeachment because we acknowledge that to some degree the mere fact of previous conviction impeachment imparts “well-nigh inescapable prejudice .on the issue of guilt.” Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 151, 482 F.2d at 740.
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BELSON, Associate Judge.
The reconsideration of this appeal gives the en banc court an opportunity to consid[458]*458er this jurisdiction’s law on impeachment of defendants by previous convictions.
Appellant contends that the sequence of the prosecutor’s questions during appellant’s cross-examination suggested to the jury that because appellant had been convicted of past offenses he must be guilty of the charged offense. A majority of a division of this court affirmed appellant’s conviction of petit larceny, D.C.Code § 22-2202 (1981). Dorman v. United States, 460 A.2d 986 (D.C.1983). We vacated that opinion and granted rehearing en banc. We now affirm.1
I
D.C.Code § 14-305(b)(1) (1981) controls the admission into evidence of a defendant’s previous convictions. The section reads, in part:
[F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde, but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment). A party establishing conviction by means of cross-examination shall not be bound by the witness’ answers as to matters relating to the conviction.
The jury can infer from a witness’ previous convictions that the witness may be untruthful in his present testimony. When the defendant is a witness in his own case, there is a danger that the jury will draw the impermissible inference from the defendant’s past convictions that he is guilty of the current offense. The danger is especially great if the past crimes are similar to the current offense. But this court is not free to decide that the danger of prejudice to the defendant warrants barring impeachment by previous convictions. Congress has prescribed that certain convictions are relevant to a factfinder’s credibility determinations. We are bound by Congress’ policy decision. Hill v. United States, 434 A.2d 422, 429 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151, 102 S.Ct. 1020, 71 L.Ed.2d 307 (1982).
It is within our province, however, to require procedures that minimize the risk that a jury will misuse the evidence of previous convictions which Congress has declared admissible. In that way we accommodate both Congressional policy and the interest of avoiding unnecessary prejudice to defendants. In past cases we have [459]*459recognized that the sequence of the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination can prompt the impermissible inference. For example, in Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522 (D.C.1978), appellant was charged with various armed offenses and with carrying a pistol without a license. The prosecutor opened his cross-examination of the appellant by asking:
Q. Now, Mr. Fields, you had a gun with, you that night; didn’t you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Are you the same Jesse Fields that was convicted in 1969 of carrying a pistol without a license?
Appellant replied that he was. Id. at 526. The prosecutor repeated the sequence, asking about appellant’s previous conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm. We held that the questions about appellant’s previous weapon convictions, asked “immediately after appellant had denied possessing a gun on the occasion of the offense charged, likely gave the jury the impression that evidence of appellant’s prior conviction was being offered to rebut appellant’s .denial.” Id. at 527. The questioning constituted reversible error.
In Bailey v. United States, 447 A.2d 779 (D.C.1982), a division of this court held that the following set of questions at the end of government cross-examination was plain error:
Q. You didn’t try to rape her down there, is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Are you the same Phillip Bailey who on May 14, 1971, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of armed rape?
A. Yes, I am.
Id. at 781. We disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s pause before the question about the previous conviction provided a buffer sufficient to avoid a prejudicial juxtaposition of general denial and impeachment by conviction of a similar offense. Id. at 783.
In Baptist v. United States, 466 A.2d 452 (D.C.1983), we distilled some general rules from Fields, Bailey, and two nonbinding D.C. Circuit cases, United States v. Henry, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 528 F.2d 661 (1976), and United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149, 482 F.2d 738 (1973). We now approve most of Baptist’s analysis. There are two general prohibitions. First, the government may not pair questions about a defendant’s previous convictions for offenses similar to those charged with questions that elicit his general denial of the charged crime. Bailey exemplifies this prohibition. Second, the government may not pair questions about similar previous convictions with questions that elicit defendant’s denial of a key element of the charged offense. Fields exemplifies this rule. The second proscription will be the more difficult to apply, because many cross-examination questions necessarily refer to elements of the charged crime, and a defendant’s answer may imply a denial of the element.2
[460]*460We observe that in some instances impeachment by previous convictions not similar to the charged crime may be so obviously misused as to become objectionable. On the other hand, impeachment by previous convictions juxtaposed with examination on matters related solely to credibility will ordinarily be unobjectionable.3 Obviously we cannot set out in advance specific rules governing the innumerable varieties of examination that may take place in particular cases.4 We can articulate only a general standard by which particular instances of impeachment can be judged. The test is whether the prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s previous conviction is such that, under the circumstances, reasonable jurors would naturally and necessarily regard the manner in which the impeachment is accomplished as implying that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged because he was guilty of past crimes.5 Our test focuses on the manner of impeachment because we acknowledge that to some degree the mere fact of previous conviction impeachment imparts “well-nigh inescapable prejudice .on the issue of guilt.” Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 151, 482 F.2d at 740. Since the test looks only to the manner of prior conviction impeachment and does not affect at all the determination of which prior convictions may be used to impeach, it does not conflict with the legislative policy expressed in D.C.Code § 14-305(b)(1). See H.R.Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 (1970).
We borrow our formulation from cases such as (Harold) Brown v. United States, 383 A.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.1978), which analyze whether remarks by a prosecutor should be construed as impermissible comments on a defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense. As in those instances, the court in monitoring impeachment by previous conviction should look to the jury’s reasonable perception, using an objective, not a subjective, test.6 We adopt [461]*461an objective test because our concern is with the impact upon the jury of the prosecutor’s manner of impeachment by prior conviction rather than the motive or intent of the prosecutor.
One important difference between our review of previous conviction impeachment and our review of prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify is that we apply different standards for harmless error in the two types of cases. Comments on a defendant’s failure to testify plainly implicate his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), so we must test for harmless constitutional error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conviction must be reversed unless error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Previous conviction impeachment does not involve constitutional rights, except in a remote sense, so we use the less stringent harmless error test of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (error is harmless if the court can say “with fair assurance ... that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error”).7 And where a defendant has failed to preserve the point, we use the plain error test (“the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial....”) Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc).
Baptist suggested that harmless error analysis and the Kotteakos test were appropriate. Baptist, 466 A.2d at 459 n. 4. The D.C. Circuit agrees. See Henry, 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 95, 528 F.2d at 668. Our Fields and Bailey opinions did not mention harmless error analysis. In those two cases we held implicitly that the errors were so flagrant that they could not be harmless; we stated explicitly that no jury instruction could have cured the prejudice the defendants suffered. Fields, 396 A.2d at 528; Bailey, 447 A.2d at 783.
[462]*462In closer cases, however, a curative instruction could be important to our evaluation of whether a less blatant error was harmless.8 The giving of the instruction, which informs the jury that it may use the previous convictions only to evaluate the defendant’s credibility, would be only one factor in this court’s assessment of harm; other factors would include the seriousness of the prosecutor’s error and the weight of the evidence of defendant’s guilt. See Henry, 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 95, 528 F.2d at 668; Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 428 (D.C.1976).9
Finally, we note that our review of asserted error in this area will be aided greatly if we have the benefit of the trial judge’s evaluation of the effect of the impeachment. Even if a prosecutor is scrupulously careful in bringing out a defendant’s previous convictions, some prejudice to the defendant is unavoidable. The trial judge is in the best position to assess the impact of the particular manner of impeachment. Defense counsel should therefore object if he or she thinks error has been committed, and the trial judge should then evaluate the prosecutor’s conduct. In appropriate cases, defense counsel should secure the trial judge’s evaluation of prose-cutorial use of a defendant’s previous convictions by a motion for mistrial or a motion for new trial. We do not wish to encourage insubstantial or groundless objections or motions, of course, but we emphasize that defense counsel should ensure that the trial judge has the opportunity to rule upon the matter. Failure to raise the issue will leave a defendant in the position of having to establish plain error in order to prevail on appeal. Watts, 362 A.2d at 709.
II
Having defined the precepts governing the use of previous convictions to impeach defendants, we now apply them to the case at hand.
Appellant was convicted of petit larceny, D.C.Code § 22-2202 (1981). The government alleged that he stole a radio from a man who appeared to be sleeping on a step but who was actually a plainclothes police officer acting as a decoy. On direct examination, appellant’s counsel brought out one of his client’s previous convictions and received a cautionary instruction. On cross-examination the following exchange occurred.
Q. Mr. Dorman, you are saying when Officer Green said he saw you go up to Sergeant Hickey on the steps, he is not telling the truth, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: No, I’ll permit that question.
BY [the Prosecutor]:
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Officer Green said that he saw you take that radio from Sergeant Hickey, he was again not telling you the truth, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Officer Green said that he saw you walk away with that radio, he was again not telling the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that when he said that you got 90 feet from Sergeant Hickey he was again not telling the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So essentially his entire testimony was just not true, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Sergeant Hickey said that he saw you ten feet from him holding the radio, again, he was not telling the truth either, was he?
[463]*463A. Yes, sir.
Q. He wasn’t?
A. Right.
Q. So you never touched the radio, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You just walked up to it, looked at it, walked down two steps and you weren’t even touching it and all of these policemen arrested you for no reason at all, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now Mr. Dorman, are you the same Lawrence Dorman that on December 21, 1973, was convicted of first degree burglary?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dorman that on the same date was convicted of attempted larceny?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dorman that on March 22, 1974, was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dorman that on November 9th, 1971, was convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon, a gun?
A. Yes, sir.
[The Prosecutor]: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Appellant’s counsel did not object to this reference to previous convictions. On redirect, appellant’s counsel brought out that appellant thought he had been appropriately punished for his previous offenses.10 The judge repeated the usual cautionary instruction after redirect and in his charge to the jury.
Appellant’s defense hinged on his argument that he was telling the truth and that the police officers who said he took the radio were not. The prosecutor therefore directed cross-examination questions to appellant’s credibility. This was a generally appropriate context in which to bring out previous convictions under § 14-305(b)(1). The last two questions before the impeachment by previous convictions, however, were not directed to credibility as were the questions that preceded them. We must decide whether these two questions elicited either a general denial of the larceny charge or a denial of a key element of that charge; if they did, then they should not have been juxtaposed with the prosecutor’s very next questions about appellant’s past burglary and attempted larceny convictions. We must weigh the impact of the cross-examination in the context of appellant’s claim that the prosecutor’s conduct amounted to plain error, for appellant neither objected nor moved for mistrial or new trial.
Although the last two questions before the previous conviction impeachment followed a series of questions directed generally to credibility, the two questions themselves were such that it was inappropriate to place them in juxtaposition with prior conviction impeachment. The first of them elicited appellant’s flat denial that he had “touched” the radio. While, strictly speaking, “taking” rather than “touching” is an element of larceny, see Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.55 (3d ed. 1978), we have grave doubts that the jury would distinguish between “taking” and “touching” when all the government’s evidence showed that appel[464]*464lant had picked up the radio and carried it away.
The second of the two questions preceding impeachment presented appellant with a summary of his account of the incident. He responded, predictably, with what was, in effect, a general denial of his guilt. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor examined appellant on his previous convictions for burglary, attempted larceny, and other offenses.
We think that the jury would naturally and necessarily have taken this particular sequence of questions and answers as implying that appellant, convicted in the past of burglary and attempted larceny, had stolen the radio. Thus, the questioning constituted error.11 The next question is whether the error, to which the defense made no objection, was plain error. We hold that it was not.
In deciding whether an error “jeopardize[d] the very fairness and integrity of the trial,” Watts, 362 A.2d at 709, we must look at all the evidence presented at trial; (Joseph) Brown v. United States, 387 A.2d 728, 731 (D.C.1978) (examining whether error “could have so affected appellant’s substantial rights as to cause a probable miscarriage of justice in light of the evidence produced by the government in this ease”); Adams v. United States, 302 A.2d 232, 235 (D.C.1973) (“[i]t is ... appropriate for us to view the evidence as a whole in resolving this unpreserved issue”).
The evidence against appellant in this case was overwhelming. The police officer who was acting as a decoy testified that he felt the radio being taken from his side. A few moments after the radio was taken, the officer opened his eyes and saw appellant walking away carrying the radio. A second officer watched appellant approach the decoy officer, pick up the radio, set it down, look in all directions, pick.it up again, and walk away with it. The second officer testified that appellant was carrying the radio when the officer arrested him. Two other police officers who were sitting in a nearby taxi saw appellant carrying the radio. Appellant, the only defense witness, testified that he was merely looking at the radio when several officers jumped on him from behind.
Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jury three times that the previous convictions pertained only to appellant’s credibility. That further reduced the possibility that the error undermined the very fairness of appellant’s trial.
Even if appellant had objected to the erroneous use of his previous convictions, we would affirm under a harmless error analysis. In light of the overwhelming evidence and the giving of cautionary instructions, we could say with fair assurance that the jury’s decision was not substantially swayed by the error.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of conviction is
Affirmed.