Dorina Lockhart v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: September 18, 2013
• Docket: A13A1274
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIRST DIVISION PHIPPS, C. J., ELLINGTON, P. J., and BRANCH, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

September 18, 2013

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A13A1274. LOCKHART v. THE STATE.

PHIPPS, Chief Judge.

Dorina Lockhart was convicted of committing the following offenses against

her husband’s nephews: (i) child molestation against D. G., by touching the child’s

penis with her vagina;1 and (ii) statutory rape against that child’s brother, T. G.2 On

appeal, Lockhart challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

1 OCGA § 16-6-4. 2 OCGA § 16-6-3. essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 3 So viewed, the evidence

at the jury trial showed the following.

D. G., the subject of the child molestation charge, was 14 years old at the time

of the trial. He recounted that his relationship with Lockhart changed when she began

sending him Facebook messages. In one, she had asked him whether he liked her

“more than an auntie”; in latter ones, she had added sexual content – asking, for

example, about the size of his penis and whether it was big enough for her.

Eventually, D. G. had two separate incidents of sexual contact with Lockhart. He

testified that the first encounter occurred in a room at his grandparents’ house;

Lockhart removed her clothing, pulled down his shorts and boxers, and “grinded” on

him by rubbing her vagina against his exposed penis. D. G. testified that the second

encounter had occurred in Lockhart’s vehicle; after she parked it one night in the

driveway of his residence, Lockhart performed oral sex on him.

T. G., the subject of the statutory rape charge, was 15 years old at the time of

the trial. He recounted that he, too, had intimate communications with Lockhart using

Facebook, and had two separate instances of sexual contact with Lockhart. The first

3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979) (emphasis in original).

2 encounter, T. G. testified, occurred one afternoon in Lockhart’s car after she parked

it in a desolate location; Lockhart performed oral sex on him and they engaged in

sexual intercourse. The second encounter, T. G. testified, occurred one evening at

Lockhart’s home; they engaged in sexual intercourse.

D. G.’s and T. G’s mother testified that, when she overheard a conversation

between T. G. and another of her sons, she began suspecting inappropriate contact

between Lockhart (who was her brother’s wife) and D. G. Subsequently, after T. G.

used his mother’s cell phone to access Facebook without logging out, she used her

cell phone to read what she discerned were Facebook exchanges between not only

D. G. and Lockart, but also between T. G. and Lockart. After discussing with D. G.

and T. G. what she had read, she reported the matter to police.

During an ensuing investigation, Lockhart submitted to an interview on May

20, 2011 by a deputy sheriff. After waiving her Miranda rights, Lockhart admitted to

having “inappropriate” Facebook exchanges with D. G. and with T. G., and admitted

that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with T. G., but denied having had any

sexual contact with D. G. She revealed that, during the time in question,4 she was 22

4 The indictment alleged that the child molestation was committed between January 1, 2011 and January 31, 2011, and that the statutory rape was committed between February 1, 2011 and February 28, 2011.

3 years old. The jury was presented an audio-video recording of Lockhart’s interview.

Lockhart elected not to testify, nor call any witnesses.

On appeal, Lockhart claims that certain of the state’s witnesses were not

credible and that the state’s case contained additional weaknesses and inconsistences.

But “we do not . . . judge the credibility of witnesses, a job that rests squarely with

the jury.”5 Moreover,

any evidentiary weaknesses, conflicts, or inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve. We do not speculate which evidence the jury chose to believe or disbelieve. Where as here, there was sufficient evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the state’s case, we must uphold the jury’s verdict.6

Judgment affirmed. Ellington, P. J., and Branch, J., concur.

5 Hammontree v. State, 283 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) (642 SE2d 412) (2007) (citations omitted). 6 Dix v. State, 307 Ga. App. 684, 686 (1) (705 SE2d 903) (2011) (footnote and punctuation omitted). At the time of Lockhart’s trial in 2012, OCGA § 24-4-8 provided that “[t]he testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact”; OCGA § 16-6-3 (a) provided that “no conviction shall be had for [statutory rape] on the unsupported testimony of the victim.” See Williamson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 421, 423-424 (1) (b) (727 SE2d 211) (2012) (quantum of corroboration needed in a statutory rape case is not that which is in itself sufficient to convict the accused, but only that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged; slight circumstances may be sufficient corroboration, and ultimately the question of corroboration is one for the jury); Hammontree, supra (victim’s testimony alone may suffice to establish the elements of child molestation).