DoorDash, Inc. v. City Of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 22, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-07695
StatusUnknown

This text of DoorDash, Inc. v. City Of New York (DoorDash, Inc. v. City Of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DoorDash, Inc. v. City Of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOORDASH, INC.,

Plaintiff,

-v- CIVIL ACTION NO.: 21 Civ. 7695 (AT) (SLC)

21 Civ. 10347 (AT) (SLC) CITY OF NEW YORK, 21 Civ. 10602 (AT) (SLC)

Defendant. DISCOVERY ORDER

PORTIER, LLC,

-v-

CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant.

GRUBHUB, INC.,

Plaintiff, -v-

SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

In these consolidated actions, Plaintiffs DoorDash, Inc. (“DoorDash”), Portier, LLC (“Portier”), and GrubHub, Inc. (“GrubHub,” together, “Plaintiffs”), challenge an ordinance adopted by Defendant City of New York (the “City”), requiring certain third-party food ordering and delivery platforms to disclose their customers’ personal information to restaurants (the “Ordinance”).1 (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 1 & n.1, DoorDash, Inc. v City of New York, No. 21 Civ. 7695 (S.D.N.Y.) (the “DoorDash Action”)).2 Plaintiffs assert that the Ordinance violates, inter alia, the First Amendment, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, the

Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and several provisions of the New York State Constitution. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 66–162). Following several extensions, fact discovery closed on May 16, 2023. (ECF Nos. 33; 66; 79; 82; 87; 88; 93; 94; 105). Plaintiffs agreed to “coordinate and consolidate joint or substantively identical discovery requests to the City wherever possible” and sought to “avoid burdening the

Court or the parties with unnecessarily duplicative discovery submissions.” (ECF No. 39; see ECF No. 43 (order requiring coordination)). Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ letter-motion asking the Court to compel the City to respond to an additional 20 contention interrogatories and to supplement its response to three contention interrogatories. (ECF No. 107 (the “Motion”)). The City opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 110). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

A. Legal Standard Interrogatories are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33, which permits a party to serve up to 25 interrogatories “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1)), to “inquire into any discoverable matter.” Now-Casting Econ., Ltd. v. Econ. Alchemy LLC, No. 18 Civ. 2442 (JPC) (SLC), 2021 WL 423473, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2)). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 and Local Rule 33.3 permit the use of

1 N.Y.C. Int. No. 2311-A (adding section 20-847.3 to subchapter 22 of chapter 5 of title 20 of the New York City Administrative Code). 2 For simplicity, the Court cites ECF numbers in the DoorDash Action. contention interrogatories, the purpose of which are ‘to assist parties in narrowing and clarifying the disputed issue[s] and reducing the possibility of surprise at trial.’” In re Keurig Green Mtn. Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., No. 14 Md. 2542 (VSB) (SLC), 2020 WL 6290584, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting Kyoei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M/V Maritime Antalya, 248 F.R.D. 126, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33; U.S. Dist. Ct. R. S. & E.D.N.Y., Civ. R. 33.3 (“Rule 33.3”). “A party served with interrogatories under Rule 33 has a duty to ‘compile information within [its] control’ and provide ‘all information available’ in [its] responses.” Rivera v. UPS, 325 F.R.D. 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co. LTD., 309

F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2015)); accord In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 196 F.R.D. 444, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). “Courts generally resist efforts to use contention interrogatories as a vehicle to obtain every fact and piece of evidence a party may wish to offer concerning a given issue at trial.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04 Civ. 2799 (NG) (VVP), 2012 WL 957970, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2012). Rule 33 “permits contention interrogatories [that are] mixed questions of law and fact[,]” but not

questions that seek an answer of “pure law.” Trueman v. N.Y. State Canal Corp., No. 09 Civ. 49 (LEK) (RFT), 2010 WL 681341, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010); see Kendrick v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 1, 2, 4 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting that hypothetical legal questions and discovery as to legal arguments are impermissible). “A contention interrogatory is proper where it asks the party to ‘explain the factual bases for [that party’s] contentions by providing the material facts upon which they will rely, but not a detailed and exhaustive listing all the evidence that will be offered.’” Keurig, 2020

WL 6290584, at *3 (quoting Linde and collecting cases describing party’s obligation in responding to contention interrogatories). B. Application 1. Additional Interrogatories As noted above, Rule 33(a)(1) generally limits parties to 25 interrogatories unless they

otherwise agree or the court, in its discretion, so orders. See Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6198 (LAK) (JCF), 2007 WL 1521117, at *8 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007) (noting that “the decision to consider multiple parties as one for the purposes of Rule 33(a) is within the discretion of the court”). When parties “are acting in unison and are represented by the same counsel, they may be treated as one party for purposes of the interrogatory limits.”

Gucci Am., Inc. v. Exclusive Imports Int’l, No. 99 Civ. 11490 (RCC) (FM), 2002 WL 1870293, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002) (rejecting six defendants’ request to serve 150 interrogatories and limiting them to 45); see 8B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2168.1 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that “in some instances nominally separate parties should be considered one party for purposes of the 25-interrogatory limitation”). Here, the City served 25 interrogatories on each of the three Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs

previously served a collective 55 interrogatories on the City. (ECF No. 107 at 1). Plaintiffs did so in two phases: In 2022, Plaintiffs served a combined set of 20 interrogatories; in late March 2023, DoorDash served an additional 15 interrogatories and Portier and GrubHub served 10 each, for a total of 35 additional interrogatories (the “Second Interrogatories”). (ECF No. 107). Of the Second Interrogatories, the City responded to the first five from each Plaintiff’s set and objected to the remainder as exceeding the limit in Rule 33(a)(1). (Id.; see ECF Nos. 107-1 at 6, 12–17;

107-2 at 5–6, 12–15; 107-3 at 5–6, 12–14; 110 at 2 n.2). As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the City somehow waived its right to object to the number of the Second Interrogatories. (ECF No. 107 at 2). The City raised the numerosity objection in its responses and in the parties’ meet and confer, which is sufficient

under Rule 33(b)(2) and (4). Further, when subparts are included, the Second Interrogatories total considerably more than 35, which is in addition to the 55 the City has already answered. For example, DoorDash’s Second Interrogatory No. 6 states: In Your First Defense in Your Answer, You contend that “Plaintiff [DoorDash] lacks standing to maintain this action against Defendant.” Identify whether the City continues to contend that Plaintiff DoorDash lacks standing, and if so, describe the factual basis for such contention.

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Related

United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co.
309 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Melendez v. City of New York
16 F.4th 992 (Second Circuit, 2021)
In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation
196 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. New York, 2000)
Kyoei Fire & Marine Insurance v. M/V Maritime Antalya
248 F.R.D. 126 (S.D. New York, 2007)
Kendrick v. Sullivan
125 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 1989)

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