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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DORIS SMITH, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-5990-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 KAYLA BOWWER et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 The Court reviews pro se Plaintiff Doris Smith’s Amended Complaint under 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Smith files this action in forma pauperis (“IFP”), suing 15 Defendants Kayla Bowwer, Myla Nixon, and Melissa Garcia under 42 U.S.C. § 16 1983. Dkt. No. 12. Like the original complaint, Smith’s Amended Complaint centers 17 on interactions with Defendants during a number of family placement matters. Id. 18 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 19 action if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 20 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 21 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing 22 complaints under § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts necessarily consider only the operative 23 1 complaint. See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 2 that an amended complaint supersedes the original and renders the original of no
3 legal effect). 4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 5 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be 6 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 7 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 8 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro
9 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 10 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 11 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 12 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per 13 curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on district courts by Section 1915(e) are 14 unwavering, and when the court determines that a complaint filed by an IFP 15 plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, the action must be
16 dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 17 Even construing Smith’s Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that 18 it suffers from fundamental defects that she failed to cure. Smith alleges that 19 Defendants are all state employees of the Washington State Department of 20 Children, Youth, and Families (“DCYF”). Dkt. No. 12 at 1. Smith does not specify 21 whether she sues Defendants in their official or personal capacities. Either way, her
22 claims fail as a matter of law. 23 1 First, Smith’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred 2 by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Official-capacity claims
3 against state officials are, at their core, claims against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 4 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“We emphasized that official-capacity suits generally represent 5 only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 6 agent.”); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[The 7 court] treat[s] [the plaintiff’s] suit against state officials in their official capacities as 8 a suit against the state of California”). As a result, Smith’s claims against
9 Defendants in their official capacities are effectively claims against DCYF, a 10 Washington state department. 11 But with limited exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 12 Constitution bars lawsuits by a citizen against a state. Simmons v. Sacramento 13 Cnty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a 14 claim against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because 15 such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see Flint v. Dennison, 488
16 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate officials sued in their official capacities, . . . 17 are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore generally entitled 18 to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). 19 One exception to this general rule exists: “when sued for prospective 20 injunctive relief, a state official in [their] official capacity is considered a ‘person’ for 21 § 1983 purposes.” Malone v. Washington, No. 19-5574 RJB-JRC, 2020 WL 5817066,
22 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Lawrence 23 Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)). This is part of the Ex parte 1 Young doctrine. Doe, 131 F.3d at 839 (“In what has become known as part of the Ex 2 parte Young doctrine, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714
3 (1908), a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well- 4 established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). However, Smith does 5 not seek prospective relief—instead, she asks the Court to view Defendants’ prior 6 acts and find that they “violated [her] constitutional rights.” Dkt. No. 12 at 6. This 7 relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 8 Second, because the Eleventh Amendment does not “bar claims for damages
9 against state officials in their personal capacities[,]” the Court turns to Smith’s 10 Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their personal capacities. Mitchell v. 11 Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Individual or 12 personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official 13 for wrongful actions made under color of law “and that were taken in [the] course of 14 [their] official duties.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). 15 Like the allegations in Smith’s original complaint, those in the Amended
16 Complaint present only vague and conclusory statements about Defendants, which 17 fail to identify any constitutional right that was violated or explain how Defendants’ 18 alleged conduct caused a deprivation of such rights. Smith says that Bowwer 19 “contacted [her] to sign a Voluntary Placement Agreement (VPA)” and then 20 “stopped communicating[.]” Dkt. No. 12 at 3. Bowwer also made “inappropriate 21 comments,” false accusations, and “coached” Smith during hearings. Id. Smith
22 alleges that Bowwer approved an unlicensed placement of her daughter.
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DORIS SMITH, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-5990-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 KAYLA BOWWER et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 The Court reviews pro se Plaintiff Doris Smith’s Amended Complaint under 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Smith files this action in forma pauperis (“IFP”), suing 15 Defendants Kayla Bowwer, Myla Nixon, and Melissa Garcia under 42 U.S.C. § 16 1983. Dkt. No. 12. Like the original complaint, Smith’s Amended Complaint centers 17 on interactions with Defendants during a number of family placement matters. Id. 18 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 19 action if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 20 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 21 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing 22 complaints under § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts necessarily consider only the operative 23 1 complaint. See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 2 that an amended complaint supersedes the original and renders the original of no
3 legal effect). 4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 5 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be 6 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 7 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 8 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro
9 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 10 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 11 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 12 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per 13 curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on district courts by Section 1915(e) are 14 unwavering, and when the court determines that a complaint filed by an IFP 15 plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, the action must be
16 dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 17 Even construing Smith’s Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that 18 it suffers from fundamental defects that she failed to cure. Smith alleges that 19 Defendants are all state employees of the Washington State Department of 20 Children, Youth, and Families (“DCYF”). Dkt. No. 12 at 1. Smith does not specify 21 whether she sues Defendants in their official or personal capacities. Either way, her
22 claims fail as a matter of law. 23 1 First, Smith’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred 2 by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Official-capacity claims
3 against state officials are, at their core, claims against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 4 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“We emphasized that official-capacity suits generally represent 5 only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 6 agent.”); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[The 7 court] treat[s] [the plaintiff’s] suit against state officials in their official capacities as 8 a suit against the state of California”). As a result, Smith’s claims against
9 Defendants in their official capacities are effectively claims against DCYF, a 10 Washington state department. 11 But with limited exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 12 Constitution bars lawsuits by a citizen against a state. Simmons v. Sacramento 13 Cnty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a 14 claim against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because 15 such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see Flint v. Dennison, 488
16 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate officials sued in their official capacities, . . . 17 are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore generally entitled 18 to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). 19 One exception to this general rule exists: “when sued for prospective 20 injunctive relief, a state official in [their] official capacity is considered a ‘person’ for 21 § 1983 purposes.” Malone v. Washington, No. 19-5574 RJB-JRC, 2020 WL 5817066,
22 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Lawrence 23 Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)). This is part of the Ex parte 1 Young doctrine. Doe, 131 F.3d at 839 (“In what has become known as part of the Ex 2 parte Young doctrine, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714
3 (1908), a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well- 4 established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). However, Smith does 5 not seek prospective relief—instead, she asks the Court to view Defendants’ prior 6 acts and find that they “violated [her] constitutional rights.” Dkt. No. 12 at 6. This 7 relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 8 Second, because the Eleventh Amendment does not “bar claims for damages
9 against state officials in their personal capacities[,]” the Court turns to Smith’s 10 Section 1983 claims against Defendants in their personal capacities. Mitchell v. 11 Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Individual or 12 personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official 13 for wrongful actions made under color of law “and that were taken in [the] course of 14 [their] official duties.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). 15 Like the allegations in Smith’s original complaint, those in the Amended
16 Complaint present only vague and conclusory statements about Defendants, which 17 fail to identify any constitutional right that was violated or explain how Defendants’ 18 alleged conduct caused a deprivation of such rights. Smith says that Bowwer 19 “contacted [her] to sign a Voluntary Placement Agreement (VPA)” and then 20 “stopped communicating[.]” Dkt. No. 12 at 3. Bowwer also made “inappropriate 21 comments,” false accusations, and “coached” Smith during hearings. Id. Smith
22 alleges that Bowwer approved an unlicensed placement of her daughter. Garcia 23 allegedly made “defamatory statements in official records and kept an investigation 1 open on [Smith’s] other children without a founded case.” Id. at 2. Nixon allegedly 2 contacted Smith about “allegations later found unfounded” and “pressured [her] to
3 sign over parental rights[.]” Id. at 3. 4 Smith raised many of these allegations in her original complaint, which the 5 Court has already found deficient. They suffer from the same shortcomings—taking 6 Smith’s allegations as true, the Court accepts that she had issues with Defendants 7 in relation to a family placement dispute, but the interactions alleged in the 8 complaint do not amount to a constitutional violation. Moreover, “social workers are
9 entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions connected 10 with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.” Meyers v. Contra 11 Costa County Dep’t of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). 12 Therefore, without factual allegations connecting Defendants’ specific conduct to a 13 deprivation of constitutional rights, Smith’s Amended Complaint fails to state a 14 plausible claim for relief under Section 1983. 15 The Court has already given Smith leave to amend. Dkt. No. 10 at 3–4. It
16 also warned that failure to state a plausible claim in the Amended Complaint would 17 result in dismissal. Thus, the Court finds it futile to allow Smith leave to amend a 18 second time. 19 20 21
22 23 1 In sum, the Court DISMISSES Smith’s case with prejudice. The Clerk is
9 directed to close this case.
3 Dated this 1st day of May, 2026.
5 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23