PHILLIPS, Justice.
This cause of action arose out of an automobile-pedestrian accident in which Phillip Doran, a minor 8i/¿ years old at the time of the accident, was struck by an automobile driven by Marsha Lynn Eaton, also a minor 15 years 8 months old at the time of [368]*368the accident. The automobile that Marsha Lynn Eaton was driving at the time was owned by Mrs. Pat Billingsley. Suit against the driver of the car and the owner thereof was brought by Arthur Doran, individually and as next friend for his son, Phillip. R. T. Eaton, Jr., father of the driver, was appointed by the court as guardian ad litem for his minor daughter, Marsha Lynn Eaton. Mrs. Billingsley’s husband, Mr. William H. Billingsley, was joined as a defendant.
After the plaintiff had presented his case, the trial court granted an interlocutory order and judgment, severing plaintiff’s cause against Mrs. Billingsley, the owner of the •car, and her husband and ordered that plaintiff take nothing as to these defendants.
The jury returned findings that both the pedestrian plaintiff and driver defendant of the car were negligent and that the negligence of each was the proximate cause of the accident. On this verdict the court entered judgment that plaintiff take nothing. From this judgment plaintiff has duly perfected his appeal to this Court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Because of the number of parties involved, the parties will be referred to in this opinion by their position in the court below or by their proper names.
We will consider plaintiff’s points of error two through six first as they are grouped together and because together they raise the issues of contributory negligence, which issues determine this case. These points are that the trial court erred in overruling plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, that there was either no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the issues that the minor plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and the issues as to proximate cause relating to each issue as to proper lookout.
The accident in question occurred on a bridge on Buffalo Speedway in Houston, Harris County, Texas, between 3:30 and 4 P.M. on a bright, clear afternoon. Buffalo Speedway extends north and south, consists of two traffic lanes running north and two running south divided by an esplanade. The speedway is straight and level and there are no obstructions near the part of the speedway in question to obstruct one’s vision in any direction. Just before the accident, the minor plaintiff was located on the east edge of a bridge on the speedway. There was another minor boy with him. A third minor boy was located on the west side along the edge of the bridge. The defendant driver, Marsha Eaton, was proceeding south in Mrs. Billingsley’s car at what the evidence shows to be approximately twenty miles an hour. The minor boy who had been with the plaintiff on the east side of the speedway and on the edge of the bridge, ran across the speedway over to the minor who was located on the west side of the speedway and the plaintiff followed at a run some six feet behind him. Before plaintiff had run across the southbound lanes, he was struck by the car driven by defendant Marsha Eaton.
At the time of the accident there was an auto driven by a Mrs. Neyland headed north on the speedway. Mrs. Neyland saw the accident. Mrs. Neyland stopped immediately and rendered aid to the fallen plaintiff until help arrived. Mrs. Neyland testified that she had seen the auto driven by the defendant Eaton from the time that it had turned onto the speedway some two blocks north of the bridge where the accident occurred. There were no other autos close to the scene of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that any findings of his failure to keep a proper lookout must be set aside as there was no direct evidence that he so failed to keep a proper lookout. We cannot agree with this contention and the cases cited by the plaintiff do not so hold.
Kelly v. Hamm, Tex.Civ.App., 337 S.W.2d 608, writ ref. n. r. e., cited by plaintiff does not support plaintiff’s contention but [369]*369holds that even where the jury had found that minor plaintiff had failed to keep a proper lookout, the preponderance of the evidence was that he had kept a proper lookout. The court noted that there was no direct evidence that he had not kept a proper lookout and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
In Blunt v. H. G. Berning, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 773, writ refused, a minor was struck while crossing a street. The minor did not testify but her mother was allowed to testify that the child had stated that she had not seen the truck coming. There were two other witnesses to the accident but they could not say whether or not the child had stopped before crossing or had failed to look in both directions before attempting to cross. Even so, the jury found that (issue 9) the child failed to stop before attempting to cross, failed (issue 10) to keep a lookout for defendant’s truck; and (issue 11) failed to look in both directions before attempting to cross. The court in concerning itself only with the failure of the child to keep a proper lookout stated:
“The law very clearly imposes upon each and every person proceeding along or across a public highway or street the duty of maintaining a ‘proper lookout’ for his own safety, the term importing such lookout as a person of ordinary prudence would have kept under the same or similar circumstances; in the case at bar and court charge the jury being further instructed that ordinary care when referring to plaintiff ‘means that degree of care which would be used by a person of ordinary prudence, of Donnie Faye Blunt’s age, experience, capacity, intelligence and discretion * * ”
In affirming the jury’s finding that the minor had failed to keep a proper lookout the court stated the law as follows:
“Otherwise stated, defensive issue No. 10, on lookout, presenting, as it does, the question of whether a reasonably prudent child of plaintiff’s age, experience, capacity, intelligence and education would have acted differently under the same or similar circumstances, was for determination by the jury; and the court’s judgment in consequence of findings adverse to a recovery must be affirmed.”
In Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273, the Texas Supreme Court held that negligence and causation, like any other ultimate fact, may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. That the jury is thus not only the judge of the facts and circumstances proven but may also draw reasonable inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced before it.
The issue on lookout presented to the jury in the case at bar was framed substantially as that in the Blunt case, above, and the jury had evidence of probative value from the facts and circumstances proven and the reasonable inferences and deductions drawn therefrom to find that the plaintiff had failed to keep a proper lookout.
Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court in entering an interlocutory take nothing judgment in favor of defendants Mrs. Pat Billingsley, the owner of the car, and her husband.
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PHILLIPS, Justice.
This cause of action arose out of an automobile-pedestrian accident in which Phillip Doran, a minor 8i/¿ years old at the time of the accident, was struck by an automobile driven by Marsha Lynn Eaton, also a minor 15 years 8 months old at the time of [368]*368the accident. The automobile that Marsha Lynn Eaton was driving at the time was owned by Mrs. Pat Billingsley. Suit against the driver of the car and the owner thereof was brought by Arthur Doran, individually and as next friend for his son, Phillip. R. T. Eaton, Jr., father of the driver, was appointed by the court as guardian ad litem for his minor daughter, Marsha Lynn Eaton. Mrs. Billingsley’s husband, Mr. William H. Billingsley, was joined as a defendant.
After the plaintiff had presented his case, the trial court granted an interlocutory order and judgment, severing plaintiff’s cause against Mrs. Billingsley, the owner of the •car, and her husband and ordered that plaintiff take nothing as to these defendants.
The jury returned findings that both the pedestrian plaintiff and driver defendant of the car were negligent and that the negligence of each was the proximate cause of the accident. On this verdict the court entered judgment that plaintiff take nothing. From this judgment plaintiff has duly perfected his appeal to this Court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Because of the number of parties involved, the parties will be referred to in this opinion by their position in the court below or by their proper names.
We will consider plaintiff’s points of error two through six first as they are grouped together and because together they raise the issues of contributory negligence, which issues determine this case. These points are that the trial court erred in overruling plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, that there was either no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the issues that the minor plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and the issues as to proximate cause relating to each issue as to proper lookout.
The accident in question occurred on a bridge on Buffalo Speedway in Houston, Harris County, Texas, between 3:30 and 4 P.M. on a bright, clear afternoon. Buffalo Speedway extends north and south, consists of two traffic lanes running north and two running south divided by an esplanade. The speedway is straight and level and there are no obstructions near the part of the speedway in question to obstruct one’s vision in any direction. Just before the accident, the minor plaintiff was located on the east edge of a bridge on the speedway. There was another minor boy with him. A third minor boy was located on the west side along the edge of the bridge. The defendant driver, Marsha Eaton, was proceeding south in Mrs. Billingsley’s car at what the evidence shows to be approximately twenty miles an hour. The minor boy who had been with the plaintiff on the east side of the speedway and on the edge of the bridge, ran across the speedway over to the minor who was located on the west side of the speedway and the plaintiff followed at a run some six feet behind him. Before plaintiff had run across the southbound lanes, he was struck by the car driven by defendant Marsha Eaton.
At the time of the accident there was an auto driven by a Mrs. Neyland headed north on the speedway. Mrs. Neyland saw the accident. Mrs. Neyland stopped immediately and rendered aid to the fallen plaintiff until help arrived. Mrs. Neyland testified that she had seen the auto driven by the defendant Eaton from the time that it had turned onto the speedway some two blocks north of the bridge where the accident occurred. There were no other autos close to the scene of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that any findings of his failure to keep a proper lookout must be set aside as there was no direct evidence that he so failed to keep a proper lookout. We cannot agree with this contention and the cases cited by the plaintiff do not so hold.
Kelly v. Hamm, Tex.Civ.App., 337 S.W.2d 608, writ ref. n. r. e., cited by plaintiff does not support plaintiff’s contention but [369]*369holds that even where the jury had found that minor plaintiff had failed to keep a proper lookout, the preponderance of the evidence was that he had kept a proper lookout. The court noted that there was no direct evidence that he had not kept a proper lookout and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
In Blunt v. H. G. Berning, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 773, writ refused, a minor was struck while crossing a street. The minor did not testify but her mother was allowed to testify that the child had stated that she had not seen the truck coming. There were two other witnesses to the accident but they could not say whether or not the child had stopped before crossing or had failed to look in both directions before attempting to cross. Even so, the jury found that (issue 9) the child failed to stop before attempting to cross, failed (issue 10) to keep a lookout for defendant’s truck; and (issue 11) failed to look in both directions before attempting to cross. The court in concerning itself only with the failure of the child to keep a proper lookout stated:
“The law very clearly imposes upon each and every person proceeding along or across a public highway or street the duty of maintaining a ‘proper lookout’ for his own safety, the term importing such lookout as a person of ordinary prudence would have kept under the same or similar circumstances; in the case at bar and court charge the jury being further instructed that ordinary care when referring to plaintiff ‘means that degree of care which would be used by a person of ordinary prudence, of Donnie Faye Blunt’s age, experience, capacity, intelligence and discretion * * ”
In affirming the jury’s finding that the minor had failed to keep a proper lookout the court stated the law as follows:
“Otherwise stated, defensive issue No. 10, on lookout, presenting, as it does, the question of whether a reasonably prudent child of plaintiff’s age, experience, capacity, intelligence and education would have acted differently under the same or similar circumstances, was for determination by the jury; and the court’s judgment in consequence of findings adverse to a recovery must be affirmed.”
In Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273, the Texas Supreme Court held that negligence and causation, like any other ultimate fact, may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. That the jury is thus not only the judge of the facts and circumstances proven but may also draw reasonable inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced before it.
The issue on lookout presented to the jury in the case at bar was framed substantially as that in the Blunt case, above, and the jury had evidence of probative value from the facts and circumstances proven and the reasonable inferences and deductions drawn therefrom to find that the plaintiff had failed to keep a proper lookout.
Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court in entering an interlocutory take nothing judgment in favor of defendants Mrs. Pat Billingsley, the owner of the car, and her husband. Plaintiff contends that the defendant driver of the car, Miss Eaton, had a nearsighted eye condition for which she had to wear prescription glasses, that she had special sun glasses to correct this nearsightedness, that it was necessary to wear glasses while driving, that defendant Bill-ingsley knew that defendant driver Miss. Eaton had to wear glasses to see well at a distance, that defendant Billingsley never cautioned defendant driver Eaton to wear her glasses while driving their car, that this was negligence and the proximate cause of the accident. There is evidence that defendant Eaton was trying to put on her glasses at the time of the accident and had not seen the minor plaintiff.
[370]*370Due to the fact that the jury found the minor plaintiff to have been contribu-torily negligent, it is not necessary for the purpose of this opinion to decide whether or not the plaintiff’s pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial were sufficient to raise the issue of negligent entrustment. Contributory negligence is a defense to negligent entrustment. Webb v. Karsten, Tex.Civ.App., 308 S.W.2d 114, Hardage v. Rouly, Tex.Civ.App., 349 S.W.2d 616, writ ref. n. r. e.
Plaintiff assigns error to the jury’s finding that plaintiff had incurred $1,000.00 in damages for mental pain and anguish plus $1,635.25 for medical and hospital bills and that such finding was manifestly inadequate and unjust. Again we point out that the finding of contributory negligence on the part of the minor plaintiff is a bar to damages, thus we need not consider whether the awards were inadequate. Southern Pine Lumber Company v. Andrade, Tex.Com.App., 132 Tex. 372, 124 S.W.2d 334, opinion adopted by Supreme Court.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial because of jury misconduct when Juror Stephens and other members of the jury openly agreed that Juror Stephens would vote for $1,000.00 damages in answer to special issue No. 11 in return for other jurors answering “we do” to special issues 8 and 9 or the issues on contributory negligence.
The trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion for new trial and testimony was taken. Plaintiff contends that the evidence given by Jurors Kebodeaux, Gilbert and Carmichael was such that the case should be remanded for new trial. We cannot agree.
Juror Kebodeaux when asked about his discussion with Juror Stephens concerning his vote answered:
“Yes, sir. We voted eleven to one on the amount in the settlement, and Mr. Stephens was the one individual that voted differently. He said that he would not change his mind unless we agreed to change ours on this other issue; that the child was partly in fault. The rest of us compromised then, and speaking for myself I personally compromised in that one issue, not knowing the end results, what it would be.”
Juror Gilbert stated:
“Well, he indicated by his talk to me that he thought no child, any child, should be out on the street, and if they should be injured, while they were on the street, they should not be entitled to collect damages.”
Juror Carmichael testified as follows:
“Immediately after we got in the deliberation room, we were confronted with the opinion of this Mr. Stephens that he felt that the child had no right as a child to be confronted, actually, in court, that he had no right as a child to be in court on behalf of this accident.”
Jurors Kebodeaux, Gilbert and Carmichael further testified to changing their vote on the questions of proper lookout on the part of the plaintiff and the related issue of proximate cause in turn for Juror Stephens changing his vote on the damage issues and agreeing to vote for the amount of damages found.
Juror Stephens categorically denied the above mentioned charges and Juror Anderson, the foreman, also denied that any misconduct occurred.
At the conclusion of the testimony on this motion, the trial court denied the motion. There are no findings of fact or conclusions of law before us so all reasonable intendments must be resolved in favor of the judgment. We hold that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to have ruled as he did.
From the statements quoted above it was just as reasonable for the trial judge [371]*371to have concluded that Juror Stephens had very strong convictions concerning the contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff because of his conduct on the particular day and in the particular place that the accident occurred, as it would have been for him to have concluded, as urged by plaintiff, that Juror Stephens was opposed to any child collecting damages from any accident such as this. The former view would have been a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts presented at the trial, the latter would have been an unreasonable bias. As to any trading that may have occurred, there was conflicting testimony and the trial court found that there had been no misconduct in this regard. The trial court has the same latitude in passing upon the evidence offered on the hearing on a motion for new trial as to the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony, as a jury has with regard to witnesses heard upon the original trial. Bradley v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Com.App., 1 S.W.2d 861, opinion adopted by Supreme Court.
Affirmed.